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ARTICLE I.—THE ECCLESIASTICAL MIRACLES.

- 1.—*Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers which are supposed to have subsisted in the Christian Church, from the Earliest Ages through several successive Centuries.* By CONYERS MIDDLETON.
- 2.—*J. H. Newman on Miracles.* (Prefixed to his Translation of a portion of *Fleury's Ecclesiastical History.*)
- 3.—“*Miracles and Supernatural Gifts not discontinued.*” Chap. xiv. of *Dr. Bushnell's Nature and the Supernatural.*

WE propose, in this article, to treat of the ecclesiastical, in distinction from the scriptural, miracles. Under this designation we include all the miracles reported by uninspired Christian writers, as having been wrought subsequently to the times of the apostles. The history of the Christian church in the early centuries abounds with accounts of such miracles. And even now, it is not only claimed by certain small and fanatical sects, in different parts of the world, that miracles are still performed among themselves, but this claim is insisted on as one of the distinguishing marks of a true church by the most numerous of all the divisions of the nominally Christian world. Although these things are very generally known, yet it has so long been a received maxim among Protestants that the age of miracles is passed, and the opinion, on whatsoever grounds, that they ceased with the apostolic age, has been so nearly universal, that any formal discussion of the

subject is likely to seem to many a vain waste of time and words.

But the ground of long settled and widely prevailing beliefs needs to be from time to time reëxamined ; and even when no new conclusion is to be reached, and no new proposition maintained, it may still be very useful to review carefully the kind and degree of evidence on which the true and time-honored opinion rests. And such an examination is all the more timely, in view of the fact that one of the most brilliant and popular of our religious writers seems inclined to favor the belief that miracles are even now wrought among us. Let us, in the outset, notice several important considerations, which commend the alleged miracles of the early church to a renewed and careful examination.

The early Christian writers not only claim that miracles were actually and abundantly wrought in their day, and before their eyes, but they lay much stress upon them as an evidence of the truth of the Christian religion, and they distinctly call upon the heathen to receive it upon this evidence. Nothing can exceed the unqualified confidence with which this claim is put forth. In many instances, these miracles are described with great particularity — places, names, and dates being given. And some of those who report them to us, profess to have examined them with great care ; to have subjected the evidence to the severest tests ; to have drawn up accurate and certified accounts of them at the times and places in which they were wrought ; and so to have used every discreet precaution as to exclude all imposture and exaggeration. This is eminently true in one notable instance, to which we shall have occasion hereafter to refer.

We have already alluded to the fact, that the question of the genuineness of these miracles has an important place in the controversy between the Roman Catholics and the Protestants. The Roman Catholic writers claim that miracles have never ceased to be wrought in the *true* church of Christ ; and that any church which admits the maxim that the age of miracles is past, virtually abdicates, by that very admission, its title to be regarded as the *true* church. The alleged mira-

cles with which our present inquiry is principally concerned, belong, it is true, to a remoter antiquity than the Papal system can justly claim ; but the advocates of that system maintain that the miracles wrought in their church at the present day are connected, in an uninterrupted series, with those of the primitive ages ; and it is confessedly difficult to draw any distinct line of separation between the ecclesiastical miracles of ancient and of modern times,—the more difficult the further we recede from the very first age after the apostles. This particular point in the Roman Catholic controversy has not yet attracted much attention in our country ; but those who are familiar with the writings of recent Catholic scholars, such as Mr. J. H. Newman, need not be told that, in the hands of an able and ingenious Romanist, the argument from this source may easily be made to embarrass an inexperienced defender of the Protestant faith.

But the most important consideration of all, in recommending the subject of the present inquiry to the serious attention of Christian scholars, is the obvious bearing which it has upon the evidences of Christianity. If we reject the ecclesiastical miracles as spurious, we must be able to show a clear distinction between them and the miracles of Scripture. We must beware of a reckless criticism ; we must take heed that the grounds on which we reject the miracles of the church be not such as to bring into any just suspicion the miracles of Scripture ; we must be careful, lest our attempts to overthrow the edifice of ecclesiastical superstition should result in undermining one of the evidences of revealed religion. We must seek for some discriminating tests, by the application of which the genuineness of the latter class of miracles can be clearly shown to be unimpeachable, even if all the former class should be pronounced fictitious. As Christians, we are all believers in miracles. To make this just and clear discrimination may not be quite so easy as those imagine who have given no particular attention to the subject.

The above considerations may suffice to show that an examination of the nature and degree of the evidence for the alleged miracles of the post-apostolical church is not altogether an idle and unfruitful inquiry.

In commencing such an investigation, it is pertinent to inquire in the outset, whether the teachings of Scripture afford us any *a priori* evidence in the case, — any ground of antecedent probability, — for or against the continuance of miracles in the church after the apostolic age. If their continuance is plainly foretold in the word of God, then the question of fact is decisively and forever settled ; then it is certain that genuine miracles did continue to be wrought ; and no matter how abundant false pretensions to miraculous powers may be found, no matter how absurd or ridiculous in their character, no matter how deficient in credible evidence, some, or many, or most of the alleged miraculous events may be, it is certain that *some genuine miracles* have *somewhere* been wrought. If the Scriptures unequivocally declare that miraculous powers are a perpetual sign by which the true church of Christ is to be distinguished from false, apostate, or heretical churches, then it is certain that such powers have never ceased to be exercised ; for it is certain that the true church of Christ has never been extinct — that the gates of hell have never prevailed against it. If the tenor of prophetic Scripture, as a whole, seems, when fairly interpreted, to *favor* the doctrine of the perpetuity of such miraculous interpositions, then we shall enter upon the historical and critical part of our inquiry, predisposed to receive whatever testimony we find in their favor ; and this will inevitably and justly have no little influence upon our minds in forming our estimate of the value of the testimony in particular cases of reputed miracles. If, again, the Scriptures evidently intimate that miracles were to cease with the apostolic age, or soon after, then all such accounts of their occurrence at a later date must, of course, be spurious ; and any critical examination of such accounts is superfluous, except for the purpose of making “assurance doubly sure,” by detecting and exposing the particular fallacy or weakness in the testimony, which we know beforehand to be insufficient and invalid. And, once more, if the Scriptures furnish us with any practical test, by which true miracles may be distinguished from false, the application of this test may enable us to form a safe and decisive judgment, where other evidence

may be inconclusive. Let us now address ourselves to the examination of this *a priori* evidence.

Do we then find in the teachings of Scripture any intimation that miracles were to be perpetual in the church? There is one remarkable sentence in our Lord's latest words to his disciples, which has been understood by many as conveying such an intimation. It is contained in the closing verses of the gospel of Mark. Just before his ascension, He gave this commission to his disciples: "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." He accompanied this commission with a solemn declaration of the consequences, to each soul, of accepting or rejecting that gospel: "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." And then follow these words: "And these signs shall follow them that believe; in my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover." It is recorded, in the last verse of the same chapter, that "they went forth and preached every where, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following." (Mark xvi: 15—18, 20.)

Mr. Newman, in his treatise on the Ecclesiastical Miracles, lays great stress on this passage. We quote a few sentences: "It might indeed have been anticipated, that among the hopes and duties with which He animated his desponding disciples when He was leaving them, some mention might occur of those supernatural powers, which had been the most ready proof of his own divinity, and the most awful of the endowments with which during his ministry He had invested them. Nor does He disappoint the expectation; for in the passage alluded to He distinctly announces a continuation of these pledges of his favor, and that without fixing the term of it. At the very time apparently when he said unto them, 'Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world,' He also gave them two promises, one for this life, and the other for the life to come. 'He that believeth and is bap-

tized shall be saved,' was for the future ; and the precious promise, which concerns us here, ran thus : 'These signs shall follow them that believe,' &c."*

Among Protestant theologians, Grotius, Barrow, Dodwell, Tillotson, and some others, have inferred from these words of our Lord, that miracles might be expected to continue in the church in all time, at least in connection with missions to the heathen. The circumstance that the words were spoken in close connection with the commission to "go into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature," and the fact that the heathen have not those manifold evidences of the truth of the gospel, on the ground of which persons in Christian lands may be justly required to yield an immediate faith and submission to its claims, seem to have been the reasons which led their minds to this conclusion.

But we think that a careful examination of our Lord's statement, in connection with the light thrown upon it by other related passages, will show that it fails to justify, not only the broad conclusion of Mr. Newman, but even the more limited inference of the Protestant writers above named.

The argument of Newman rests partly upon the supposition that the words recorded by Mark were spoken at the same time with the promise recorded by Matthew, "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." This supposition, to say the least, is not sufficiently certain to be capable of adding any considerable weight to his interpretation. Whether the words were spoken on the same occasion or not, it is worthy of notice that the promise of *perpetuity*, which is expressly connected with his presence, is not connected with the predicted signs which should follow them that believe. The Lord did not say that these signs should follow them "alway, even unto the end of the world." And we have no more right to interpolate the word "alway" into this last promise, than we have to insert the word "all ;" we have no more right to say, "these signs shall *always* follow them that believe," than we have to say, "these signs shall follow *all*

* Lect. IV, p. 79. See also Lect. IV, pp. 90, 91.

them that believe." It is true, as Mr. Newman observes, that our Lord does not fix any limit to these predicted signs; but it does not necessarily follow from that omission that they must be perpetual. That question must be determined by other evidence. What, then, can we gather from other places of Scripture, as to the extent to which these signs did actually follow them that believed? Even before the words which we are now examining were spoken, the like signs had been promised by the Lord to the apostles and the seventy disciples. (Matt. x: 8; Mark vi: 7; Luke ix: 2, 3; x: 9.) And we have the record of their actual performance, in fulfilment of his promise. (Mark vi: 13; Luke x: 17.)

Thus these signs *had* already followed *some* of them that believed — those, namely, whom the Lord had sent forth with a special commission to preach his gospel. They *did* follow them afterwards, during a long course of years, no doubt for a full century, at least, after the time when our Lord uttered the prediction; and this, in our view, fulfils all that the prediction can be fairly shown to contain.

But the existence of miraculous powers in the church, is not *disproved* by invalidating this alleged proof. Are there any intimations in Scripture which justify the expectation of their *cessation*? In answer to this question, we grant that there is no positive proof from Scripture that the gift of miracles was to cease with, or soon after, the apostolic age. The passage in I Cor., xiii: 8, "whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away," when interpreted with a just regard to the context (verses 9—13), seems to refer to the difference between the earthly and the heavenly state, rather than to different periods in the history of the Church on earth.* But while we concede that there is no positive evidence from Scripture that miracles were to be limited to the earliest age of the church, we think that the general tenor of Scripture teaching on this subject is such as to *favor that presumption*, and to generate in our minds a just suspicion against

* Macknight, however, applies it in the latter way.

any pretensions of this sort in later times. The way in which these miraculous events are narrated and referred to, both in the Old Testament and in the New, agrees with the commonly received opinion that their main design is to authenticate the credentials of those who are divinely commissioned to reveal God's will to men, and to instruct them in religious truth. So it was in the case of Moses, of the prophets, of the apostles, of the seventy. In all these cases, "the Lord gave testimony unto the word of his grace, and granted signs and wonders to be done by their hands." (Acts xiv: 3.) He "confirmed the word unto them" that heard it, "bearing witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will." (Heb. ii: 3, 4.) Paul refers to these miraculous powers as the signs of his apostleship. (II Cor. xii: 12.) And the whole current of Scriptural testimony sets in this direction. In view, then, of this manifest design of these miraculous gifts, we have every reason to anticipate their cessation after the apostolic age. We have no more reason to expect their perpetuity, than we have to expect a perpetual succession of prophets and apostles, a perpetual series of inspired men to make new communications of divine truth, a perpetually growing canon of Scripture. If there is no new truth to be revealed, there is no occasion for renewed miracles. The old truths are sufficiently authenticated by the old miracles.

VI But besides the foregoing considerations, there is something remarkably significant in the manner in which false pretensions to miraculous powers are referred to in the inspired writings. And this is connected with a separate branch of our general inquiry, namely, whether the Scriptures represent the possession of miraculous gifts as a perpetual mark of the true church. Apart from the passage already noticed, there is not, so far as we are aware, any other which has ever been supposed to affirm that the true church of Christ was to be distinguished from apostate or heretical churches, or from the pagan world, by a perpetual endowment of miraculous powers. But, on the other hand, there are several passages which very clearly represent the claim to this endowment as the mark of

an anti-Christian church. It is the "*false Christs and false prophets*," that "shall shew great signs and wonders," and "deceive" many. (Matt. xxiv : 24.) It is "that *Wicked One*," whose coming is after the working of *Satan*, with all power, and *signs*, and *lying wonders*." (II Thess. ii : 9.) It is that beast that is to be cast into the lake of fire, that "doeth *great wonders*," making "fire come down from heaven on the earth in the sight of men, and *deceiving* them that dwell on the earth by those miracles which he has power to do." (Rev. xiii : 13, 14.) And it is the *false prophet* that "works" miracles, and "*deceives* them that have the mark of the beast." (Rev. xix : 20.) All this is very far, certainly, from representing miracles as a perpetual sign by which the true church is to be discerned. And in all these passages, there is not only no intimation of the existence of genuine miracles, contemporaneous with these predicted counterfeits, but, on the contrary, the very success of the latter, in deceiving men, seems to imply the *non-existence* of the former. False miracles are, indeed, wont to appear whenever true ones are wrought, as in the case of the magicians of Egypt, and the sons of Sceva (Acts xix : 13—17); but they are also surer to be exposed, and less likely to deceive many, when they are brought into comparison with the genuine. So it was in both the cases referred to above.

There remains one further preliminary inquiry, before we enter upon the examination of the character and evidence of the miracles of the post-apostolic church, namely, the inquiry whether the Scriptures any where furnish us with any *practical test*, by the application of which true miracles may be distinguished from false. We should be justified in expecting some such specific test, in view of the circumstances of the case. For while, on the one hand, genuine miracles are insisted on as an important evidence of a divine commission, and on the other hand, false miracles, of a very seductive character, are represented as occurring, it seems almost indispensable that we should be supplied with some ready means of distinguishing between the true and the false. Without this, we can hardly see how miracles could answer any good purpose, in confirming the credentials of a messenger from

God. Now there is a passage in the Old Testament, which seems to answer precisely this needful purpose. In the 13th chapter of Deuteronomy, the Lord says to the people of Israel, "If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and give thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them, thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul. * * * And that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God." (Verses 1—3, 5.) We see here, that the people were to judge freely for themselves, in respect to any miraculous pretension; that in thus judging, they were to regard the *object* of the miracle, more than the event; and that the truth previously revealed was assumed to be so clear as not only to justify them in rejecting any apparent miracle, however inexplicable, which in its object was opposed to the truth, but also to form the decisive ground of a capital sentence. This rule, found in a code which so sacredly guards human life, justifies us in assuming that, under the fuller and brighter revelation of religious truth in the Christian dispensation, we are competent, in some cases, to form a decisive judgment as to the validity of professed miracles, from a consideration of the doctrines with which they are connected, and the purposes for which they are avowedly wrought. This inference is, moreover, confirmed by the words of the Apostle Paul: "Though we, or an *angel from heaven*, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." (Gal. i: 8.) The apostle here manifestly assumes that the leading truths of the gospel were so plain, well known, and unchangeable, that miraculous pretensions might be received or rejected, according as the doctrines which they professed to attest were in agreement or at variance with those cardinal and unalterable truths; that is to say, we are justified in certain cases, according to the

testimony both of the Old Testament and the New, in judging of the miracle by the doctrine, rather than of the doctrine by the miracle. Nor is this to reason in a vicious circle. It would be so, indeed, if we based the evidence of a divine commission *solely* on the power of working miracles. If we should say, "this doctrine must needs be true, because a miracle is wrought in proof of it;" and then turn round and say, "that miracle must be spurious, because it is wrought in proof of a false doctrine;" that would be indeed to reason in a suicidal way. But the fundamental truths, which we assume to be so plain and permanent, that no miracle can overthrow them, rest on a broad and sure basis of evidence, of which miracles form only one of the component parts. And besides, the character and *abundance* of the miracles wrought in confirmation of these truths must forever distinguish them from all the lying wonders by which error seeks to prop itself up. This principle, then, may be regarded as established, that we may sometimes judge of the miracle by the doctrine, instead of being always bound to receive the doctrine on account of the miracle. And we shall find fit and important occasion to apply this principle, in the progress of our inquiry.

We are prepared now to enter upon an examination of the alleged miracles of the early church; and is it too much to say, that we come to this examination with a justifiable conviction of the strong antecedent *improbability* of the permanence of miraculous powers in the church? Certainly it is not too much to say, that we are amply justified in looking upon miraculous pretensions with a critical and suspicious eye, and in demanding the most unexceptionable evidence, and in applying fearlessly the important practical test, which the word of the Lord so explicitly and emphatically sanctions.

What testimony, let us first inquire, do the early Christian writers give in regard to the existence of miracles in their day? We have already stated, in a summary way, that they affirm the occurrence of abundant miracles, and call the attention of unbelievers to them, in the most confident tone, as evidences of the truth of the Christian religion. We will now verify this statement by particular proofs.

Justin Martyr, writing about A. D. 150, uses such expressions as the following : "There are among us men and women who possess the gifts of the Divine Spirit."* "Even until now there are among us prophetic gifts."† "That Jesus was born as a man, for the salvation of believing men, and for the ruin of demons, you may learn from what passes under your own eyes ; for many of our people have cured many demoniacs throughout the world, and in your city of Rome, by adjuring them in the name of Jesus Christ."‡

Irenæus, A. D. 150—175, says : "In the name of Jesus Christ, his true disciples, receiving grace from Him, work for the benefit of other men, as each has received the gift from Him. For some cast out devils *certainly and truly*, so that oftentimes the cleansed persons themselves become believers and join the church. Others have foreknowledge of things future, visions, and prophetic announcements. Others, by imposition of hands heal the sick, and restore them to health. Moreover, as I have said before, even the dead have been restored to life, and have continued with us for many years. Indeed, it is not possible to tell the number of gifts which the church throughout the world has received from God in the name of Christ Jesus, and exercises *day by day* for the benefit of the nations."§ "We hear many brethren speaking in *all languages*."||

Tertullian, A. D. 198, offers this bold challenge to the heathen magistrates : "Place any possessed person before your tribunals ; let any Christian command that spirit to speak, and he shall as surely confess himself to be a devil with truth, as elsewhere he will call himself a god falsely."¶

Minucius Felix, A. D. 220, addressing himself to the heathen, says : "The greatest part of you know what confessions the demons make concerning themselves, as often as they are expelled from the bodies of men, by the torture of our words, and the fire of our speech. * * * Believe them, there-

* Dial. with Trypho, c. lxxxviii. † Ibid., c. lxxxii. ‡ II Apol., c. vi.

§ Contra Hæres, lib. II, c. xxxii, § 4. || Ibid., lib. V, c. vi, § 1. ¶ Apologeticus, c. xxiii.

fore, to be demons, from their own testimony and true confession. For being adjured by the true and only God, they unwillingly and wretchedly betray their uneasiness in the bodies of men, and either fly out instantly, or vanish gradually, in proportion as the faith of the patient, or the grace of the agent, assists towards the cure.”*

Origen, A. D. 225—250, says of the Christians of his day: “They drive away devils; they perform many cures; they foresee things to come. I have seen many examples of this sort; and God is my witness, that my sole purpose is to recommend the religion of Jesus, not by fictitious tales, but by clear and evident facts.”† “We drive the devils before us, out of men, and places, and also out of beasts; for they sometimes attempt to do mischief also to these.”‡ “Some heal the sick, by invoking the name of God over them. I myself have seen many so healed in difficult cases,—loss of senses, madness, and innumerable other maladies, which neither men nor devils could cure.”§

Cyprian, A. D. 250—255, after describing the effects of demoniacal possessions, adds: “Yet adjured by us in the name of the true God, they presently yield, confess, and are forced to quit the bodies which they possessed.”||

Arnobius, A. D. 303, declares that in his day, “the mention of Christ’s name put the evil spirits to flight, struck their prophets dumb, deprived the soothsayers of the power of answering, and frustrated the arts of arrogant magicians.”

Lactantius, A. D. 320, uses almost the same language as that quoted above from Origen and Cyprian.¶

These testimonies are sufficient to show the ground which the writers of the first three centuries occupy in regard to the existence of miraculous gifts in the church in their times. From this period onward, detailed accounts of particular miracles become more abundant. A few examples will illustrate the general character of these. Gregory of Nyssa, A. D. 375—395, relates that his namesake of Pontus, commonly known

* *Ad Octavium*. † *Contra Celsum*, lib. I. ‡ *Ibid.*, lib. VII. § *Ibid.*, lib. III.

|| *De Idolorum Vanitate*, c. vii. ¶ *Divin. Institut.*, lib. II, c. xvi.

as Gregory Thaumaturgus, when he first came to his diocese, about the year 240, found it full of idolatry. Being overtaken in one of his journeys by a violent storm, he was obliged to seek shelter for the night in a heathen temple. The next morning he started again on his journey, but before he had proceeded far he was pursued and overtaken by the priest of the temple, who threatened him with violence for having driven out the master of the house where he had lodged. It seems the demons had been accustomed to appear visibly to their worshippers, at the time of sacrifice ; but on that morning, when the usual sacrifice was offered, they signified in some way that they had been driven out, and had no power to return. When the pagan priest was informed by the pious bishop that he had unlimited power over these false gods, he changed his tone, and besought Gregory to exercise that power by giving them leave to return. The Bishop consented, and tearing off a scrap of paper from a book which he happened to have with him, he wrote these words : " Gregory to Satan : enter." The priest returned and placed the laconic epistle upon the altar ; whereupon the demons immediately returned. The priest was of course converted, and became one of the saint's most devoted followers.

Jerome, A. D. 380-400, in his *Life of Paul the Hermit*, who lived in the first half of the third century, tells us that Satyrs and Fauns presented themselves to this holy monk, confessing their mortality, and begging to be recommended by him to their common Lord, who came to save the world.

Athanasius, A. D. 350-370, relates in his *Life of Anthony*, (A. D. 330), that this monk was one day visited in his cell by a tall and very meagre stranger, who announced himself as Satan. He had come to present his humble petition that the monks would let him alone. " I am become weak," he said ; " I have no place left on earth ; the Christians are everywhere ; even the desert is filled with monks." But Gregory was not moved to pity by the sorrows of this poor old man, whose trembling limbs had borne him to the door of his cell as a suppliant. He first called him a liar, then complimented him on having told the truth for once, and finally dismissed

him, after he had well scorched him by pronouncing the name of Christ.

Theodoret, A. D. 455, in his account of Simeon Stylites, (A. D. 410-450), mentions the following as one of the miracles which he himself saw. A man who had vowed, in the presence of the saint, to eat no more animal food while he lived, being afterwards overcome by temptation, privately ordered a fowl to be prepared for his dinner. But when he sat down to eat it, he found the flesh turned into stone. Affrighted at this prodigy, he ran at once to Simeon, confessed his fault before many witnesses, and begged the hermit to intercede for him, that his sin might be forgiven. Many examined the fowl afterwards, and found the part about the breast to be composed partly of bone, and partly of stone.

Sulpitius Severus, about A. D. 400, reports the following, among many other miracles performed by St. Martin of Tours, (A. D. 375-395.) As he was journeying, he saw at a distance a funeral procession, which he mistook for a procession in honor of some pagan divinity. He accordingly made the sign of the cross, and ordered the procession to stop, and the bearers to set down their burden. Constrained by an irresistible force, the cause of which was wholly unknown to them, (for his command, if audibly spoken, could not reach their ears, on account of the distance), they at once stopped, and set down the bier. When Martin came nearer, he perceived his mistake, politely apologized, and permitted them to proceed.

Augustine, A. D. 390-430, relates a great number of miracles wrought by the relics of the first Christian martyr. After the bones of Stephen had lain unknown for four hundred years, Doctor Gamaliel appeared in a vision to a priest named Lucian, on purpose to reveal the place where they were deposited. They were immediately removed, with great pomp, to Jerusalem; and from thence portions of them were distributed throughout the Christian world. Not far from Hippo, where Augustine was bishop, there was a shrine containing a portion of these relics. Innumerable miracles, says Augustine, were wrought at that shrine. Diseases were instantly

cured ; the blind were restored to sight ; and five different persons were restored from death to life. Of these, two were carried dead to the shrine ; two were restored by means of garments that had touched the relics ; and the fifth by the application of oil from the lamps that were kept burning in the place where the relics were enshrined.*

In forming our estimate of the value of the evidence on which the ecclesiastical miracles rest, it will be pertinent, in the first place, to observe the *kind* of miracles which are most commonly reported. The earlier Fathers are almost entirely silent in regard to the miracle of restoring the dead to life. There are, so far as we know, only two writers of the first three and a half centuries, who make any mention of it ; and one of these speaks of it with some intimations of doubt. Eusebius, in his account of Papias and his writings, uses the following language : " We must now show how Papias * * * received a wonderful account from the daughters of Philip. For he writes that in his time (A. D. 100-150) there was one raised from the dead." He then adds another wonderful account, delivered by the same Papias, of Justus, surnamed Barsabas, who was said to have drunk deadly poison without suffering any harm. And a little after, he adds, " the same historian also gives other accounts, which he says he adds as received by him from unwritten tradition, likewise certain strange parables of our Lord, and of his doctrine, and some other matters rather too fabulous."† Putting all this together, we can readily estimate its value. Eusebius says, that Papias says, that the daughters of Philip told him, that one was raised from the dead. Eusebius thinks it wonderful that *one* should be raised from the dead, in the very next age after the Apostles ; and he does not regard the person who reports the miracle as a very reliable witness. Now it is well known that Eusebius was far enough from being unreasonably incredulous. It is quite certain, therefore, that he knew of no miracles of this sort in his own day.

* Aug. de Civitate Dei, lib. xxii, c. 8.

† Eccles. Hist., lib. iii, c. 39.

The language of Irenæus, the only other early writer who mentions the miracle of raising the dead, is more positive. In the passage already quoted, he speaks of persons who had lived many years after having been restored to life. And in another place he says that this miracle is *very often* performed * (*sæpissime*); but he gives no particular examples. And Theophilus of Antioch, who was his contemporary, when a heathen challenged him on this point, promising to become a Christian if but *one* plain instance of raising a dead person to life could be produced, seems to decline the challenge.

Of the gift of tongues, we find still scantier notices. Irenæus is the only one who affirms its existence after the times of the Apostles; and he affirms it in the same general terms as in the case of the restoration of the dead to life, without confirming his statement by any particular instances. And this very Irenæus, in another place, † complains of the difficulty and trouble which he had in learning the barbarous language of the Celts, in order to preach the gospel to them. One would have thought, that if the Bishop did not himself possess the gift of tongues, which he represents as so common in his day, he might have spared himself that tedious labor, by committing the work of evangelizing these barbarians to some of those brethren who were accustomed to "speak in *all* languages." (*παντοδαπαῖς λαλούντων διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος γλώσσας.*)

Passing over the occasional accounts of prophetic visions, ecstatic trances, discerning of men's hearts, and expounding under a supernatural influence the mysteries of Scripture, we have remaining the healing of the sick, and the casting out of demons, as the most common kinds of miracles reported to us. Now it is obvious that these are the very kinds of miracles which may be most easily counterfeited; and it is notorious that a great number of spurious miracles of these two classes have been so cunningly performed as to be believed by many to be genuine. Besides, the very writers who report these

* Lib. ii, c. 31.

† Pref. to lib. i, contra Haeres.

miracles to us, admit that the Jews and Pagans, as well as the Christians, performed miracles of both those kinds. This is allowed by Athenagoras,* by Justin Martyr,† by Irenæus,‡ and by Origen.§ Again, these miracles belong to the class of phenomena in which it is well known that the imagination and the feelings play an important part, and in which we are least competent to determine the limit that divides the natural from the supernatural. There is a region of nature, which seems to border on the supernatural, because it includes many things which our philosophy has not yet been able to explain, and which, nevertheless, we are compelled to admit as veritable facts, and not mere ocular and auricular deceits and delusions. Facts without number, observed and recorded through a long succession of ages, prove that mind influences mind, and spirit acts upon matter, in ways which cannot now be reduced to the exactness of science. The mention of such words as necromancy, witchcraft, mesmerism, clairvoyance, and spiritual mediums, is enough to bring before our minds a dim and vast continent which has not yet been thoroughly explored, and accurately mapped out. It is just in this darkly seen region, that the phenomena of cures, apparently supernatural, may find by and by their natural place. The similarity of the phenomena justifies this conclusion. How like, for example, to many cases in our own times is this which Tertullian tells us of a sister in the church in his day, who had the gift of revelations: "She converses with angels, and sometimes also with the Lord himself; she sees and hears mysteries; she knows the hearts of some, and she prescribes medicines to those who want them." || Not many years ago, an intelligent and well educated Greek, a native of the island of Cyprus, who was by no means inclined to superstition, but rather to rationalism, remarked to the writer, in a conversation on the demoniacal possessions referred to in Scripture, that similar cases were by no means uncommon in that island; and that they were cured sometimes, but not always, by the exorcisms of the priests.

* Apol., p. 25. † Dial., w. Tryph., lib. ii. ‡ Lib. ii, c. 6. § Contra Cels., lib. iii.
|| De Anima, c. ix.

May we not suppose that some, at least, of those who in ancient and in modern times have worked these reputed wonders, have acted under the sincere persuasion that they were endowed with miraculous powers? Might not that very persuasion supply one of the most important conditions of success?

Whatever may be thought of the applicability of these suggestions to the reported miracles of healing diseases and expelling demons, there are other cases in which we cannot hesitate to regard as natural phenomena occurrences which were regarded by the witnesses of them as miraculous. We give a few instances of this sort. Cyril of Jerusalem, in a letter to the Emperor Constantius, who had recently come into possession of the whole empire, relates that on the 7th of May, A. D. 351,—the day of the feast of Pentecost,—about nine o'clock in the morning, a huge cross, formed of dazzling light, so brilliant that the sun seemed pale in comparison, appeared in the sky above Jerusalem, stretching from Calvary to the Mount of Olives. This was seen by all the people of Jerusalem, for several hours. Now, after making reasonable abatements for rhetorical exaggeration, and also for the effect of excited fancy and fear, in supplying any defect which a calm and critical observer might have detected in the form of the cross, we may well believe that a remarkable appearance was seen in the sky, which was generally regarded by those who saw it as miraculous.

Eusebius relates two other prodigies, which occurred at the same place, and which may be set down as belonging to the same class. At a time when the persecutors of the church in Palestine were rioting in the blood and tortures of the faithful martyrs, on a remarkably cloudless and serene evening the pillars in the porticos of the city were suddenly bathed in tears, and the ground was covered with a copious moisture. The earth was weeping over the impiety of the enemies of Christ, and the very marble was melting with pity to rebuke the hardness of human hearts. Again, under the bishopric of Narcissus, about A. D. 300, during the vigil of Easter, the lamps in the church, which had not been properly filled for

the occasion, began to fail. As there was no supply of oil at hand, the bishop ordered the negligent lamp-lighters to bring water from a particular well, and, after he had prayed over it, to pour it into the lamps, with a sincere faith in Christ. They did so ; when lo ! the lamps suddenly blazed up brightly, "the nature of the water," according to our historian, "being changed into the fatness of oil." Now admitting the substantial facts in both these instances, we may refer them, not to a supernatural agency, but in the one case to the condensation of moisture arising from a sudden change of temperature, and in the other case, to the well-known law of the equilibrium of fluids of different density.

But besides uncommon, and not understood natural phenomena, we believe that there occur in all ages extraordinary interpositions of Divine Providence, which are separated, by however narrow and obscure a line, from the class of events properly miraculous. As Trinitarians, we may recognize as an instance of this kind, the death of Arius, occurring as it did in a sudden and remarkable manner, and just at the critical moment when he was about to gain a decisive triumph over the distressed defenders of the truth of God.

We believe, moreover, however absurd it may seem to some who are reputed wise in this world, that God sometimes answers the prayers of his people, in a way which, though not in strictness of speech miraculous, is yet so direct and special that it may be easily and pardonably mistaken for miracle. The occasion for such mistakes is not likely, we fear, to be frequent in our day ; but they may well have been more common in ages of less knowledge certainly, and possibly of more faith and prayer. The well-known story of the Thundering Legion may be cited as a probable example of this sort. That the soldiers of Marcus Aurelius, in a war against the Marcomanni, (A. D. 176,) were delivered from imminent peril, and enabled to gain a great victory, by means of a timely shower of rain, accompanied with thunder and lightning ; and that this event was so remarkable in its circumstances, as to suggest to both Christians and Pagans, the belief of a supernatural interposition ; — these are well-accredited facts. That there

were Christian soldiers in that army, is also sufficiently certain. Is it improbable that these Christian soldiers, in their extremity, should have cried mightily unto God for deliverance? Is it incredible that God should have answered their prayer by commanding the clouds to pour down water?

In the foregoing considerations on the different varieties of ecclesiastical miracles, we have aimed to remove many of them from the category of miraculous events, without impeaching, in any serious degree, the character of the narrators. Taken as a whole, the miracles reported in subsequent ages are widely removed, in character as well as in evidence, from the miracles of Scripture. Mr. Newman admits this, in language so significant that we cannot forbear to quote it: "It appears," he says, "that the ecclesiastical miracles were but locally known, or were so like occurrences that were not miraculous as to give rise to doubt or perplexity, at the time or since, as to their real character; or they are so unlike the Scripture miracles, so strange and startling in their nature and circumstances, as to need support and sanction rather themselves than to supply it to Christianity; or they are difficult from their drift, or their instruments or agents, or the doctrine connected with them."

These words of Mr. Newman invite us to examine more particularly, now, the "drift" of these miracles, "the doctrine connected with them," and the trustworthiness of "their instruments or agents." This is not an agreeable task; but it is one which a faithful treatment of our subject requires.

By far the greater part of the miracles which are reported to us by ecclesiastical writers, especially after the third century, are said to have been wrought, either by monks and hermits, or in connection with reputed relics of saints and martyrs. Miracles and monkery, as Isaac Taylor has so forcibly shown in his book on *Ancient Christianity*,* are inseparably connected together in their accounts. In all such cases, we need not fear to make a summary application of the Scriptu-

* Pp. 467—473.

ral rule which we have already settled, of judging the miracle by the doctrine in support of which it is professedly wrought. No intelligent Protestant can doubt that the monastic system, as it existed during these centuries, tended to and resulted in, the perversion of Christian doctrine, the corruption of Christian morals, and the serious endamaging, in other ways, of the best interests of the Christian church. We may boldly affirm, that God would never lend his supernatural signature to such purposes as these ; and that therefore the signature which they profess to bear is a forgery. It is no more incredible in itself, that a raven should bring half a loaf of bread daily to Paul the anchoret, than that the same bird should daily bring bread and flesh to Elijah the prophet ; but it is beyond all comparison more incredible that the Lord should send this miraculous supply of food, for sixty successive years, to an idle and vain-glorious hermit, who had deserted the society of men, without any necessity or justifiable reason, than that He should send it in the same manner, for a brief season, in time of famine, to his chosen and faithful prophet, who had hidden himself, by divine direction, from the violence of a cruel tyrant, who was enraged against him on account of his fidelity to God, and his fearless delivery of his prophetic message. And the same principle may be applied, with equal confidence, to all miracles alleged to be wrought by the relics of the saints. That these relics were regarded with an excessive, superstitious, idolatrous veneration, is beyond all question. Equally certain is it, that God would not lend his power for the purpose of increasing or perpetuating that idolatry. And yet there are no miracles better attested, during the fourth and fifth centuries, than such as tended, most directly and effectually, to the increase of veneration for the ascetics, and adoration of relics. In the face of this evidence, we are content to say, "Let *God* be true, and every *man* a liar." God's testimony is, to our mind, decisive against man's in this matter.

But while we regard this evidence as decisive in itself, we do not by any means admit that the evidence in favor of these miracles is unexceptionable in other respects. We shall now briefly notice several important facts, which go to impair very

seriously our confidence in the testimony of those who report to us these miracles.

The first circumstance of this kind to which we would call attention, is the manifest *growth* of the pretension in the first few centuries of the Christian era. In the writings attributed to the Apostolical Fathers, we find no claim whatever that miracles were performed by them, or in their day. In Justin Martyr we find the curing of diseases and the expulsion of demons asserted, but without the specification of particular instances. Irenæus claims more, and speaks in a bolder tone, but is equally general in his assertions. Origen and Chrysostom reiterate the pretension, but, for the most part, with the same indefiniteness. Augustine advances the claim still higher, and gives numerous details. And still later writers narrate, with all particularity of detail, more marvels than we have capacity to believe or patience to enumerate. In a word, the *later* authors grow more confident in their tone, more extravagant in their assertions, and more specific in their details. In regard to the casting out of demons, however, it is fitting to note a remarkable qualification of this general statement. After the Council of Laodicea, A. D. 367, had decreed that none should exorcise demons but such as were appointed for this purpose by the bishop, it is recorded that few, if any, of the bishops or the laity were able to cast out these evil spirits! * Which is the more significant, the restrictive decree of the Council, or the decline of the miracle that followed?

Another important circumstance, in abatement of the value of the testimony of the fathers on the subject of miracles, is the fact that there are grave discrepancies in that testimony. We have already noticed the apparent disagreement between Irenæus and Theophilus of Antioch, in regard to the miracle of restoring the dead to life; and also between Irenæus and himself, in regard to the gift of tongues. But there are other inconsistencies, more glaring still. Origen speaks, as we have seen, in a tone of confident and solemn asseveration, as to the

* Middleton, p. 95.

frequency of miracles in his day, and declares that he has seen what he affirms. Yet he shows a reluctance to describe particular cases ; and the reason which he gives for this omission is remarkable. "Should I only set down such of them as were transacted in my presence," he says, "I should expose myself to the loud laughter of the unbelievers, who imagine that we, like the rest whom they suspect of forging such things, are imposing *our* forgeries also upon them." These words are found in his first book against Celsus. But how differently he speaks in the seventh book of the same work : "Miracles began with the preaching of Jesus, were multiplied after his ascension, and then again decreased; but *even now* there are *vestiges* of them among a *few*." (πλὴν καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐστὶν ἵχνη παρ' ὀλίγοις.) Chrysostom also speaks in several passages of miracles as *frequent* in his day. He says that wonders were performed every day by the relics of the martyrs, in casting out devils and curing diseases, so that the population of whole cities was drawn to their sepulchres : and yet in other places he laments that the gifts of the spirit had ceased long ago ; says that Paul's handkerchief could once do greater miracles than all the Christians of his day, with innumerable prayers and tears ; likens the church of his time, in this respect, to a once wealthy but now impoverished lady, displaying only the empty casket where she formerly kept her jewels ; and more than once undertakes to account for the admitted cessation of these supernatural gifts. In allusion to the Jews who desired a sign from Jesus, he says : "There are also some even now who desire and ask, 'why are not miracles performed still at this day? And why are there no persons who raise the dead and cure diseases?'" He answers, that "it is owing to the want of faith, and piety, and virtue, in these times." And again, "In the infancy of the church extraordinary gifts were bestowed even on the unworthy, because those early times stood in need of that help, for the more easy propagation of the gospel ; but now they are not given even to the worthy, because the present strength of the Christian faith is no longer in want of them." The great theologian of the Western church does not seem to

be on any better terms with himself in this matter, than the great preacher of the East. Augustine tells us that miracles were wrought in his day, either by the name of Jesus, or by his sacraments, or by the prayers and memorials of the martyrs; and he gives us a copious list of them in the eighth chapter of the twenty-second book of his "City of God." After describing more than a score, particularly those wrought by the relics of Stephen, the first martyr, he apologizes for naming so few, says that he has certificates of about *seventy* that were wrought at the shrine where the relics above mentioned were deposited, although they had been brought there only about two years before, and declares that he has certificates of a much larger number from another place, where a portion of the relics of the same saint had been longer enshrined. (Of these last, in comparison with the former number, he says, "*Incomparabili multitudo superant.*") One would have supposed that such occurrences as these would have excited no little interest and wonder; but Augustine complains, on the contrary, of the indifference and incredulity, even of Christians, in regard to these miracles. They were scarcely ever known, he says, to the whole city or neighborhood where they happened to be performed, but for the most part only to a very few; or if ever they were told abroad to other people, yet they were not recommended with such authority as to be received without difficulty or doubting, though reported by true believers to true believers. In order to remedy this evil, and bring these neglected miracles more into notice and credit, Augustine addressed himself to the task of obtaining formal authentications of them. As often as any miracle was reported to him, he took care to have the parties examined, and a precise narrative drawn up and publicly read to the people. But after all his pains-taking accuracy, he was still obliged to renew his complaint; he could not succeed in obtaining for these wonders that degree of attention and credence which he so much desired. Those few who were present at the public recital of these narratives remembered them but a few days, and seldom or never took the trouble to tell them to those who were absent. Truly the good bishop of

Hippo, according to his account of the matter, had much reason to be surprised and vexed. Men are not wont to behave so. It is not in accordance with the ordinary manifestations of human nature, for people to be so indifferent,—so deaf, silent, and forgetful,—when such stupendous wonders as the instantaneous healing of the sick, and the raising of the dead to life, are transacted at their very doors, and attested by undeniable proofs. We are compelled to conclude that there must have been *some reason* for their indifference and incredulity. What was it?

What seems strangest of all is, that Augustine introduces the very chapter which records the above accounts, with the following words: "They ask us, why are not those miracles performed now, which you declare to have been wrought formerly? I could tell them, that they were then necessary, before the world believed, for this very purpose, that the world might believe; but he who still requires prodigies, that he may become a believer, is himself a great prodigy, in that he does not believe now, when the world does believe."

There is one more important remark, in regard to the credibility of these miraculous accounts. We are truly sorry to be compelled to say it, but it is too plainly true that the doctrine of *pious fraud*, or the sentiment that the end justifies the means, early began to find favor among the teachers and governors of the church. This principle, which was no doubt borrowed from the followers of Plato and Pythagoras, who avowed it without scruple, was an established maxim with many of the Christians, even as early as the middle of the second century. Ambrose, Hilary, Jerome, Augustine, Gregory Nazianzen and Chrysostom, not to mention others, unquestionably held that fraud and deception might lawfully be used for a good purpose.* In the beginning of his work on the Priesthood, Chrysostom defends this sentiment at length; and in his Commentary on Galatians ii: 11-13, he represents the

* See Mosheim, Hist., vol. i, pp. 130, 268. Comment., vol. i, pp. 212, 289.

Apostles Peter and Paul as acting upon it. Jerome, too, adopts the same interpretation of that passage. Julius Africanus, indeed, utters a noble protest against it, saying, in the spirit of Paul in Rom. iii: 5-8: "God forbid that the opinion should ever prevail in the church of Christ, that anything false can be fabricated for Christ's glory;" * and yet this earnest deprecation shows that *occasion* had arisen already (about A. D. 200) for opposing such an immoral doctrine.

In view of the above considerations, we do not hesitate to say, that we do not consider the testimony of the ecclesiastical writers as establishing, *beyond a doubt*, the genuineness of *any one miracle*, after the age of the Apostles. The evidence does not seem to us such as to *compel belief* in a candid mind. Yet we would not say, with Bishop Middleton, that miracles probably ceased altogether while some of the Apostles were yet living; nor yet with Mr. Conybeare, in his admirable work on the Life and Epistles of the Apostle Paul, that they vanished with the disappearance of the Apostles.† As to the first, it can hardly be supposed that the miraculous powers, which were a part of the official endowments of the Apostles, were withdrawn from any of them while they lived. This would seem to involve the revocation of their apostolical commission, and could hardly fail to diminish respect for their apostolical authority. As to the second, we know that the Apostles, in addition to the power of working miracles themselves, were able, at least in the case of speaking with tongues and prophesying, to impart miraculous powers to others, and that they actually did impart such powers to very many others. It does not seem to us probable that these supernatural gifts should have been suddenly and totally withdrawn. It seems more natural to suppose that the Apostles, and others who had been endowed, in whatsoever manner, with these extraordinary powers, continued to exercise them while they lived. Then, if such powers ceased to be conferred after the apostolic age, they would gradually die out in the next gener-

* Neander, vol. i, p. 709—note. Routh's Reliq. Sacr., vol. ii, p. 230.

† Vol. i, p. 427.

ation, and would become utterly extinct within less than a century after the death of the last Apostle. In this case, it would, of course, be impossible to fix any precise date for their cessation. That cessation would be, as Dr. Burton remarks,* "imperceptible, like the rays in a summer's evening, which, after the sun has set, may be seen to linger on the top of a mountain, though they have ceased to fall on the level country beneath." On this supposition, the more sober expressions of Justin Martyr and Irenæus, possibly even of Origen, might be received with very little abatement. "*Even until now,*" they might truly say, "*vestiges of these gifts remain among a few.*" But let it be understood that we admit this, only so far as it seems probable on the grounds just mentioned, and not merely from faith in their testimony. Had there been any sharply defined epoch when miracles suddenly and totally ceased, we cannot but think that there would have remained to us some authentic evidence of so remarkable a fact. But as it was a part of the plan of Divine wisdom, that their cessation should not be positively and clearly foretold,—for it is easy to see what a perverse use infidelity would have made of such a prediction,—so it was a part of the same wise plan, that these wonderful works should become gradually less and less frequent, so that the precise time when they became quite extinct should not admit of being determined.

We think now, in view of the survey which we have taken of this subject, that none need be at a loss to understand the grounds on which we reject the ecclesiastical miracles as spurious, while we receive those of Scripture as genuine. For ourselves, at least, the result of this examination has been to confirm our faith in the miracles recorded in the New Testament. It is with indescribable relief and satisfaction, after wearying through the miraculous accounts of the Church Fathers, that we come back to the simple and dignified narratives of inspired men. We feel at once, that the miracles of the Bible, in their character, their object, and their evidence,

* Eccles. Hist., vol. ii, p. 233.

stand at a vast remove from the stories of later and uninspired authors ; so that nothing short of the most reckless and vaulting scepticism, can overleap the chasm which divides them from each other, and transfer its suspicions from the fabulous ecclesiastical marvels to the wonders wrought by Christ and his Apostles.

The miracles of Scripture, on the one hand, are of such multitude and variety, that those who would fain explain them on natural principles, and those who would attribute them to artful imposture, are alike baffled in their endeavors ; the dignity of the miracles themselves, the worthiness of the object for which they are wrought, and the simplicity of the manner in which they are narrated, combine in beautiful harmony to assure our faith ; the witnesses who relate them to us have all the highest marks of credibility ; they are never boastful and extravagant, never timid and hesitating ; it never seems to occur to them that their accounts will provoke the ridicule of the heathen, or surpass the credulity of the faithful ; they write, not like men who are solicitously looking *forward* to calculate the reception which their narrative is likely to win, but like men who are reverently looking *backward* upon remembered facts of which they were witnesses. We take knowledge of them that they have been with Jesus.

On the other hand, when we turn to the ecclesiastical miracles, we find them chiefly of such kinds as may be most readily mistaken or counterfeited ; we find many of them too puerile to be respectable or credible ; we find a large part of them wrought to uphold and advance doctrines and practices which we know to be contrary to Scripture ; we find the narrators of them avowing a principle which inevitably weakens our confidence in their testimony,—a principle which the Apostles of the Lord repudiated with abhorrence ; we find many inconsistencies and suspicious characteristics in their testimony,—the late Fathers advancing their pretensions much higher than the earlier ; the same writers now bold and sweeping in their assertions, and now timid and apologetic,—betraying alike in both extremes too much regard to the effect of their communications upon the minds of men ; dreading

the ridicule of the heathen, and fretting at the incredulity of the Christians; in fine, not able to obtain full credit for their narratives, even with their Christian contemporaries.

We have no fears, then, lest, in avowing our disbelief in the alleged miracles of later ages, we should bring into discredit, with any candid and careful inquirer, the miracles on which our Christian faith in part rests. We should have no hope of making these last more credible, or of serving in any way the cause of Christianity, by accepting the former. Neither do we think that we should be likely to make the miracles of Christianity more credible to any considerate unbeliever, by assuming the championship of any miraculous pretensions of the present day, or of modern times. We have no hope of persuading the infidel to accept the miraculous evidences of our religion, by endeavoring to convince him that miracles are still of occasional occurrence, and may likely enough soon be as plentiful as of old. We regret sincerely that such a man as Dr. Bushnell, so capable of adorning his sentiments, whether true or false, with the attractions of brilliant rhetoric, and of impressing them upon the mind by the most felicitous illustrations, should have judged that he could do any good service to the cause of evangelical truth by laboring in this direction.

*Non tali auxilio, nee defensoribus istis,
Tempus eget.*

In our judgment, such a readiness to believe in the present existence of miracles as he manifests, is much more calculated to discredit the miracles of Scripture in the eyes of unbelievers, than any inability of ours (if admitted according to his allegation) to explain why such wonders should have been wrought then, and not be wrought now.

We do not apprehend, however, that even the genius of Dr. Bushnell will be able to give much currency to the views which he advocates. The ground taken in his book on Nature and the Supernatural,* is too radical to be very mischievous.

* See chap. xiv.

His belief is too violent to be contagious. He not only sees sporadic miracles now, and looks for copious and continued ones by and by, but also expects, perchance, new books of Scripture, and possibly a new dispensation.* He has fallen, too, in our judgment, into several inconsistencies. How shall we reconcile, for example, his assertion that miracles are to be judged by their *beginning*, and not by their *end*,† with his remark on the following page, that the *bad* wonders are very likely to *precede* the others? ‡ Indeed, he sets out with a definition of the supernatural, so novel and inadmissible, that he is not able himself always to remember it, nor to avoid sometimes using the word in its accepted and appropriate sense. He has, indeed, brought forward some remarkable incidents, which it is not our province to explain. We will only remark, that special providences, remarkable impressions on the mind, and signal answers to prayer, are things that occur in every age. In the perpetuity of these we most heartily believe; but these all are widely distinguished from miracles wrought in attestation of new truths communicated from Heaven to men. If miraculous powers should ever be conferred upon men, we cannot believe that the possessors of them, like some of those whom he mentions, will wish to keep them secret, and scarcely dare to exercise them. It was not so of old. They were given for a purpose in which all mankind had an interest, and it was meet and needful that they should be wrought publicly, and without any modest misgiving.

There is one more reflection, which we cannot forbear to add, ere we close this already too protracted discussion. We find comfort and encouragement in the persuasion, as the result of this examination, that the type of piety in the church now is more truthful, as well as more intelligent, than it was in the earliest centuries after the Apostles. It has long been fashionable to extol the primitive Saints, as far superior to those of modern times. Yet the writings of the Apostles themselves reveal to us many and serious blemishes in the

* See p. 447.

† See p. 456.

‡ P. 457.

Christian character of the first converts. And a familiar acquaintance with the writings of the Christian Fathers is not adapted to beget in us an unbounded admiration for the successors of these first disciples. It may be that they were, as a whole, more constant in the face of persecution, and more ready for every form of self-renunciation, than professed Christians of our own time. But even of this we are by no means sure. It is certain, on the other hand, that in some important branches of Christian morality they must be ranked below the present standard. We believe that the law of veracity, in the strictness of its obligations, was less understood and obeyed than it is now. When, to illustrate the matter from our present subject,—when we have made all due allowance for mistakes, credulity and carelessness, there remain miraculous accounts which we cannot, by any rational exercise of charity, attribute to anything else but false testimony and conscious imposture, on the part of men who judged it an act of piety and orthodoxy to lie for the glory of God, or rather for the glory of lazy hermits and of dead men's bones. We believe that there must have been instances of unmitigated, bare-faced villainous falsehood, such as we trust it would be hard to find an equal number of professed Christians among us willing to perpetrate. We believe that this improvement is the effect of the word and spirit of God, operating in various ways, but largely through the influence of Christian education, generation after generation. We recognize a gradual elevation of the standard of truth and morality in the church,—a silent, but ceaseless and powerful working of the divine leaven, which is destined to penetrate and to influence the whole mass of humanity, and to bring the church of Christ nearer and nearer, in the progress of the centuries, to the divine ideal revealed in the precepts and the promises of the Bible. The progress of our investigation has led us through some dark passages, and disclosed to our view some sorrowful facts; but a gleam of hope and joy thus lights up the end of our pathway.

are called cases of conscience, or perplexing questions of conscience, and hence, as a science, should be wholly connected with reference to such questions. This is the legitimate, and the

ARTICLE II.—MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

- 1.—*An Essay on Intuitive Morals : Being an attempt to Popularize Morals. Part II—Theory of Morals.* Boston : Crosby, Nichols & Co. 1859.
- 2.—*Moral Philosophy : Including Theoretical and Practical Ethics.* By JOSEPH HAVEN, D. D. Boston : Gould & Lincoln. 1859.
- 3.—*Bishop Butler's Ethical Discourses, and Essay on Virtue. Arranged as a Treatise on Moral Philosophy, and Edited, with an Analysis,* by J. T. CHAMPLIN, D. D. Boston : John P. Jewett & Co. 1859.

WE have placed these books at the head of our article, not so much for the purpose of reviewing them, as an indication of the renewed interest in the subject of Morals which has sprung up of late. At the same time, these repeated attempts at reconstruction plainly indicate a feeling that the science has not yet been placed upon so sure a foundation, and been so completely developed in its different parts, as to preclude the hope of further improvement. On this ground, perhaps we shall be justified in presenting a brief outline of our own view of the science, that we may contribute our mite, also, towards the elucidation of this great subject. This done, if space remains, we may recur to the above-named treatises, at least so far as to indicate the relation of some of their principal views to our own.

Moral Philosophy is the modern substitute for Casuistry. This, while it is a well-known historical fact, is, at the same time, an instructive fact as to the proper sphere or object of the science. It had its origin in the attempts to solve what are called *cases of conscience*, or perplexing questions of duty; and hence, as a science, should be wholly constructed with reference to such questions. This is the legitimate, and the

only legitimate, end of the science,—its only occasion or ground. In the theoretical part, it should establish, on rational grounds, the general principles of right and wrong, with the purpose of applying them, in the practical part, to perplexing questions of duty in the various departments of life. Moral Philosophy, then, has to do, first, with the principles or grounds of right and wrong, and secondly, with the application of these principles in determining difficult questions of duty. Perhaps we shall best succeed in conveying, as far as it can be done in the brief space allowed us, some idea of the science as it lies in our own mind, by speaking, in succession, of the object-matter or sphere of the science,—of the nature of right and wrong,—of the grounds of right and wrong,—of the nature of moral obligation,—and of the nature of the cases to which the theoretical principles thus deduced should be applied.

Moral philosophy, like each particular science, has a special sphere of its own. It treats of a particular department of nature or life, which has its own facts capable of observation, and its own laws capable of deduction. It has to do exclusively with human action, and this not as wise, reckless, courteous, or graceful action, but in the single view of its being right or wrong. The object-matter of the science, then, or that to which it pertains, is action as right or wrong. It is thus based upon phenomena, or facts, like the other sciences. An action, as far as it is external, is observed by the senses, like any other phenomenon; and as far as it is internal, or a mere conception of the mind, is a matter of consciousness to us, if it be an act of our own, and if not, is judged of by the outward act, the situation of the actor, and the results of our experience generally, both with regard to our own and others' acts. In this way we form a notion of the different actions, both of ourselves and others. At the same time, having a notion of the relations of the actor to other objects and beings, and, consequently, of the bearings of his acts upon them, in contemplating an act in its relations to other things, we unavoidably judge of its suitableness or unsuitableness under the circumstances. It is thus determined to be either right or wrong.

But, it may be said, we form our conclusion as to the moral character of an action, not from the act as a whole, nor from

this in conjunction with its bearings, but from the intention or motive apparent in the act. Very true. But what is the intention or motive in an act? The intention is what is intended, and of course is the real act. If one bestows charities upon the poor, but with the express purpose and intention, cherished in his mind, of securing the votes of the community for Congress, his real acts are not acts of benevolence at all, but only electioneering acts,—just as truly as soliciting votes by persuasion or bribery is electioneering. What he is after is votes, and he takes this method of obtaining them, as that which is likely to be the most successful. Of course, then, when this purpose once becomes evident, we judge of his acts accordingly, and as all the more unworthy, because accompanied with deception,—and deception, too, at the expense of virtue itself. So, too, the motive, being that which really *moves* one to an act, is nothing more nor less than the particular purpose or design which is before the mind in performing the act. It is the same, therefore, as the intention. The real end or intention of one in performing an act, is that which moves him to it. When the motive or intention is nothing beyond what is naturally implied in the outward act itself, we make no distinction between it and the act; but when it is something beyond that, and is ascertained to be so, it is always regarded as determining the real character of the act, because it shows what the real act was. Thus, should one kill a mad dog, at large in the streets, he would naturally be supposed, from the nature of the outward act performed, to have done a good deed; but should it be ascertained that his object was to kill some other animal belonging to a neighbor, which the dog was passing by, we should condemn the act as wrong,—and on the ground, as we might say, indifferently, that his motive, or his intention, was wrong—*i. e.*, that the real act was wrong.

But character, also, may be either right or wrong, as well as actions. We not only approve or disapprove actions as right or wrong, but the actor also, and even the character of a man, as exhibiting such and such principles of action. We do so, however, only as these principles are conceived as determining

the conduct, or as insuring certain acts under certain circumstances. Principles of action necessarily follow the character of the acts which they determine,—if these are right, they must be right, if these are wrong, they must be wrong. So that the complete object-matter of moral philosophy is action, including the intention or motive, as showing the real nature of an action, and active principles or character, as leading to such and such acts.

Pursuing our intended line of exposition, we are next to consider the nature of right and wrong. The words *right* and *wrong* are terms in general use, as applicable not only to action, but equally to other things; and we are warranted, by the general principles of language, in assuming that there is a common meaning running through them in all their different applications. What, then, is the fundamental idea expressed by these words? Wrong, as is well known, is only another form of the word *wrung*, and hence denotes what is “twisted,” “deflected,” “out of the way.” In like manner, right, from the Latin *rectus*, means “straight,” “without deviation.” Here, then, we have the fundamental meanings of the words, and these meanings, in substance, they must retain, whatever the objects to which they are applied. We all understand, when one says “every thing goes wrong,” that matters do not seem to him to follow each other in their natural or accustomed order, but to be quite out of keeping with each other. So, when a rail-road conductor lifts his hand to the engineer, and says “all right,” we understand that he considers everything relating to the train in its proper and natural place for starting. In like manner, a right action must be one which is suitable or correspondent to all the facts in the case,—an act in which there is no violation of actual facts and relations. And a wrong act, of course, is the direct opposite of this.

Natural right and wrong, then, are the basis of moral right and wrong. Or, more properly, right and wrong in their nature are the same in all cases; and moral right and wrong are distinguished from right and wrong in general, only by the object-matter to which they pertain. The term moral is derived from the Latin *mores*, meaning “conduct,” “charac-

ter," etc. Moral right and wrong, therefore, are simply natural right and wrong as exhibited in conduct. The peculiar character with which right and wrong are invested in this case, arises from the peculiar feelings which are connected with the performance or contemplation of acts known to be right or wrong. In our constitution, feeling, in its various forms, is the grand impulsive element, or moving power to action. Now feeling, with the exception of certain organic feelings which depend upon local physical causes, is consequent upon mental perceptions or thoughts; and when these intellectual views of things are correct, is graduated in character and intensity just in proportion as it behooves us to act. Thus, a landscape spreads out before one, and he has the calm and serene emotion of beauty, which fixes him entranced to the scene; or, he finds himself unexpectedly upon the brink of a precipice, and he has the thrilling and agitating emotion of fear, which causes him to shrink back and flee from the danger; or, he commits, or sees another commit, an act of injustice, cruelty, or treachery, and he shudders with horror in thinking of it. And this is evidently as it should be, for as man is the great actor in this scene of things, and hence the great disturber of God's universe if he act wrongly, it is fitting that he should be endowed, not only with a clear perception of the right, but with the most pungent and authoritative feelings urging him to its performance. And it is these feelings which give the peculiar coloring to right and wrong in action, and seem to mark off moral right and wrong as something quite distinct from other kinds of right and wrong. These peculiar feelings—the accusing or approving power of conscience—being the last and highest impulse of our nature, should be sacredly observed, for they are—since He gave them to us—but the voice of God speaking within us.

Leaving this point, we are next to inquire for the ground of right and wrong, or the foundation upon which the idea will be found to rest when traced up to its source. As an intellectual perception (and we can, of course, know nothing of right and wrong except as apprehended by us), it must rest at last, either upon an external revelation of God, upon our own

nature, or the nature of things in general. If our notions of right and wrong are due to revelation, then all our moral discriminations must be resolvable into revealed cases of right and wrong, and we can have no notion of right and wrong, except as that which is commanded or forbidden by God. All duties, in such a case, would be only positive duties, and nothing could seem to us either right or wrong in itself. We could form no judgment of our own, in any case of conduct, in regard to its rectitude, and hence, in the great majority of cases arising in life, should be wholly without a guide, and consequently without responsibility. However much, therefore, revelation has quickened and guided our sense of duty, it cannot be allowed, by any thoughtful moralist, to have wholly originated it.

Is the ultimate ground of right and wrong, then, to be found in the nature of man? that is to say, is it an ultimate perception of which we can give no account, except that we are so constituted that we can but perceive it so and so, just as we can but perceive that two and two make four, or that the sky is blue, and the grass is green? It might, to be sure, even in these cases, be said that our perceptions are such only because the nature of things is such—*i. e.*, that our perceptions are but the counterpart of the actual nature of things. And this, indeed, is highly probable, but it never can be shown to be so. If pushed to give a reason for believing the grass to be green, or the sky to be blue, we should have to rest at last upon the single reason that we are so constituted that we can but perceive them to be so. Now, is our perception of right and wrong of this nature? This is the view of those who regard conscience as a sort of moral sense, which detects, by direct intuition, or inspection, the quality of right or wrong in actions, just as the external senses do the various qualities of external objects. But can this view be maintained? We think not. For in this case, all reasoning about duty would be superfluous and absurd. On this hypothesis, it would be just as absurd to ask one *why* he thinks such an act to be right or wrong, as it would be to ask him why he thinks the sky to be blue. The only answer which he could make, in either case,

would be, because it so appeared to him—*i. e.*, he could barely appeal to his original perceptions, which is no reason at all, but only saying that he believes so, or thinks so, because he perceives so. But men are always reasoning about the right and wrong of actions, and expect from each other very different reasons from this, too. If one maintains anything to be right which we consider to be wrong, we don't hesitate to ask him his reasons for his opinion, and to show him our reasons for ours. We ply him with arguments on all sides, and drawn from whatever source, and pay no attention to any pretence of an intuitive perception that the act is right.

What deceives men apparently on this point, is, that the moral feelings, like all feeling, are of course immediate, or, if we may so say, intuitive. When an action is seen to be right or wrong, or according to right and wrong relations, certain feelings in regard to it immediately spring up in the mind,—we are attracted towards it or repelled from it, we approve it or disapprove it. And in most cases, the question of the right or wrong of the act is so obvious, or so settled in our mind by traditionary teaching, that these feelings are all that we are conscious of,—so much so, that it is common to speak of *feeling* this and that to be right or wrong. But feeling is not a perception, but only the consequence of a perception. In itself it is blind, though it performs a most important office in bringing home to us a sense of things, and impelling us to follow the dictates of our reason and conscience. While, therefore, the moral feelings do not supersede the necessity of moral perceptions, but rather imply them, still, as being the more prominent element of the two in all ordinary cases, they very naturally attract the chief attention, and stand in the popular mind as the sole indicators of right and wrong. It is thus, as it would seem, that the perception of right and wrong has come so generally to be considered intuitive. It is, however, as we have seen, the feeling, not the perception, which is intuitive. This, we think, will appear more evident when we come to set forth what we conceive to be the true ground of our moral perceptions.

We hold, then, that the ground of moral distinctions is in the nature of things, and hence, that our perceptions of right

and wrong are judgments formed from the nature of each case. And by saying that the ground of right and wrong is in the nature of things, we mean very much the same as when we say that the ground of truth is in the nature of things. Absolute truth depends upon the absolute nature of things, and truth to us, upon nature as it appears to us. So absolute right depends upon the absolute nature and relations of things, and right to us, upon this nature and these relations, as we apprehend them. And as the nature of things causes truth only by constituting it, so the nature of things causes the right only by constituting it. We mean, then, to say that the elements of right are in the nature and relations of things, just as the elements of truth are, and that the one is as truly deducible from nature as the other is. Perhaps the best formula on this subject is that of the old English moralists, that "right is according to the nature and reason of things." There is always a reason for a right act, which may be drawn from the nature and relations of things. A careful study of actions, in their nature and relations to other beings and things—if they be not such acts as are indifferent in their bearings—will always disclose some reason why they should or should not be done. This will be best seen by applying our theory to the four great departments of right acting, called the cardinal virtues,—Temperance, Veracity, Justice, and Benevolence.

To begin with the first of these, why is an act of temperate self-restraint right, and an act of intemperate self-indulgence wrong? Is it not because the one act is in accordance with, and the other contrary to, the nature of man?—*i. e.*, the true economy of his nature. Man has various passions, appetites, affections, feelings, or by whatever name designated, all urging him to action in different directions. He also has a principle of intelligence capable of ascertaining the nature and relations of beings and things,—the power of observing, comparing, and reflecting upon things, so as to understand their nature and bearings one upon another. This principle of intelligence is variously denominated reason, understanding; or, when employed about actions, conscience. To follow this principle against passion, appetite, etc., is, in the general sense

of the word, temperance ; and to reverse the rule in our conduct, is intemperance. Now the question is, how are we to determine which of these general principles should be our guide. They are both, in a general sense, equally natural—*i. e.*, they are equally principles implanted in us by nature. They are on a level, therefore, in this respect. But one principle is blind, the other is intelligent—the one works wholly in the dark, the other bears a torch in its hand. Can there be any doubt that this light was given us to guide our steps, and that when we do not follow it we violate our nature? Is not this a reason, and a sufficient one, drawn from the nature of the case, for always restraining passion and impulse within the bounds of reason and conscience, and thus leading a life of temperate self-control? Certainly no one would decide from the nature of man that the opposite should be the rule of life. If a light has been furnished us in our nature, it must have been intended that we should walk by it. It is obvious, therefore, that that extensive family of virtues, which come under the generic term temperance, have their ground in nature, even the nature of man himself.

Much more obvious is it, that the virtue of Veracity has its ground in nature ; for veracity is barely speaking and acting out things as they are. It is merely truth, reality, reflected in our words and acts,—a strict conformity, in all that we do and say, to things as they exist. It may always be said, that such a statement is true, and such an one false, because it is according to, or contrary to, fact, reality, nature. And should it be said that truth in act or statement, is right, and falsehood wrong, because the one is beneficial and the other hurtful to society, this may be admitted as one ground of veracity, but not the first and appropriate ground. When one states that to be true which he knows to be false, the first thing which stares him in the face is that he has falsified fact. This the merest child feels, who is not capable of appreciating remoter relations and consequences. As far as veracity affects the good of others, it has the same ground as benevolence. But this is only a secondary ground. There may be several grounds for the same virtue, but each has its appropriate primary ground,

and there can be no doubt that this, in veracity, is fact, reality, nature.

Let us now proceed to the third cardinal virtue, Justice, and see how the case stands here. Justice, according to its derivation, is what may be authoritatively enjoined or commanded. It presupposes a clear case, therefore, and strong and valid reasons on its side. In a general sense, justice embraces all duties between men for which one can present a valid claim upon another, but it relates chiefly to property. We do not propose to go into anything like a complete discussion of the right of property, but we believe that the rightful owner of anything can always show a reason for his claim, drawn from the nature of things, which no other person can. In other words, that in the natural order of things there is always a hand, and but one hand, to which every possession rightfully belongs,—that when in this hand, it is in its natural place, that when not in this hand, it is out of its place. An article does not become property until it has been appropriated by some one, and when any one has thus appropriated an article, he is expected to prove his title to it, if disputed,—he must be able to show a better reason for his possession than any one else can. If he has produced it by his labor, or bought it with his money, or received it as a free gift from a friend, or taken it from the ocean, or any of the great, unappropriated fields of nature, no one can dispute his claim to it—*i. e.*, contest his right on rational grounds. In his hand, therefore, it is in its right place. He holds it without a rival, and has the sole right of its disposal. No other person, therefore, can present any reason why he should have the article without his consent; and should he obtain it without his consent, he has just as truly removed it from its natural place, as one would a tropical plant, by transplanting it to the pole. It is evident, therefore, that the right of property is founded in the nature of things, and that justice is but observance of the order of nature in regard to property.

We now come to the department of right embraced under Benevolence. How does the case stand here? Benevolence means good-will. And will any one deny that good-will to

our fellow-creatures is more according to nature than ill-will? As Bishop Butler has shown, there is naturally, accidental causes of disagreement being supposed out of the way, good-will, rather than ill-will, towards each other among men—*i. e.*, men naturally have some fellow-feeling for and interest in each other. But whether this be actually so or not, there can be no doubt that it was intended to be so, and would be so, but for the perversion of human nature. We cannot suppose clashing and discord to be the law of nature, whether among men or things. But if harmony be the law of nature, it is necessary that there should be good-will among men. And if well-wishing, then well-doing is the law of nature; for the wish is father of the act. Where there is benevolence there is sure to be beneficence,—so much so, that both are usually implied in benevolence.

Besides, the capacity of happiness and misery in man, and, indeed, in all sensitive creatures, constitutes a reason, in the nature of things, for benevolence towards them. We are so made that we can but prefer happiness to misery. Indeed, happiness is the great good of man, and misery his great evil. And does not this constitute a reason why men should promote the happiness of each other in all possible ways within the bounds of justice and veracity? Does not nature point to this course, by making us capable of happiness and misery? We think there can be no doubt as to the answer which must be returned to these questions. Benevolence, therefore, like the other great departments of virtue, has its foundation in the nature of things.

To the four cardinal virtues which have now been considered, might be added Piety, which is a virtue indeed, and something more than a virtue. And we may say without irreverence, that the ground even for this is laid in the nature of things. The *fact* that God is our Creator, Preserver, and constant Benefactor, constitutes a sufficient reason for worship and service to him, and is the only ground upon which we can be made to feel the justness of the claims made upon us in his Word. Were the fact otherwise—were there no foundation laid in the nature of our relations to him, and of his to

us, for the worship and service required—no demand of service, no round of observances, proposed to us by Revelation, could ever be felt by us as duties. But it is not our purpose to treat of religion, nor even of the religious aspects of morals. Though the foundations of duty are laid in the nature of things, yet it is God who laid these foundations there, and who thus reminds us of our duty. Every question of duty, therefore, resolves itself at last into the will of God, and should be performed as if directly enjoined by him. But as it is precisely here that morality passes into religion, and duty into piety, it would be transcending our purpose to pursue the subject any further.

We are now prepared to consider the nature of moral obligation. Our view upon this point will be readily inferred from what has been said of the nature and grounds of right and wrong. Obligation, as was remarked of the terms right and wrong, is a word of general application, and must have radically the same meaning in all cases. It denotes, according to its derivation, that which binds or constrains to something. It is not, however, a physical but a rational constraint,—the force of some consideration over the mind. A note of hand is called an obligation, because it contains a promise to pay, and acknowledges an actual indebtedness. So we feel ourselves obliged to one who has bestowed a favor upon us, and thus created a balance against us. In like manner, moral obligation is only the constraint to a given act or course of action, which arises from the reason or reasons that urge to it. If what has been said under the previous divisions of our subject be true, it can be nothing else than this. We infer the same from the use of other terms which are employed to express moral obligation, such as *ought*, *duty*, etc. *Ought* means to *owe*, and *duty* implies a *debt*—what is *due*. Both words alike imply a balance against us—*i. e.*, a deficiency, an incompetence to meet the case rationally, without performing the act in question. Moral obligation, then, is a rational constraint to a particular course of conduct, urged home by the most persistent and authoritative feelings of our nature.

Such, in brief, are our views on the fundamental questions involved in theoretical ethics. As to practical ethics, we

merely wish to indicate the general nature of the questions, which, as it seems to us, it is incumbent on the science to resolve according to its theoretical principles. The nature and grounds of right having been determined theoretically, the investigator is supplied with all the requisite principles for judging of the right in different cases, and thus determining the various questions of duty which arise in life. But not all such questions, surely, need be considered in a book of science. The great majority of questions of duty are sufficiently obvious to common intelligence, and though men do not always perform them, it is not incumbent on the scientific moralist to assume the character of adviser, exhorter, or preacher, and set himself to persuading men to perform duties which they know to be duties, but do them not. It is only perplexing questions of duty which he has anything to do with. His business is to resolve, not to enforce, duties. Questions which need no resolution, do not come at all within the scope of his inquiries. It is only in cases where there is apparently some conflict of duties, or reasons both for and against a duty, or some other ground of perplexity, that the scientific moralist is called upon to offer his counsel. And if it be inquired what these cases are, we name the following as specimens. Of this nature is the question of the binding force of what are called "positive precepts" of Scripture, and generally, of the relation of Scripture to duty. Here the common mind is liable to become perplexed, and needs the light which may be reflected upon the subject by general principles. Another question of a similar nature, is the obligation imposed by civil laws, and their relation to what has been called the "higher law." Such, also, are the questions of the relations of right and expediency, of self-love and benevolence, of justice and benevolence, and numerous others growing out of the different relations of life.

And now, having completed the sketch of our own views, we return for a moment to compare with them, on a few points, the views of the authors who names stand at the head of this article.

The *Essay on Intuitive Morals*, which stands first in the list, is an American reprint of an anonymous English treatise,

got up, evidently, in the interest of heterodoxy, both in philosophy and religion. The laborious pains-taking, displayed even in the text, but especially in the notes, in lugging in and disparaging the fundamental doctrines of the evangelical faith, is but a single instance, among many, of a most illiberal use of the prerogatives of science, by a class of writers, on both sides of the Atlantic, who arrogate to themselves the exclusive designation of liberal. As to the ethical doctrines of the book, they are professedly but little more than a re-hash of those of Kant. This great philosopher, finding that his criticism of knowledge had ended in the denial of the existence of God and of the human soul, as anything more than regulative ideas employed in arranging our knowledge, made a strenuous effort to save their existence, as postulates of the practical reason, or conscience. This, speaking always in the *imperative*, demands a perfect law, a perfect virtue, and a perfect happiness, which can be realized only through the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the being of God. Hence, their existence is a necessary postulate. Thus these great ideas, annihilated by the action of reason on one side, are again evoked into existence by its action on the other. A house thus divided against itself, surely cannot stand.

The fundamental doctrine of the Kantian ethics is the absolute freedom, or autonomy, of the will. Being thus wholly spontaneous and self-determined in its action, it is the legislator of the mind, and hence enacts the law of duty for life. The moral law, then, is but the law of the mind, and right, obligation, duty, are all internal, and, indeed, all the same. The Kantian ethics, therefore, are as subjective as his metaphysics. There is no more an external ground for the one than for the other. The divergence of such a system from that sketched in the former part of this article, is sufficiently obvious.

Dr. Haven's book is one of a very different character. Having already won golden opinions by his treatise on Mental Philosophy, the public were predisposed to receive with favor a treatise from him on Moral Philosophy. Such a treatise, it was confidently anticipated, would be a valuable addition to

the books on that subject already in existence. Nor has the expectation been disappointed. While not by any means a profound treatise, it is yet quite happily conceived, and in the main, is executed with a soundness of judgment and an appreciation of the subject, which are highly creditable to the author. We cannot, however, subscribe to all of its doctrines, and might easily point out some disproportions in the development of the subject. We will only indicate one or two points of divergence from our idea.

In the first place, then, we cannot agree with Dr. Haven in the account which he gives of the ground of right and wrong. He professes, indeed, to hold the same view on this point that has been advanced in the former part of this article—that the distinction in question rests upon the nature of things. But let us see with what consistency he holds this view :

“We seem to be driven, then, to the only remaining conclusion, that *right and wrong are distinctions immutable and inherent in the nature of things*. They are not the creations of expediency, nor of law ; nor yet do they originate in the divine character. They have *no* origin ; they are eternal as the throne of Deity ; they are immutable as God himself. Nay, were God himself to change, these distinctions would not. Omnipotence has no power over them, whether to create or to destroy”—*p. 47.*

Now, with all deference to the accomplished author, we must say, that we can but regard the ideas expressed in the successive sentences of this paragraph as utterly inconsistent with each other. Right and wrong are here asserted to be distinctions inherent in the nature of things, and yet to have no origin, and even to be beyond the control of Omnipotence. How can these things be ? If right and wrong are distinctions inherent in the nature of things, do they not arise from the nature of things, and thus have their *origin* there ? And further, if these distinctions are due to the nature of things, would they not be changed if the nature of things were changed ?—and such a change, Omnipotence is certainly competent to effect. The author does, to be sure, on a subsequent page, attempt to obviate these objections to his view, but the attempt, as it seems to us, only makes the confusion greater. He says he

means by the "nature of things," only "the actions and moral conduct of intelligent beings," which certainly God does not create, and that these are the things in whose nature right and wrong inhere. The nature of things, then, turns out to be only the nature of acts, and the upshot of the whole is, that the acts of intelligent beings are in themselves either right or wrong. But how right and wrong in themselves? Is it meant that acts considered simply by themselves, and out of relation to everything else, are right or wrong, or are seen to be right or wrong by moral agents? It is notorious that an act which has no bearing upon other beings and things has no moral character at all, and can never be determined to be either right or wrong. Flourishing a stiletto in the air is an indifferent act, but plunging it into the bosom of a human being is a wrong act. Acts are not therefore right or wrong in themselves, only as they are determined to be so by their bearings upon other things. It is only when taken in the totality of their surroundings and bearings, that acts can be said to be right or wrong in themselves. Hence, the nature and relations of things generally, as far as they are affected by acts, must be considered in determining their character. The author, as is evident from the passages already referred to, and from many others which might be pointed out, really holds that moral distinctions are apprehended *intuitively* by the mind, and should not, therefore, have referred them to the nature of things at all, any further than the nature of things may be supposed to determine our perceptions in this case, as in others. Strictly intuitive perceptions, as was explained in the earlier part of this article, must be referred to the nature of the human mind, rather than to the nature of things.

We will offer but a single criticism further on this, in many respects, very excellent treatise, and that shall have reference to the practical part. An unusually large proportion of the book is devoted to practical ethics, and generally to very good purpose. We can but feel, however, that many of the topics treated of, often at considerable length, are more congenial to the office of the preacher, the friendly adviser, or the civilian, than to that of the scientific moralist. How can any case of conscience arise in regard to such questions as those of Self-

support, Self-culture, The Different Kinds of Property, The Different Forms of Civil Government, and various others largely treated of in this book? It behooves the moralist, indeed, to take a comprehensive survey of the duties of man, by contemplating life in all its various relations; but he has no occasion to dwell upon any other than *cases of conscience*, under any of these relations. If in any of the relations of life, or departments of action, there are cases where the course required by Temperance, Veracity, Justice, or Benevolence, is doubtful, it is incumbent on him to apply himself to these, and endeavor to clear them up by the light of general principles already established. Having solved such questions, he may ignore all others.

It only remains that we briefly indicate the relations of the views of Butler—the last in the list of authors at the head of this article—to our own, and we have done. Butler is generally admitted to be by far the profoundest writer on morals in the English language. His fundamental principle is, that vice is contrary to the nature of man,—to the true economy of his nature. Now this, obviously, as a determining principle of actions in general, is too narrow. As we have seen, it is only acts of intemperate self-indulgence, which, in strictness, are contrary to the economy of human nature. Acts of falseness, injustice, cruelty, etc., are no otherwise contrary to human nature, than they are contrary to, or are disapproved by, reason or conscience. And it is only by making conscience the representative and summary of human nature, that Butler makes his general principle adequate to the demands of the case. But by so doing, which he does with admirable skill, his principle becomes one of universal application; since reasons may be given against every species of wrong, and hence all wrong may be said to be contrary to human nature, as summed up in reason, or conscience. His views, therefore, seem to us nearer the truth, and capable of being more easily conciliated with our own, than those of any of the above authors, and indeed, of any author with whom we are acquainted. We can but regard the ethical views of Butler, as not only profounder, but sounder, than those of any other writer in our language.

ARTICLE III.—BADEN POWELL ON THE IMMUTABILITY OF PHYSICAL LAWS.

The Order of Nature, Considered in reference to the Claims of Revelation. By the Rev. BADEN POWELL, M. A., F. R. S., F. R. A. S., F. G. S. Savilian Professor of Geometry in the University of Oxford. London. 1859.

THERE has been a stage in the progress of nearly every department of physical science, before any considerable completeness of views has been reached, when a certain class of men have seen the bulwarks of religion giving way before its progress. But thus far, in every instance, when partial views have given place to well-defined science, all apprehension has subsided; and, in several instances, the sciences specially paraded as hostile to religion, have become its supporters. If we were to select a science particularly illustrating this remark, we should name Geology. There is no other science with whose fundamental principles the Scriptures make so free use, and scarcely any science so late in coming to somewhat of maturity. The author or compiler of the Pentateuch could not have been a geologist. Yet he so completely coincides with mature geological views that, in the nature of the case, the geological allusions were unintelligible till Geology became a science. The Geology of Genesis is the Geology of independent research in so many particulars, and in such detail, that it is a confirmation of the Divine origin of that Book, more complete than is furnished by any other science, or by any other single evidence.

It was, however, thought, when the remark was first made, that "the battle of the evidences will have to be fought on the field of physical science," that only partial science could be pressed into the service of apparent hostility. But in the

book before us, the attempt is made to employ the highest possible generalizations of science, not merely to discredit, but to exhibit as impossible, that which alone gives authority to divine teachings. The design of its author is so to exhibit the general uniformity in the operations of nature, as to render miracles, in all possible cases, incredible. Hume claimed that they could not be proved ; Powell, that they are *impossible*, and (I use his term, notwithstanding the want of philosophical accuracy which it implies) *inconceivable*.

The author is a clergyman of the Church of England, and Professor of Geometry at Oxford ; but he has, for many years past, been mainly known as an earnest cultivator of the exact and physical sciences. We remember that views presented by him at some of the earlier meetings of the British Association were regarded with somewhat of disapproval. And a disposition to affiliate himself with the spirit of the *Westminster Review* and the "Vestiges of Creation," has been by no means concealed. In a former publication, Prof. Powell attacked the Old Testament as untenable on scientific grounds, and he regards himself as having demolished it. Thus much is avowed ; but when he comes to the New Testament, he admits its claims as a Divine Revelation, to be apprehended by *faith*, but not to be understood as having a claim to truth in any of its *physical aspects*. "The literal sense of *physical* events, impossible to science, cannot be essential to spiritual truth, nor have contraventions of natural order any necessary connection with vital Christianity"—*p.* 370.

The *impossibility* of interruptions to physical laws, is the leading idea of the work, and the only one upon which any labor is bestowed as a scientific question. In substantiating his position, the author pursues the method of progressive approach. Quotations are made from a long list of authors, and a running commentary added, to give a history of the progress of scientific views. Man is represented, in his uncultivated state, as disposed to accept ideas of the marvellous, and to ascribe all wonderful occurrences to the intervention of supernatural power. As cultivation advances, a disposition is induced to inquire into causes, and ultimately to regard all

changes as determined by, and referable to, natural laws. When the views of nature became enlarged, and particularly when the Copernican system was received, and ideas of order were extended so as to embrace, not this world alone, but a system of worlds, of which this is only a small part, men became altogether averse to admit the idea of interruptions. The fullest confirmation of the idea of order, as pervading the universe, was found in the discoveries of Newton and the searching analysis of La Place. It then became certain, not only that there is order, but the most perfect order, such that future events may with the utmost confidence be predicted, the exact position, for instance, of any of the bodies of our system, in all past and in all future time, may be at any moment ascertained. Hence, our author's idolized idea, "the unity of worlds," the great "cosmical idea," "a conviction of the *universality* and *immutability* of natural order."

It is matter of unquestionable experience, that the world is governed by general laws. It is not difficult to see the necessity for such laws to beings constituted as we are. God has seen fit to administer his government upon such uniformity of principles that we rely upon them, and fear no deviation from them. It by no means implies that He who restricts himself to this uniform course, for important ends, may not also, when important ends are to be answered by it, deviate from this uniformity. Nor would rare deviations at all unsettle our confidence in the ordinary uniformity of nature.

But this, certainly, is not all that Prof. Powell means. His meaning is that law is *in its nature immutable*, not only that there has been, and will be, no deviation, but that there can be none. A few of his expressions will make this clear. "To a correct apprehension of the whole argument, the one essential requisite is to have obtained a complete and satisfactory grasp of this one grand principle of law pervading nature, or rather constituting the very idea of nature"—p. 230. "It is not the *fallibility* of human testimony, but the *infallibility* of natural order, which is now the ground of argument; and modern science cannot conceive religious truth confirmed by a violation of physical truth. Many of

the most serious inquirers into this subject, have agreed in the necessity for having recourse to some wider principles in their view of miracles than the old assumption of the suspensions of the laws of matter, the admission of which they acknowledge inconsistent with the present state of physical knowledge "—*p.* 296.

While we are surprised by such avowals, we do not find our respect for the author increased by his frequent assumptions that at the present day the best minds are yielding the point of miracles as in any sense interruptions to the order of nature, or that they possess any "evidential" importance in the scheme of Christianity. Christianity, *as a fact*, might be to the sceptic a most difficult thing to account for, and he might feel himself compelled to concede its divine origin, even if it were not supported by miracles. But its *authoritative* character, and reliance upon it as a basis of individual security under the government of God, must, as we regard them, rest ultimately on miraculous sanctions. These sanctions essentially consist in interruptions of the laws of nature. We do not say, therefore, that, if our author's view of the impossibility of these interruptions were admitted, it would be destructive of Christianity as an institution in the world, but it would be destructive of its authority as a rule of life and a scheme of redemption.

In what, then, consists this impossibility? It is claimed to be the essential element of the inductive philosophy, and "that those who are not prepared to embrace it in its full extent, must be sent back to the school of inductive science, where alone it must be independently imbibed"—*p.* 230.

What is there, then, in the inductive process which so imperatively demands this concession? We confess ourselves uninformed. It is the business of inductive science to bring isolated cases in nature under general laws; and these generalizations may be extended as observation is extended. But this is its limit. It is not its province to assert or deny, but to arrange. It is true, that for convenience we express the laws of nature in a general and dogmatic form, as that "every particle of matter has a tendency to move towards every

other particle of matter;" but this is only an expression of the general fact, and the inductive philosopher does not feel himself at all precluded by it from the opposite hypothesis, and the hypothesis of mutual repulsion has accordingly been freely resorted to, on occasion, by the safest and most cautious thinkers. There is nothing, then, in the inductive process, or in the results of this process, to indicate this impossibility.

It is not to be denied that we have an intuitive belief in the uniformity of nature—in the idea of *continuance*, as Butler terms it. There is a natural expectation of uniformity of sequence from uniformity of antecedent. We certainly have such expectation. It does not, however, arise from induction, but from our constitution. It does not result from repetition of instances, but it arises as soon as the relation of antecedency and sequence is observed in a single instance. This expectation is, however, a very different thing from the impossibility of its being disappointed. In a great majority of cases it is disappointed. It was one of the special grounds of ridicule of the immediate followers of Bacon, that they were in the habit of stating all of the antecedents of a fact which required explanation. They had as much reason from their constitution to expect that one as that another would be the permanent antecedent. This natural expectation, then, simply leads to repeated trials; and it is only after repeated trials that reliable conclusions are attained. The mere expectation, then, of the continuance of an observed order of events, cannot be the basis of an assertion that this order cannot be departed from.

But these reliable conclusions are at length reached. We trust them with the utmost confidence. We know that gravitation, for instance, is so constant that the oscillations of a pendulum, properly adjusted, will be absolutely uniform from year to year, counting precisely the same number each year for indefinite periods. The cause of these results we come to rely upon with a certainty that is practically absolute. And the only question in this connection, which bears on our subject, is this: Do we feel this confidence in the law because we believe that it *will not* be interrupted, or because we see that

it *cannot* be interrupted? Most assuredly men do not see any such impossibility, nor do they generally believe it. Thus the general belief that the world was created, and that it will come to an end,—no matter how such belief came, nor whether it be true,—the belief itself, so generally entertained, is proof that there is nothing repugnant to our sense of things, in the idea that these laws have not a necessary existence, and may therefore be interrupted. Hence, the impossibility of such interruptions was designated by Mansel, with no underserved severity, as a “shallow and crude assumption.”

Much, then, as this assumption of the impossibility of interruptions in nature is boasted of as a fundamental principle of the inductive philosophy, it obviously has no place whatever in the inductive system. Prof. Powell has done great injustice in attempting to fix it there. But with all his efforts to acclimate it, we can still not only see that it is an exotic, but detect its origin. Our author claims to be a pure physicist, but we think the idea can be traced in his book to a very different class of speculations. His views, curbed within the narrowest limits, are, that we must not conceive of the Author of nature as a personal God, but as the pure, immutable intelligence, which has its embodiment in immutable natural order.

There is, in the first place, a denial of the doctrine of final causes. On page 237 we have the following language:

“We cannot reason from the case of a work of human design, which is a definite contrivance to answer a specific known purpose, the work of a finite agent, limited by the circumstances and conditions of the case, to the structure of the infinite universe, in which we can infer no final design or purpose whatever. * * * The argument proceeds on the analogy of a personal agent, whose contrivances are limited by the conditions of the case and the nature of his materials, and pursued by steps corresponding to those of human plans and operations—an argument leading only to the most unworthy and anthropomorphic conceptions.”

The idea of volition in the Author of nature, and hence of character, in any proper sense of the term, is also attacked, as follows:

"The attempt to reason from law to volition, from order to active power, from universal reason to distinct personality, from design to self-existence, from intelligence to infinite perfection, is in reality to adopt grounds of argument and speculation entirely beyond those of strict philosophical inference"—p. 244. "The difficulty which presents itself to many minds, how to reconcile the idea of *unalterable law* with *volition* (which seems to imply something changeable), can only be answered by appealing to those immutable laws, as the sole evidence and exponent we have of Supreme volition; a volition of immutable mind, an empire of fixed intelligence"—p. 247.

The simple conception of power manifesting itself in a given order, is a very natural sequence of such views. It is all that there is left, after the elimination of personality and character, from the teachings of the physical world. And such conception alone Powell actually reaches. "The true conception of universal order is the correlative, almost the synonym, of universal mind"—p. 139. (See also note, p. 242.)

As far, then, as we are able to trace the history of this idea of the impossibility of interruptions in nature, it commences with the prolonged and intense study of nature in her uniform course. As other views are precluded by one's too exclusive devotion to physical science, his conceptions of the Author of Nature are made to harmonize with these proclivities of his mind, until they settle into the simple idea of a power, of which these uniform results are the expression. But when this conception of the Divine Being, as a merely immutable power, is once entertained, it will reflect back upon all of one's subsequent studies of nature the impression of the utter impossibility of interruptions to its order. Such seem to have been the results of physical study on Prof. Powell.

The sciences which pertain to the material world occupy an important place in mental culture, and we would not say a word against the study of them. There is a defectiveness in the education of any one who has neglected them, which cannot be compensated for by attention to any other studies. They are indispensable for the kind of discipline, and modes of thought, and sources of enjoyment, which they furnish. But when they *alone* furnish the culture, it is likely to be shallow,

ostentatious and unreasonable. We quote an important testimony on this point, from Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures, p. 25 :

"An exclusive attention to physical pursuits exerts an evil influence in two ways. In the first place, it diverts from all notice of the phenomena of moral liberty, which are revealed to us in the recesses of the human mind alone; and it disqualifies from appreciating the import of these phenomena, even if presented, by leaving uncultivated the finer power of psychological reflection in the exclusive exercise of the faculties employed in the easier and more amusing observation of the external world. In the second place, by exhibiting merely the phenomena of matter and extension, it habituates us only to the contemplation of an order in which everything is determined by the laws of a blind and mechanical necessity. Now what is the inevitable tendency of this one-sided and exclusive study? That the student becomes a materialist, if he speculate at all. For, in the first place, he is familiar with the obtrusive facts of necessity, and is unaccustomed to develop into consciousness the more recondite facts of liberty; he is, therefore, disposed to disbelieve in the existence of phenomena whose reality he may deny, and whose possibility he cannot understand. * * * In the infancy of science this tendency of physical study was not experienced. When men first turned their attention on the phenomena of nature, every event was viewed as a miracle, for every effect was considered as the operation of an intelligence."

Prof. Powell has carefully guarded his system, by an effort to exclude or damage every consideration which could be brought against it. Accordingly all ideas of the creation of the world, or of living beings upon it, are set aside. All the systems of worlds must have existed eternally. "Science furnishes no trace of a beginning, nor prospect of an end"—p. 251. Life is not a creation, but a development. God did not breathe into man the breath of life, and thus make him a living soul, but man became such by the operation of ever-present law. "It is in relation to the broad principle of law that such interferences as the sudden, supernatural origination of species of organized beings, in remote geological epochs, are seen to be wholly unwarranted by science, and such fancies utterly derogatory and inadmissible in philosophy"—p. 229.

"As ethnological researches have advanced, those who have most extensively cultivated them have been more and more impressed with the belief in the high antiquity of man." And the investigations of Mr. Horner are regarded as *proving* the existence of man, comparatively civilized, 13,000 years ago. (See p. 209.)

Such is the scientific theology of Prof. Powell. He regards God as only the embodiment of invariable law, the *origination* of matter and life, as therefore inconceivable, and the whole course of nature, in the past and in the present, is but the operation of this supreme, unvarying, impersonate intelligence of *Fatalism*.

These views set at nought the whole scheme of Natural Theology, and with such a disregard to the opinions of other men as to imply that Prof. Powell is authorized to deliver, not opinions, but decrees. It is not, however, our purpose to enter at all into the defence of Natural Theology. It comes only incidentally into mention. But the doctrine of the high antiquity of our race, and the history of the peopling of the earth with its various species, are points which come distinctly within the domain of natural science. We must dissent utterly from the views expressed in "The Order of Nature" on these subjects. It is difficult to find sufficient support for them, either in fact or in authority, to relieve the author from the charge of malicious perversion. There are a few men whose field of observation has been limited, but who have investigated minutely within their field, though without that opportunity of correcting their results, which a large culture or a wider scope of observation would have furnished, and who have leaned to the belief of a much earlier commencement of the "human period" than has ordinarily been entertained. But our author does not fall into this class, for his opportunities have been abundant. Nor will we class him with our American Egyptologists, for we hope he belongs to a better school. But it is not a little remarkable that this set of views is held so nearly exclusively by those who struggle for notoriety in a field which is notoriously new and obscure.

We know of no Geologist or Antiquarian, whose scientific character entitles his views to consideration, who does not re-

gard the period of the introduction of the human species as among the latest great changes which have occurred on the earth. Such is the bearing of the great mass of the facts which touch this question. The few doubtful indications which have been thought to have an opposite bearing, all admit of easy solution; and if they did not, they could have little weight against the concurrent force of general geological investigation.

It is true, that Geology does not lead us to a beginning of this world. But it does contain the history of the world from a period long anterior to the existence of life upon it, as well as its subsequent history. We can determine, with great precision, the period at which the first living beings existed, their character and modes of life. We know distinctly when they disappeared, and when new forms of life appeared. They must have been created; that is, there must have been miraculous interposition in giving form and life to new species of being, or these new species must have come into being by a process of development from other and previous forms of matter. So far as any utterance is heard from Geology, it is in contradiction of the development hypothesis. It presents us with a long succession of new species. These new species appear suddenly, not by gradual transition from preëxisting forms. Each is different, in many and important particulars, from any which were known before. There is no indication that the change has been by a perfecting or developing process. The intermediate forms are nowhere found as connecting links. The transition from one form to another and a new form, is without any preparatory steps. The only hypothesis which meets the case is, that at each change, new species, new creations, were introduced.

The development hypothesis of La Mark was put forward at a time when paleontology was in its infancy. Zoölogy soon became, in the hands of Cuvier, so far perfected as to enable him to show that there is no regularly ascending plane from the lower to the higher forms in the existing fauna of the earth. The gradations are by *steps*. There are well characterized distinctions in the organization of the closely allied species, and

the passage, by insensible differences, from one species to another, is not found. It was left for paleontology to show the same thing in the fauna of the præadamite periods. And this it has done so completely, that Darwin, the most recent and the most able defender of the development theory, does not choose to gainsay it. He only holds the decision in abeyance, tacitly acknowledging that paleontology, *in its present state*, is all against him; but claiming that undiscovered forms may constitute the connecting links, without resorting to the doctrine of interventions. Thus the essential fact is conceded, and we must judge of the bearings of any science by what is known, and not by what is hoped. But the tendency of discovery in paleontology, thus far, has been to confirm the belief in these interventions. If there is ever to be a discovery of forms which shall connect the different species and indicate that they have been derived the one from the other, by development, how has it happened that clearly distinguished species have thus far been discovered, and that the intermediate forms all yet remain to be discovered?

Thus all the facts in the history of the distant past, which can be made to touch this question, confirm the belief that there have been interruptions, often recurring, ever since terrestrial life existed, and down to a very recent period. It certainly would not, then, be matter of surprise, if we should find proof of other and more recent interruptions to the order of nature.

The miracles of the Scriptures are rendered probable on moral grounds, and are proved by testimony. But we are indebted to science for the knowledge that there has been a long succession of miracles for countless ages back in the world's history. Hence, when a philosophy, falsely so called, asserts that a miracle is impossible, we can now meet the assertion with the certainty that it is not true, wherever the error may be; for we find these miracles occurring from time to time, as occasions for them occur, all along down the course of præadamite life, since the waters were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared.

It is scarcely worth the while to allude to the assertion, several times thrust forward, that the origination of species,

or the origination of matter, is *inconceivable*; as if whatever is *inconceivable* is impossible. It is very true that we cannot conceive of the *mode* of doing it. We cannot understand the process by which the Divine Being acts. We are not able to see how God could breathe life into inanimate matter, or how from non-existence the material world came into being. We are unable to understand how God could cause matter to obey the law of gravitation. But we are equally unable to see how matter could obey the law of gravitation without a cause. All that can be said is that these things are incomprehensible. But while creative power is incomprehensible, it is not as a subject of thought, *contradictory* to any principle of mind, and we are not, therefore, precluded from believing it, any more than we are a mathematical result, because we cannot follow the steps of the analogies.

Again, he takes pains to remove the necessity of resorting to miraculous interventions, by assuming "that events of an unaccountable character may be parts of some fixed order of causes unknown to us. And that a truly rational inquirer will be content to let such difficulties await their solution"—*p.* 272. If this principle were allowable, then no effect could be regarded as a miracle, till we are sure that all discovery that is ever to be made, has been made. The principle would be applicable to any fact which is strictly anomalous in kind—one of which we know no law bearing upon it. Our inability to explain it may result from our ignorance, and the difficulty must await its solution. But the case is different when a well-known law in a particular instance ceases to operate. Thus, if at the word of a man, the waters of a sea divide "and become a wall unto them on their right hand and on their left," till a nation has passed through on dry ground, and then at the word of a man the waters return again into their place, such an event is not one that must be left to await its solution. The inability to explain it does not depend on our ignorance, for the law of the equilibrium of water we are well acquainted with. If we did not know the law of the substance acted on, then the fact might be a difficulty which must await its solution. But we know the law,

and know that in a given instance that law was interrupted. The miracles of the Scriptures possess their evidential character in this aspect alone. They are not merely wonders, but they are interruptions to the laws of nature,—*obvious interruptions to well-known laws.*

It would scarcely be pardonable to omit any allusion to our author's misrepresentations of some of the ablest Christian writers. Thus, while correctly quoting Butler on miracles, he so perverts an occasional expression, as to leave the impression that Butler regarded miracles, not in the light of a proof of Christianity, but as remarkable occurrences, all reducible ultimately, as the phenomena of electricity have already been, to well understood laws of nature.

There is another class of misrepresentations that should be referred to. An effort is made to show that the miracles of Scripture are not sustained by satisfactory testimony, and then to show that alleged miracles of modern times are substantiated by equally, or more, reliable testimony. Of the case which is said to have occurred in Edinburg, about the year 1830, we are not minutely informed. But as to the miracles at the tomb of the Abbé Paris, Prof. Powell, in most palpable disregard of the testimony given by witnesses under oath, before the civil tribunals, claims that the facts asserted could not be disproved, and that the evidence was unassailable. After such perversions, we should feel justified in referring to documents, rather than accept his statements.

But the thing specially noticeable is, that he should make this unnecessary effort to disparage miracles. Though we scarcely know what his admission amounts to, yet he does admit the miracles of the New Testament. But the whole aim of his book is to show that they are not to be regarded in any physical sense. This admission of them, and then the removal of them from any physical interpretation, would seem to answer his avowed purpose of rendering allowable the truths of Scripture in their spiritual sense. But this discussion of the later alleged miracles is clearly intended to throw discredit upon the honesty or competency of the sacred writers. It is as if the doctrine of the impossibility of physical

interruptions needed support by weakening the ordinary evidences of miracles.

The facts compel us to say that Prof. Powell also misrepresents the results and tendencies of science; particularly Geology, Ethnology, Natural Theology and Biblical Interpretation, as unfavorable to evangelical Christianity. For this we can hardly imagine an apology; for in these sciences he claims to be an adept, and he ought to have been sufficiently observant to free him from inaccuracy in such statements. But we have no hesitation in putting forward the counter-statement, and are sure that a searching examination and the ultimate verdict will sustain us.

The reader will now necessarily inquire what is the aim of the Rev. Baden Powell in such a work. We are not by any means prepared fully to answer. It is not difficult to see what the result will be. The book will have influence upon the minds of a class of persons who have too much of character and acquaintance with science and Biblical evidence to give much heed to the clamor of men of the baser sort against religion; but who would accept apparent results of a scientific and grave discussion. If a distinguished physicist and clergyman has, in opposition, it would seem, to education and to interest, been compelled to abandon the views of his co-laborers—and especially if he rests upon a basis so convenient for reference and application, as a denial of the physical possibility of those phenomena upon which the essential evidence of the Christian Revelation depends, it cannot but have its influence in unsettling the convictions of some, in confirming the doubts of others, and perhaps in furnishing to a third class a fallacious argument, of which the fallacy can be shown only by those who are somewhat conversant with physical science.

The incidental intimations of the author's proclivities do not impress us favorably. He leaves the conviction upon the reader's mind that he is a materialist; and we do not see, from some of his statements, how he can escape a denial of liberty and moral accountability. He obviously sympathizes with such men as H. T. Buckle, and Hume, and Hobbs, while he gives the cold shoulder to Mansel, and Hamilton, and Hugh

Miller. But it is by no means essential to bring these incidental matters into our estimate.

Whether he secretly aims at what others openly boast of having accomplished, we would not too confidently assert. Strauss boasts of having overthrown to its very foundations the evangelical record as an authoritative or historical promulgation of a religion, and he then proceeds to reconstruct out of its ruins a dogmatic Christianity. Powell discredits the entire system of Christian evidences, and then adopts the whole of Christianity by *faith*. We quote his words:

"To obviate serious misconception, it is material to insist on the distinction that, while the boundary line, by which the deductions of science are so necessarily limited, is thus carefully drawn, this is by no means to be misunderstood as if it were meant as a *negative* of higher truths; but only that they are of *another order*"—p. 249.

"Thus on every ground, we can only arrive at the conclusion that the belief in miracles, whether in ancient or modern times, has always been a point, *not of evidence* addressed to the *intellect*, but of *religious faith* impressed on the *spirit*. The mere fact was nothing: however well attested, it might be set aside; however fabulous, it might be accepted—according to the predisposing religious persuasion of the parties. If a more philosophical survey tend to ignore suspension of nature, as inconceivable to reason, the spirit of faith gives a different interpretation, and transfers miracles to the more congenial region of spiritual contemplation and Divine mystery"—p. 439.

Such is Prof. Powell's re-construction, after having given what, if it were accepted as true, would be a fatal thrust at religion. But precisely what he means, we do not understand. We can conceive that his language was not intended to have a meaning, but to serve as a sort of subterfuge, a form of denial of all truth in Christianity, while yet a gloss of piety was used to veil the enormity of such denial. But a more favorable view is not precluded. There may be such an instinctive repugnance to the abandonment of the Christian scheme, that it will be retained on any terms; and yet such a misconception of physical principles as to reject the possibility of miraculous authorization. But the practical effect will be much the

same in the two cases. Miracles are to be rejected, whatever else be done, whether we consider them as falsehoods,—fables, addresses for present effect to the ignorance and superstition of the times,—or as *transferable to the more congenial regions of spiritual contemplation*. With any such disposition of miracles, the Scriptures may teach us in the same sense that Prof. Powell may, and we are at liberty, if we so choose, to reject the instruction from any quarter, and with equal impunity. But when we come to the question, How shall man be just with God? no reliable answer is returned. The Scriptures profess to answer, but they are convicted of too many untruths to merit any attention. The world is left in the depths of its ignorance, and no conceivable way now remains by which information can be authenticated. If these doctrines are carried to their last result, society, in its more advanced state, must either reject religion in all its phases, or accept those blasphemous views—not unknown on this side of the Atlantic—in accordance with which every man receives in himself all the restoration which he needs, becomes his own Savior, and may become as worthy of adoration as he who claimed to be the Son of God.

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ARTICLE IV.—DR. EDWARD BEECHER'S "CONFLICT"
AND "CONCORD."

1.—*The Conflict of Ages; or the great Debate on the Moral Relations of God and Man.* By EDWARD BEECHER, D. D. 1853.

2.—*The Concord of Ages; or the Individual and Organic Harmony of God and Man.* By EDWARD BEECHER, D. D. 1860.

THESE volumes of Dr. Beecher, though published at different periods, and under different titles, are part and parcel of the same scheme of doctrine. The latter work is but a pendant, a complement, of the former, advocating and defending the same opinions, and carrying them out to greater lengths. It will be appropriate to notice the previous volume first.

By "the Conflict of Ages," Dr. B. understands the controversy, which has been going on for ages in the Christian church, respecting human depravity; those on the one side insisting, as the result of their own convictions and consciousness, on the natural and entire depravity of man; while those on the other side, not being able to reconcile such a state of things with the perfections of God, and with what he owes to new created beings, have been inclined to modify, to soften, and in some instances to deny altogether, the fact of such depravity. In this controversy are involved what Dr. B. calls the two "grand, moving powers of Christianity;" viz: the perfection of the Divine character on the one hand, and human depravity and wickedness on the other. And what is peculiarly unfortunate, these powers, he tells us, according to the present adjustment of things, are counteracting one another; so that, like a steamship whose paddle wheels should move in opposite directions, the vessel can only roll, and tumble, and whirl about in the foaming flood, without the possibility of making progress.

Dr. B. defines precisely, in some of his first chapters, what is due from the Creator to *newly created* intelligent beings,—what “the laws of honor and right” demand of him, on their behalf; and he is entirely confident that these laws have not been regarded. The conclusion therefore is, that *they were not then newly created*; that they must have existed and sinned in a former state of being; and that they have been sent into this world, with all their sinful habits and propensities about them, with a view to their possible reformation and salvation.

Such is the theory of Dr. B., on which he accounts for the natural and entire sinfulness of mankind; and such the argument, and almost the only argument, by which he attempts to establish the fact of our preëxistence. He admits that there is no proof of it in the direct language of Scripture; though he insists (falsely, as we shall show), that there is no proof to the contrary. But such a supposition is absolutely necessary, in order to reconcile the fact of our natural and total sinfulness with the acknowledged perfections of God, and with what he owes to newly created beings. His argument is revolved, and re-revolved, and viewed in all possible aspects and lights, through the five hundred and fifty pages of this thoroughly elaborated volume. The history of the conflict from age to age is unfolded, objections are weighed, and an earnest effort is made to commend the theory to the consideration and acceptance of all classes of professing Christians. The spirit of the work is kind and charitable, and the author seems to have indulged the hope,—a vain one, as the event has showed,—of bringing not only Evangelical Christians, but Pelagians and Unitarians, to unite with him in his peculiar views.

With this brief statement of the general theory and plan of the author, we proceed to offer such remarks as have occurred to us, in the reading of this remarkable volume.

And, first, the very title of the book seems to us exceptionable. “*The Conflict of Ages*,” implying that the conflict here treated of—the controversy respecting human depravity—has been the chief, if not the only controversy of the religious world, in all past time. And yet Dr. B. knows full well

that this is not the case. Other questions were mooted, and other controversies agitated, long before the days of Augustine and Pelagius, when the subject of depravity began to be discussed. Such were the controversies of the ancient philosophers respecting the existence, the nature, and perfections of God ; and the controversies with the Gnostics respecting the origin of evil. The controversy concerning the Trinity and the person of Christ preceded that concerning depravity, in the Christian church, by several generations, and has continued, with little abatement, to the present time. This controversy, certainly, is as well entitled as that concerning depravity to be denominated "*the Conflict of Ages.*" Each has been *a* conflict of ages, — *one*, in the midst of many others, — but neither can with propriety be termed "*the Conflict of Ages.*"

Our second remark relates to what Dr. B. calls "*the moving powers of Christianity.*" These he holds to be the fallen and ruined condition of man on the one hand, and the perfection of the Divine character on the other ; or, as he expresses it, "*the principles of honor and right*" which God must have observed, in his treatment of new created beings. Now, we admit that these are principles of great importance and influence ; but that they are entitled to be called "*the moving powers of Christianity,*" as though they were its only, or its principal moving powers, may well be doubted. The Apostle Paul seems to regard *the love of Christ* as the great moving power of the gospel. "*The love of Christ constraineth us ; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead ; and that he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him who died for them, and rose again.*" Other mighty moving forces, according to the same Apostle, are "*the powers of the world to come.*" Considerations drawn from the future world, — the resurrection, the final judgment, the glories of heaven, and the pains of hell, — these, probably have more power to stir and influence the human mind, than almost any other. It is under the influence of these truths, that men are generally awakened. It is under the influence of the love of Christ, that they

are melted and subdued. Certainly, the principles referred to by Dr. B., though acknowledged to be of much importance and influence, are not entitled to be regarded as exclusively, or chiefly, "*the moving powers of Christianity.*"

We come next to a consideration of what our author calls "the laws of honor and right,"—those which are binding upon the Supreme Being, in his treatment of new created minds. They are, says our author, such as the following : 1. That he shall not "hold his creatures responsible or punishable for anything in them of which they are not the authors, but of which he is, either directly or indirectly, the creator, and which exists in them anterior to, and independent of any knowledge, desire, or choice of their own." 2. "That he shall not himself confound the distinction between right and wrong, by dealing with the righteous as with the wicked." 3. That he shall "not so charge the wrong conduct of one being to others, as to punish one person for the conduct of another, to which he did not consent, and in which he had no part." 4. "That he shall confer on new created beings such original constitutions as shall, in their natural and proper tendencies, favorably affect their prospects for eternity, and place a reasonable power of right conduct, and of securing eternal life, in the possession of all." 5. "Not only do the demands of honor and right forbid the Creator to injure his creature in his original constitution, but they equally forbid him to place him in circumstances needlessly unfavorable to right conduct, and a proper development of his powers."

Such are "the principles of honor and right," as laid down by Dr. B., and of which he has much to say, in the course of his reasonings. He regards them as imperatively *binding* upon God, in his treatment of new made intelligent creatures. In some instances, they are stated more fully and strongly than in the above quotations. For example, he says, p. 481, "In order to justify God, and to condemn his sinful creatures, all the sentiments of an honorable mind demand that it be made to appear, that he did all for his creatures that our highest conceptions of justice, honor, magnanimity, and generosity require ; all that was needed to place them in the most

favorable position possible, all things considered, for good conduct."

My first remark in regard to these alleged principles of honor and right is, that we are but poorly qualified to judge respecting them. They are above our reach. We are indeed made capable of moral perception,—of distinguishing, within certain limits, the right from the wrong ; so that, on a variety of questions, the appeal is pertinent: "Why, even of your own selves, judge ye not what is right?" But since the distinction between right and wrong grows out of the nature and relations of things, and since, beyond a very little distance, this nature and these relations are entirely unknown to us, we are but poorly qualified, except so far as we have the Divine word for our guide, to pass upon intricate moral questions. How much do we know respecting the nature of the Supreme Being, and the relations which he sustains to all possible and actual existences ; and how little it becomes us to decide as to the principles of honor and right which, under all circumstances, are binding upon him? *He* knows perfectly what they are, and he can, if he pleases, reveal them to us ; but beyond what he has revealed, it becomes us to decide with the extremest caution.

To some of the principles which Dr. B. has laid down we could ourselves subscribe. They are so obvious as to preclude all hesitation. To others, we could subscribe with some modification. To others still, and those which are most essential to his argument, it is doubtful whether we could subscribe at all. For example, we know not that God is bound, in honor and right, to place every new created being "in the most favorable position possible, all things considered, for his good conduct." We are not sure that he has done as much as this for any new created being whatever. It is certain that he did not do it for our first parents ; nor is it likely that he did it, at their first creation, for the angels. The angels, like our first parents, were once on trial ; and trial implies something more than the possibility or the liability, to sin. It implies the existence of something to *try* the subjects of it. In other words, it implies *temptation* ; and to expose a new made creature to

temptation is not to place him "in the most favorable position possible for his good conduct." In that previous state, of which Dr. B. speaks, we were not ourselves placed, according to his theory, in the most favorable position possible. We were exposed to the seductions of the great leaders in rebellion, who fell before we did, and by their "wiles and temptations" we were drawn into sin. See pp. 239, 243.

Besides, there are other principles of honor and right, which we think quite as obvious as some which Dr. B. has cited, the admission of which would be fatal to his argument. For example, is it right for God to take a fallen spirit of his own creation, strip him of all consciousness of the past, reduce him to a state of infantile ignorance and weakness, send him into this world, and here subject him to all sorts of perils, and hold him liable to eternal punishment, for sins of which he has not, and cannot have, the slightest knowledge? Is it right for God to subject such an one, from the first, to the influence of corrupting moral associations, and of infernal spirits, and all this in the endeavor to convert and save him? We suggest these queries, to which others might be added, for the consideration of Dr. B. In view of them, let him decide whether there are not other principles of honor and right, which are quite as obvious, and of as binding a character, as some of those which he has proposed.

It seems to us, that the manner in which God should treat his new made creatures in this world, or in any other, will depend very much upon the kind of probation on which they are to be placed. If they are to enter upon a probation of law, of works, as the angels did, and as our first parents did, to see whether they will continue obedient and live forever; then, obviously, their moral existence should commence without any native corruption, or inbred propensities to evil. And this is just what so many of our old standard writers, whom Dr. B. quotes, have said, and truly said, respecting the state of man before the fall. But suppose a race of intelligent creatures is to enter upon a very different probation,—to see, not whether they will persevere in holiness, but whether they will turn from their sins,—not whether they will obey and be

happy, but whether they will repent and be forgiven. The conditions of their existence are now mightily changed, and the obligations of their Creator towards them are changed also. If, — through the operation of some wise natural law — a law which could be interrupted only by miracle, — such persons should be left to commence their moral existence under the influence of native corruptions which were sure to show themselves in evil, no reproach or dishonor could, on that account, be cast upon their Maker.

One of the most objectionable parts of the work before us — the one which we deem of the most hurtful tendency, is that in which the author sets forth the difficulties and alleged absurdities of attempting to connect our sins with that of Adam. These difficulties he turns over and over, looks at them in various aspects and lights, magnifies them to the utmost, arrays one class of theologians against another, and thus provokes the enemies of evangelical religion to say: "This is what we have always told you. This doctrine of depravity, as derived from Adam, is a monstrous absurdity. It shocks all our sentiments of honor and right. And now you hear as much from one of your own number. You have it on the authority of Dr. Edward Beecher, that such a doctrine can never be received as true."

So great was the exultation among Unitarians and Universalists, when "the Conflict of Ages" was first published, that one of their leaders said, "This book gives to orthodoxy the severest blow that it has ever had. We rejoice to see Dr. Beecher pulling away the foundation from the edifice of spiritual Babylon." * Another declared his "readiness to expend a large portion of the funds of the American Unitarian Association, in circulating the work." † And yet none of these men have any more confidence in Dr. Beecher's mode of introducing sin into the world, than they have in the commonly received theory; and they exult in what he has done, only as they think it will go to unsettle orthodoxy, and may have a

* Thomas Whitmore. † Dr. Ellis, of Charlestown, Mass.

tendency to draw unwary souls into the meshes of their own delusions.

It is no part of our plan to go into a prolonged discussion of human depravity, and of its connection with the first sin of Adam. This would require a volume. We will here only say that the connection of our sin with that of Adam rests, as we have before hinted, upon a *natural law*—*a wise and good law*—a law of wide extent, and of far-reaching influence—a law which could be counteracted only by a miracle, and that miracle God was under no obligations to perform. Every seed among vegetables produces its like. Every living creature, whether on the earth, or in the air, or in the water, brings forth others after its kind. And our first parents did the same. When Adam fell, he became at once a depraved, corrupted, ruined man. His very nature underwent a change. He begat children in his own likeness; and these children begat others in their likeness; and so the corruption has descended from father to child, through all succeeding generations.

Nor is this saying, with the Gnostics, that our inherited corruptions belong exclusively to the body. Nor is it saying that the soul is propagated like the body. Even supposing that God gives, by an act of creation, the soul at birth, it is altogether likely that he proceeds, in this important matter (as he does in everything else), according to some established law; and this is the great law of likeness above described.

We know not that this most important law has ever been interrupted, in a single instance. God has contravened other natural laws, by the performance of miracles; but never this. So great was his regard for this law of likeness, that when the man Christ Jesus was to be brought into the world without the taint of natural corruption, God chose to perform a miracle in another way. He chose to introduce his Son upon the earth, without the intervention of a human father.

If this law of likeness made us sinners, independent of our own activities, or subjected us to punishment for sins that were not our own, we could not undertake to vindicate it. But it does neither. The very nature which we inherit from Adam

is an *active* nature, else it could not be a sinful one; and its acts, from the first, are spontaneously, freely, selfishly wrong. They are as really our own, and as really sinful (though not, of course, to the same degree), as any of our subsequent acts. Hence, we deserve a degree of punishment for them; and the provision which God has made for our deliverance and salvation is all of *grace*, — free, sovereign, glorious grace.

In describing the case of the infant, as being a sinner in consequence of his descent from Adam, Dr. B., in some instances, misrepresents it, and aggravates it, making it much harder than it is. Thus he tells us that man is "wronged at the outset;" that "from the very first, he is abandoned of God;" that his "constitution is so deranged and corrupt, as to tend to sin with a power which no man *can* overcome." * But nothing of this, as it seems to us, is true. No sins are charged upon the individual, which he does not freely and actively commit, and he is punished for no one's sins but his own. Nor is he punished for these any more than they deserve; nor, in the present life, in any measure so much as they deserve. How, then, is he "wronged at the outset?"

And as to his inheriting a tendency to sin which he *cannot* overcome; this is true only in the *moral sense*. His inability is no other than a want of inclination, which furnishes no excuse for sin.

And the infant child, so far from being "abandoned of God," is taken up, from the first, by the *grace of God*, and ample provision is made for its salvation. If removed out of the world in mere infancy, it is first, as we believe, renewed and pardoned, and then taken directly to heaven. Or if its life is continued, it enters on a probation of grace, the means and provisions of which are so abundant, that salvation cannot be forfeited, but by its own fault.

Speaking of the advantages of his theory of preëxistence, Dr. B. says: "Man," on this supposition, "is the author of his original depravity, and not God. What men enjoy, in

* Pp. 158, 458, 473.

this world, is a gracious gift of God to them, beyond their deserts. What they suffer is less than they deserve ; for it is of the Lord's mercies that they are not consumed. The multitudes that are saved, owe eternal life to the free grace of God. All who are lost, perish entirely by their own original revolt from God, persisted in during this life. But on the other supposition,"—that man commences his existence here, and becomes a sinner through the sin of Adam,—"*none of these things is true*"—*p.* 244.

Now, so far from assenting to this closing assertion, we hold that, on the latter supposition, *all* the things before said are true. They are as true on the latter supposition as on the former. On the theory we advocate, "man, and not God, is the author of his original depravity," *i. e.*, if by depravity be meant sin. Man is as much the *actor*, the *responsible author*, of his first sin, as of his last. On the theory we advocate, "what men enjoy in this world is a gracious gift of God to them, beyond their deserts. And what they suffer is less than they deserve ; for it is of the Lord's mercies that they are not consumed." And so of the remaining statements in the above quotation. All these things are as true on the common evangelical theory, as they are on that presented by Dr. B. ; and it is unaccountable that he should not have known it, and acknowledged it.

But to come more directly to the new theory of accounting for human sinfulness, we mean that of preëxistence. The doctrine is, in brief, this : That at some remote period, long anterior to the creation of this world, we were all created, pure, holy, happy spirits ;—that we persisted in holiness for a time, but at length, through the power of temptation, and the seductions of those who had lived and sinned before us, we were drawn into sin ;—that we lived in sin, no one knows how long, until evil habits and propensities had accumulated upon us ;—that with a view to our possible recovery from sin, God determined to create a material world, and send us into it, on a probation of grace ;—that to prepare us for this new probation, he found it necessary to obliterate from our minds all knowledge and remembrance of our former state,

reducing us to infantile weakness and ignorance, and allowing us to bring nothing with us from the previous world but the bare substance and faculties of our souls, together with the evil habits and propensities which had grown upon them and corrupted them.* The child thus introduced into this mortal life begins, of course, to sin from the first, and continues to sin until, peradventure, the grace of God arrests him, and he is recovered and saved.

Such is the theory of Dr. B.; by the help of which he thinks to remove all difficulties, and unite all sects and parties on the subject of human depravity and guilt;—by the help of which he hopes so to adjust the great moving powers of Christianity, that the system shall no longer falter and flounder, but shall advance with a vastly accelerated speed, and soon fill the earth.

To the theory in question we have several objections, some of which will now be presented.

1. If this doctrine of preëxistence be true, and of so much importance as Dr. B. represents, it is unaccountable that it should not have been revealed to us in the Scriptures. If it is indeed the only key which unlocks to us the mysteries of our present condition, and unfolds to us the true system of the universe; if it presents the only method in which the facts of our existence can be reconciled with the Divine perfections, and in which the vital powers of Christianity may be so adjusted that the system can advance without obstruction; then why, we ask again, has it not been revealed? Dr. B. admits that it is not directly revealed. If learned at all, it must be learned by implication and inference; and by inference so obscure, that the church, in all ages, with possibly here and there an exception, has been ignorant of it.

Dr. B. insists, indeed, that this doctrine does not stand alone in lacking direct support from the Bible, but that the same is true of several other great doctrines, such as the Divine existence, and the inspiration of the Scriptures. But these as-

* Pp. 235, 239, 243, 462, 466, 530, 535.

sertions are made, certainly, without due consideration, and cannot be sustained.

The more stress Dr. B. lays upon his favorite doctrine of preëxistence, and the greater the importance which he attaches to it, the greater the marvel that it should not have been expressly revealed, and the stronger the objection which the lack of such a revelation presents.

2. The Scriptures teach, not that Adam had long existed in a former life, but that he was *created*, when he began to exist in this world. God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and he *became* a living soul;—clearly implying that he was not a living soul before. And by one of the prophets, God is said, not only to "stretch forth the heavens, and lay the foundations of the earth," but to "*form the spirit of man within him.*" (Zech. xii: 1.)

3. The Scriptures also teach, in direct opposition to Dr. B.'s theory, that our first parents, when first created, were holy. They are said to have been created "in the image of God," and to have been "made upright." Until they had eaten the forbidden fruit, not a word was said to them by their Creator, which indicated that they were, or ever had been, the objects of his displeasure.* So far from this, God communed with them, and blessed them, and pronounced them, and the whole creation, of which they were the constituted sovereign and head, *good—very good.*

4. The Scriptures further teach, in opposition to the same theory, that mankind have not sinned in a previous life. From their intercourse with the heathen, or from some other cause, a portion of the Jews, in Christ's time, entertained the idea, that men were often punished, in this life, for sins committed in a former state. Accordingly, they asked our Savior, respecting the man who had been blind from his birth: "Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born

* Dr. B. infers that our first parents were not holy, at their creation, from the fact that "they were naked, and were not ashamed;"—as though *they were lost to all shame!* But on this ground, what is commonly called their fall was a benefit to them; as it gave them some sense of decency, if nothing more.

blind? Jesus answered, Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents, but that the works of God should be made manifest in him." (John ix: 2, 3.) Our Savior here expressly contradicts the doctrine of a preëxistent state of sin. The Apostle Paul does the same; for he affirms, that before Jacob and Esau had been born upon earth, they had "done neither good nor evil." (Rom. ix: 11.) How could this be said of them, in case they were transgressors from another world?

5. The Scriptures expressly connect our own state of sin and death with *the fall of Adam*, and not with a preëxistent state of transgression. "In Adam, all die." "By one man (Adam) sin entered into the world, and death by sin." "By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation." "By one man's disobedience, many were made sinners." (I Cor. xv: 22; Rom. v: 12—19.) If these passages do not connect the sinfulness of men with the fall of Adam, operating in some way as a cause, then it is impossible for language to do it; and so the words have been understood by Christians, ever since they were written; and for Dr. B., or any one else, to say that the connection here indicated is merely *typical, analogical*, or more properly *allegorical*,—a *seeming* connection, introduced by the Apostle, to aid him in setting forth more strongly the great doctrine of salvation by Christ,—is a most unwarrantable tampering with the sacred word. We have not time nor patience to go into a critical examination of our author's interpretation of the passages above quoted,—extending, as it does, through some twelve chapters of his book. He may have satisfied himself on the subject. We presume he has. But sure we are that he has satisfied almost nobody else. The language of the Apostle is unequivocal. It as plainly sets forth our connection with the first Adam, as with the second,—our fall and ruin through the one, as our redemption by the other; and that kind of exegesis, which would explain away its obvious sense, is very like those glosses and interpretations which would extract Unitarianism or Universalism out of the plain teachings of our Lord and his Apostles.

6. The doctrine of preëxistence is refuted by yet another representation of Scripture. If we existed and sinned in a

previous life, then we must be called to an account for those sins. If we are saved, not only must they be repented of and forgiven, but an account must be taken of them, that the universe may see the amount of our indebtedness to sovereign grace. Or if we are found at last among the lost, an account of them must be taken, else the full demands of justice against us cannot be ascertained. In either case, therefore, whether we are saved or lost, the sins of that previous life (if there be any such) must be accounted for in the final day. And yet no mention is made in the Scriptures of our liability to any such reckoning. So far from this, the very supposition of it is precluded. "We must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things *done in his body*"—in *the present world*—"according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." (II Cor. v: 10.)

7. We add, finally, as an argument against the doctrine of preëxistence, that it removes no difficulties. It embarrasses the subject of human depravity with many new difficulties, but we see not that it removes any of the old ones. On this theory, as on that commonly received, the infant comes into the world imbecile, ignorant, and utterly unconscious of any former life. On both theories, he commences his existence here with a depraved, corrupted nature, with deranged sensibilities, with propensities and tendencies to evil which lead him directly into sin. On both theories, this natural corruption is the result of natural laws,—laws wisely established and sustained; in the one case, the law of habit; in the other, the law of natural descent. On both theories, the sins of the individual are all of them his own, freely, actively committed, conferring personal guilt, and deserving of punishment; so that salvation, in both cases, is entirely of grace. And now what mighty difference is there, so far as the removing of difficulties is concerned, between the two? We cannot see that the new theory removes any difficulty which has been thought to lie against a fair and reasonable interpretation of the old; while certainly it embarrasses the subject with many difficulties peculiar to itself, such as that it contradicts the Bible in a variety of particulars, as we have seen, and is itself a mere assumption, without any proof from con-

sciousness, memory, philosophy, history, or from any other source.

Dr. Beecher's second volume, "*The Concord of Ages*," is, as we said, but a complement of the first; advocating the same views, as to the preëxistence of the human race, their sin and fall in a former life, and their being sent into this world, and here placed under redemptive influences, with a view to their possible recovery and salvation. And yet some of the connected points are more fully developed in the second volume, and carried out to ulterior results. He tells us that the angels were not all of them created at once; that the oldest and greatest of them date back their origin to a vastly remote period,—long anterior, not only to the placing of man upon the earth, but to the inception of a material universe. He tells of the trial on which they were placed, and of the particular temptation before which they fell. "We know what it was from which the first generation [of angels] revolted. From pleasure, of course, there was no temptation to revolt. But from a *discipline of suffering*, such as they needed to fit them to be founders of the universe with God, they could be tempted to revolt." (p. 98.) "That Satan and his followers needed, in some way, a *discipline of suffering*, and were called to it, and also that they revolted from it, renouncing faith, obedience, and patience, and enthroning self-will and self indulgence, the very nature of the case, and their spirit and policy in all ages since, most clearly evince." (p. 254.)

The great Jehovah was, of course, grieved and distressed at the fall and ruin of so many of his creatures; but he could not prevent it. He did what he could, but "in the earlier periods of creation there was a necessary limitation of his power."* The revolt came in spite of him; his grand sys-

* "Either the limitation of Divine power in the earlier stages of creation, which I advocate, exists, or it does not. If it does not exist, then no man can defend God against the charge of malevolence. If it does exist, then there is, as I have shown, a simple and natural solution of the origin of evil." (Conflict, &c., p. 486.)

"So long as infinite and unconditioned power at all times to exclude all sin is ascribed to God, and his suffering is denied, the malignant spirit of the system of evil cannot be exposed." (Concord, &c., p. 176.)

tem was disorganized ; and it only remained that he must restore it in the best possible way.

With this object in view, — having abandoned Satan and the other great leaders in revolt to the ruin they had incurred, and having reserved in safe keeping, somewhere, the less guilty rebels, who had been more recently created, and had been seduced by their wiles, — he resolved to create, for this latter class, a material world, and to send one after another, in a way of ordinary generation, into bodies here. For them he would provide a Saviour ; he would furnish them with new spiritual influences and means of grace ; he would make even their material organizations (which are so often represented as a temptation and a snare) a means of instruction and profit to them ; and by these methods he would recover great numbers to himself. Those who cannot be in this way restored, must be left under the power of their great leader and destroyer, and go to their own place.

The course of things here indicated has been in progress now for a long period, — ever since the placing of man upon the earth ; in all which time, God has been “ gathering in his own elect,” and “ enduring, with much long suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction.” But the period of suspended light and full moral impression is now well nigh over. The repressed emotions of the Almighty will soon burst forth ; his anger will burn like fire ; Satan and his hosts will be confounded and confined ; the glory of the Lord will suddenly be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together. Christ will soon be married to his redeemed church, and “ the Concord of Ages ” will be, temporarily, consummated.*

After a long period of rest and peace to the church, during which the company of redeemed ones will be vastly augmented, and by means of them Christ will be carrying on his work of reorganization throughout the universe, Satan will be loosed for a little season. But he will speedily be smitten down again, and involved in a more hopeless condition than

* All this is to be done at the pouring out of the seventh vial, spoken of in Rev. xvi : 17.

before ; and from that time onward, "the Concord of Ages" will be perpetual and eternal. It will be disturbed no more forever.

The final victory over Satan and his rebel host will not be, however, one of force, but rather of light, of conviction, and of moral impression. "The power which prevails is not almighty force ; but it is the power of long suffering goodness and truth, in their highest forms, triumphing over its opposite spirit, so fully developed by its evil and malignant influences." "The whole is, on the part of God, a victory, not of force, but of logic, of truth, and of holy emotion, purifying and uniting the universe forever." (pp. 555, 523.)

On this condensed statement of the views of Dr. B., as exhibited in his second volume, it would be easy to multiply remarks ; but we must confine ourselves to a very few.

One of the first inquiries which suggests itself is this : How does Dr. B. *know* all that is involved in this far reaching hypothesis ? The Bible discloses some things ; but above and beyond what it reveals, *how does Dr. B. know ?* The Bible informs us that at some time, previous to the creation of man, God brought into being a multitude of angels ; that a portion of them fell into sin ; and that the great leader of the rebel host, under the guise of a serpent, became the seducer of our first parents. But how does Dr. B. know that the creation and revolt of the angels took place at such a vastly remote period ; that they took place, not together, but at different times ; and all anterior to the material universe ? How does he know as to the nature of that probation on which the angels were originally placed, the injunctions laid upon them, and the precise form of the temptation before which they fell ? The Bible asserts God's unlimited power over the hearts and actions of creatures ; how does Dr. B. know that, in the early periods of creation, his power was so limited that he could in no way prevent the fall of the angels ? How does he know so much of God's vast system of the universe, which was broken in upon by this revolt of angels, and which, through the instrumentality of his redeemed church, he has undertaken to restore ? The Bible intimates, if it does not directly assert,

that *all* "the angels, who kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, are reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day." How does Dr. B. know that only a *part* of them are in this hopeless condition, and that the other part are reserved for a probation on the earth? How does he know that we ourselves belong to this fallen company, and that our present depravity, though we are not at all conscious of it, is the result of sin in a former life? How does he know as to the blessed results of our present probation, and that they are to be brought about, in great measure, through the influence of material organizations? How does he know when Christ's victory over Satan is to be accomplished, and "the Concord of Ages" is to be ushered in, and that this grand consummation is to be effected, not at all by physical force, but only by the force "of logic, of truth, and of holy emotion, purifying and uniting the universe forever?"

We might multiply questions of this sort, and wait long for an answer, were it not that Dr. B. has told us, in part, how he came by his knowledge. It is not all the fruit of his logic, though on this he lays a mighty stress. Christ, he tells us, "is the great leader of his church in philosophy and logic," and Satan's beasts "are as sensitive to it as they are to fire." (pp. 459, 542.) But his superior knowledge, on the high topics above referred to, is chiefly the result of *revelation*. "The true and highest ground of certainty lies in the fact, that God is a real Being, and that he has a *self-revealing power*, such that he can make his presence, thoughts, emotions, and character a vivid reality to the mind. To receive and be affected by such a self-revelation of God, the mind is by its nature adapted. It was designedly so made by God, just as the eye was made to see the sun." (p. 41.) "There may be a thousand mysteries in the nature of God, * * * and yet we may have a true and reliable knowledge of him, as an intelligent, moral, and affectionate person; and we may so truly understand his ends, plans, and emotions, that we may be in full and perfect sympathy with him, especially *if he discloses these things to us, as he has promised, in the way of self-revelation.*" (p. 115.)

With this revelation of God to his own soul, Dr. B. is quite confident that he has been favored ; and this is his chief reliance in engaging, as he has done, in "the Conflict of Ages." "It has been feared that I should unsettle man, by assailing certain views of God which I deemed false ; because, in so doing, I shake the old foundations, and men, it is said, cannot or will not reconstruct the system on the better basis proposed by me. This will be as it pleases God. He exists as a real God, in a definite character, and with a *self-manifesting power*. This is my reliance. This is a defence of the truth, that can never fail." "The mind has *divinely inspired intuitions* of intellectual and moral truth." (pp. 43, 314.)

Dr. B. doubtless remembers that others, besides himself, have had supposed revelations, and have relied upon them to their hurt. There is scarcely any extravagance, whether of doctrine or practice, which has not been justified in this way. The monks and mystics had revelations in abundance, received, in most instances, very much as Dr. B. describes. To trust to revelations or impressions, beyond what the Bible reveals, is in the highest degree delusive and dangerous. This is the nit and root of all fanaticism.

Dr. B. has much to say of "a suffering God," and thinks himself far in advance of ordinary Christians in regard to this point. Indeed, it is this feature of the Divine character,—long, patient, benevolent suffering in the behalf of his enemies,—which is to be disclosed at the termination of the existing conflict, to the utter discomfiture of Satan and his rebel hosts.

That God is a personal, spiritual Being, possessing not only intellect and will, but a most perfectly constituted emotional nature, the Bible abundantly teaches, and most Christians believe. He not only *sees* what is doing in the universe, but he *feels* in view of it ; and feels just as a being of infinite wisdom and goodness ought to feel. He feels delight in view of holiness, and displeasure in view of sin. He is happy in the love of his loyal and devoted subjects ; while he "is angry with the wicked every day." God sympathizes with his people, in their trials and sorrows. This is no new doctrine in the

church. It has been held and taught by the ablest divines, in all periods of the church's history. They have not held, indeed, as Dr. B. does, that God is pained in view of evils which he has no power to prevent; for this would be inconsistent with his immediate and perfect blessedness. But that God sees thousands of things taking place in the universe which, in themselves, are disagreeable to him, and that he feels a degree of suffering in view of them, and just that kind and degree of suffering which is most suitable to him as a benevolent being, there can be no doubt. Nor is this kind and degree of suffering at all inconsistent with his perfect happiness. So far from this, his happiness is involved in it. He could not be holy or happy, on any other supposition. How could He be holy or happy, if He had no sympathy in suffering, and could not be displeased in view of sin?

But there is another form of suffering which Dr. B. ascribes to God, respecting which there is more room for doubt. He supposes the Divine nature of Christ to have participated in all the suffering of his physical nature, and more especially in the inflictions and agonies of the cross.

In view of the representations of the Scriptures, and of what we know respecting the attributes of God, we must believe that Christ suffered in his human nature only. Still, He did not suffer as a *mere* man; for He was not a mere man. We believe Him to have suffered more, inconceivably more, than any mere man could have suffered in the same time. He suffered enough, considering the infinite dignity and glory of his person, and his ineffable nearness to the Father, to make as bright a display of the justice of God, of his regard for his law, of his holy hatred of sin, and his determination to punish it, as could have been made in the eternal destruction of our guilty race. His sufferings thus became a *full equivalent*, a *substitute*, for the penalty of the law, and laid a firm foundation of hope and salvation to all those who flee to him and put their trust in him.

Dr. B. has some peculiar notions as to the reach and the efficacy of Christ's sufferings and death. They not only availed to make an atonement, in the ordinary acceptance of

the term, but there was in them the power of *an example*,—the example of a *suffering God*,—which was felt, and will be felt in the world, forever. “The essential element in the power of the cross is the power of *God's example*. Christ vindicates and establishes the law, and atones for sin, not merely by the transient infliction of a penalty upon Him, but by *the moral force of the whole act*, in all its relations, in all worlds, and forever. No penalty inflicted on the lost world so reveals God's convictions as to holiness and sin, and so confirms the universe, as did this example.” (p. 190.)

Throughout “*The Concord of Ages*,” Dr. B. reiterates his objections to the fall of Adam, and the introduction of sin, through his instrumentality. This doctrine he *certainly knows* cannot be true. “We can *know*, and that infallibly, that it is at war with the very nature of God; that he could not do what is ascribed to him, without denying himself,—without violating every sensibility of his nature.” (p. 177.) We have heard men speak as confidently before, in opposition to God's plainly revealed truth. The Unitarian tells us that, whatever else may be true, the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be; that whatever else the Scriptures quoted in proof of it may be supposed to mean, they cannot teach or mean the Trinity. The Universalist tells us the same, in regard to the doctrine of eternal punishment. And yet the faith of the Christian world is not shaken by such confident assertions. “The foundation of God standeth sure.”

Having rejected what we conceive to be the doctrine of Scripture as to the origin of human depravity, Dr. B. falls back, with the utmost assurance, on his favorite theory of pre-existence. But we have no occasion to follow him here, or to discuss this branch of the subject further. It is mournful to see so much talent, and learning, and piety, and capacity for usefulness, as are concentrated in Dr. B., all devoted,—we had almost said prostituted,—to the inculcation of a dogma, which very few Christians on the face of the earth ever have believed, or can believe. He acknowledges to some disappointment as to the result of his first publication. He is conscious, perhaps painfully, that he stands almost alone. Still

he has faith in God, and has no doubt that the truth and the wisdom of his speculations will ere long be vindicated. To all this we unite with him in saying: "This will be as it pleases God."

Dr. B. has several chapters on what he calls "pious ignorance." This, he says, is the refuge under which the believers in Adam's fall and its consequences have long sheltered themselves. They cannot explain the connection between Adam's sin and that of his posterity; and when an attempt is made at explanation, scarcely any two agree. And yet they all cling to the doctrine, under the impression that it is revealed and must be true, whether they can understand it or not.

Now were we to admit the truth and the fairness of the above representation, — which we do not admit, — it would be pertinent to inquire: Is not Dr. B. chargeable with the same kind of pious ignorance which he attributes to others, and in the same degree? Does he not believe a thousand things as *facts*, the *quo modo* of which he cannot understand or explain? Let him tell us, if he can, *how* the three and the one are united in the Godhead; or *how* the Divine and the human are united in the person of Christ; or *how* body and soul are united in his own person? Or to come nearer to the subject in hand; if we all existed and sinned in a previous life, can Dr. B. tell us why our Heavenly Father has taken from us all knowledge and remembrance of such a state, and why he has given us no intimation of it in his word? There are a great many things respecting which we all are, and must be ignorant in the present life, and this certainly should be a "pious ignorance," if it exists at all.

It is due to Dr. B. to say, before we close, that the view which he takes as to the introduction of evil into this world is not inconsistent, necessarily, nor do we understand it to be so in his own mind, with substantial orthodoxy, on most of the great points of the evangelical faith. If we came into this world as fallen spirits from a previous state of existence; if we live here as incarnate demons, until by the grace of God we are renewed; then, certainly, we are *depraved creatures*, — deeply, totally, naturally so. We need an almighty Saviour

and Sanctifier ; we need an atonement ; we need to be regenerated by the Holy Spirit ; we need to be justified, sanctified, and finally glorified ; and all this through the abounding grace of God, and the merciful provisions of the gospel. And to those who despise and reject these provisions, "there remaineth nought but a fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries." All that is here stated stands connected with Dr. B.'s theory of depravity as naturally, perhaps, as with our own ; and on all these great points of Christian doctrine, he is regarded as holding substantially the orthodox faith.

And yet we are far from thinking that the speculations in which he has indulged are altogether harmless. In fact, no considerable error, in point of doctrine, should be regarded as harmless. "A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump."

The freedom which Dr. B. has allowed himself, in interpreting certain portions of the Bible, we fear may encourage others in the like or worse practices. And then this doctrine of a pre-existent, sinful state, may lead to inquiries and theories of which our author, perhaps, little thinks. The following may be taken as specimens possible :

"If we all lived and sinned in a previous state, what followed there, in consequence of our sin ? Were we sent down to hell ? If so, it seems we have been raised out of it ; and may not others, who are now there, be raised also ?"

"We were on probation in the other world, before we sinned ; we may have been on probation afterwards ; and now we are on probation again. How many probations is the sinner to expect ? If he has already had two or three, may he not hope for another beyond the grave ?"

"Have the sins which we committed in that previous state been repented of and forgiven ? And if so, on what grounds ? If through the atonement, then Christ must have died for fallen spirits in other worlds, as well as for men in this. May he not have died even for the devils ? But if our sins were forgiven without an atonement, then an atonement is not necessary for lost spirits ; and how can we know that it is necessary for lost men ?"

“If our sins in that previous-life have not been repented of and forgiven, then they all stand against us, and *must be repented of*, if we are ever saved. But we have lost all knowledge of them. They are gone from our sight beyond recall; and how can we repent of sins of which we have not the slightest consciousness?”

“The devils are to be vanquished, it seems, not by might, nor by power, but by the force ‘of logic, of truth, of holy emotion,’ of resistless moral influences. But such a conquest very much resembles a subduing of the heart. Are we to understand, then, that the devils are to be subdued in this way, — or, in other words, to be converted?”

We suggest these queries, not as those which have ever occurred to Dr. B., or perhaps ever will, but as a few among the thousand which will be likely to come up, should his theory of preëxistence be extensively embraced, and by means of which erratic minds will be sure to be led astray. Certain it is, that no error, in which persons feel interested, will be likely to lie long in the mind alone. Unless renounced, it will lead on to others, and these again to others, until the whole soul is darkened, corrupted, and ruined.

But we have better hopes of the author of these volumes, though we thus speak. We trust that he has a “heart established with grace,” which will effectually prevent his being “carried about with every wind of doctrine.” Instead of wandering far from the truth, we hope to see him returning to it, to rejoice with us in the triumphs of the second Adam over all the mischiefs entailed by the first.

ARTICLE V.—THE DOCTRINE OF ROMANS I: 18—23.

[Concluded from the January Number.]

WE will now proceed briefly to interrogate and consider the systems of *Gentile Mythology* on the general subject under discussion. When properly interpreted, do they not corroborate the view we have taken of the teachings of the Apostle to the Gentiles? In other words, do not those mythologies all point to an age in the far off past, when the human race was more of a unit, religiously considered, than it now is — when all the present nations were nearer to a common source of divine knowledge, whence they have brought, in various measure, the elements of a primitive revelation? Do they not confirm, or at least illustrate, the doctrine we have set forth of the deteriorated moral condition of the Gentile races in the age of the Apostle as compared with an earlier age, and of the traditional and fragmentary character of their religious opinions? The result of such examination as we have been able to give to this particular feature of the moral life of ancient Gentileism, may be stated in the language of one who has most profoundly studied that life. Says Tholuck, "An impartial examination of heathenism will afford the important result, that heathenism is *a corrupted truth*, a divine utterance heard falsely, which, in its own nature, comes from God." This remark is, as we shall see, particularly pertinent to the point now before us.

The most careless student of the heathen mythologies must be struck with their obvious relationship, at many points, to the theology of the Old Testament Scriptures. This fact will force itself on his mind, one would think, on their most cursory examination. And this circumstance should suggest the importance of making diligent use of the sacred records of the

earliest books of the Bible in tracing all human religions to their genesis. This we are certain is the only way to give anything like coherency or significancy to the mythological stories of the Roman, Greek, Egyptian, or Indian religions. They cannot be satisfactorily expounded, except by treating them as the remnants and combinations of truths originally revealed from God to man. By connecting them with worship established, and rites ordained, and promises published, whilst yet "the whole earth was of one language and of one speech,"* whilst yet, as the passage may, perhaps, mean all mankind were at one in their religious creed, "when the faith of Shem was confessed in the tabernacles of Japheth, and acknowledged in the tents of Ham,"† before the rebels of the plain of Shinar were "broken into sects over all the earth,"†—by thus connecting them, a very intelligible explanation can yet be given to many of them, and a due place assigned them in the history of human religious opinion. On the other hand, when regarded as either the inventions of the speculative reason, or the offspring of unreasoning religious instincts, they become, for the greater part, a congeries of unintelligible and ridiculous absurdities, a pitiful display of the most capricious pranks of the imagination.

This point is of sufficient importance, and is sufficiently related to our subject, to detain us awhile. The modern distinction between the *legend* and the *myth*, modern at least so far as formal definition goes, though it is thought by some to have been *felt* by the ancients,—this distinction has been apparently *so* accepted by some distinguished Christian authors, as to deny any sort of historical basis to the mythologies of ancient Rome, Greece, Egypt, and India. The latest representation of this character that has fallen under our notice, is found in the Bampton Lectures of Mr. Rawlinson, on "The

* Gen. xi: 1.

† "Religious History of Man." By D. Morison. p. 166. An extraordinarily original and suggestive work, and one to which, notwithstanding some vagaries of fancy, we acknowledge ourself indebted for many valuable hints on subjects kindred with the one before us.

Historical Evidences of the truth of the Scripture Records." Thus, at the very commencement of his first lecture, he writes as follows: "The religions of Greece and Rome, of Egypt, India, Persia, and the East generally, were speculative systems, which did not even seriously postulate an historical basis." We find several subsequent remarks of the same import with this, though we meet with a few also in this same work that may be regarded as somewhat modifying the statement here made, and in another work by the same author, we meet with paragraphs which we shall by and by quote in support of quite another position.

We are not ready to concede unqualifiedly the ground here taken by Mr. Rawlinson; indeed, we are not sure that the author wishes to have the statement quoted interpreted otherwise than comparatively. And to this extent we should agree with him. We cheerfully admit that the mythologies named are not complicated to any great extent with historical facts, but we cannot consent to the view that sets them forth as wholly wanting the element of some very important facts derived from the primitive religious history of mankind. We are not prepared to admit as their sufficient explanation, that "they were developed gradually out of the feeling and imagination of the people." There was, we must believe, at the core of every system of heathen religion, a nucleus of fact and truth of direct, divine original, around which feeling and fancy gathered their fantastic accretions. And hence, in the study of every such system, one main object should be the careful discriminating of the *derived* from the *invented* elements.

The view suggested by Mr. Rawlinson, and which in substance we suppose to be the common view, has had, it seems to us, too long and too exclusive sway in the teaching of our schools and in our literature. Its influence, both upon classical and upon Christian education, we believe to be hurtful. The doctrine that the heathen religions have *no* historical basis, is unfavorable to the important truth of the common origin and the unity of the races of mankind, and has gone far towards dislodging that truth from the minds of men, or of

causing them to hold it with feeble convictions. And moreover, the view does great injury to the mind of the student of history. For, the mythological characters, when disjoined from the great leading characters of Scripture history and promise, cannot be studied without either corrupting and enfeebling the moral sentiments, or else exciting a spirit of skepticism, and bringing the efforts of the human mind in the department of religious speculation into something like contempt.

But let the heathen systems be studied as the degenerate productions of a primitive and revealed religion, of which we have an authentic record in the Old and New Testaments, and they may be both pleasingly and profitably studied. Let the wildest and most extravagant of the Gentile mythologies be bound by legitimate historical connections to the choice vine of an original code of instruction from heaven, and then what would otherwise be meaningless or absurd, and utterly unworthy of the human intellect, would assume significance and importance as testimony to inspired truth. And this result would be of the highest value in its educational influence. A kindlier feeling, a more fraternal and sympathizing feeling, a more humane sentiment in regard to the whole past of the history of the races, a more hopeful outlook concerning the future of the life of mankind; in short, a much more ennobled and comprehensive sentiment concerning the oneness of the nations, and their common interest in all the movements of Providence, would take possession of the classical student, if he was taught to refer the conceptions of God and truth with which he meets in pagan authors to the partial remembrance of a once universal revelation; if he was taught to consider the religions of the Gentile world, not as the utmost to which unaided human struggle can attain, but as the lowest condition to which man can sink in his departure from the revealed knowledge of God; and especially if he was instructed to see, in the results of this departure, a discipline by which the nations are to be prepared to receive again the truths of a common revelation.

That the Gentiles once knew God by virtue of an immediate revelation; that they guiltily departed from his right worship

and substituted the worship of creature-objects ; that, thus, their theistic traditions and primeval faith gradually decayed and disappeared, with only here and there a few lingering remnants to signify the nobility of their original state ; and that it was their history and character in these particulars, and not any question concerning the origin, amongst the heathen, of the idea of the Divine Being from the contemplation of nature, that the Apostle had in view in the passage under consideration,—these are the points to the establishment of which our remarks are directed. Running through all the ancient worships and religious systems from the time of the Dispersion to the time of Christ, we trace the presence and influence of ideas derived traditionally from the one fountain-head of Revealed Theology. And this traditive element it was that gave to heathenism, before the age of the Apostles, all its vitality and strength. This traditive element it was that constituted the Messiah of Jewish promise and expectation, “the Desire of all Nations ;” this traditive element it was that gave force to the Apostle’s rebuke, when he said of the Gentiles, “they are without excuse, because when they knew God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened ;” and this same traditive element it was that formed a link of connection between the false religions and the true, and prepared the nations to hear with relish and appropriating faith the announcement of the great mystery of the gospel concerning the reünion of the Jews and Gentiles, of which Ephesians ii : 11 — 22, is an epitome. And now that the mystery is opened, we can see the meaning of all those religious notions and longings that accompanied the Gentile prodigal in all his wanderings from God, and of which advantage should at last be taken to bring him to Himself, and draw him back to his Father’s house.

We will now select and briefly comment on one or two of the so-called mythological fables, wherein we shall find evidence that the whole group, so far as they are religious, are the relics and vestiges, with additions, of a once revealed and pure religion. The study of all these fables in detail, would

afford proof, we believe, that the ideas of the Divine Being and other associate truths, so far as these appear in them, are not ideas to which any people have risen from a state of uninstructed ignorance, but ideas that advertise bankruptcy and ruin. The moral chaos every where found amongst the extrajudicial and the extra-Christian nations, like the literal chaos of Gen. i: 2, tell the story of the wreck of an inheritance once fair and good. And the right examination of the heathen systems would bring us to this conclusion;— would lead us to adopt the sentiment of a contemporary reviewer of Max Müller's work on ancient Sanscrit Literature, viz.: "This volume reveals the features of strange and uncouth forms of error, or, rather, mixed systems of error and truth. It tells us plainly that when the human mind once lost its way, the more it strove the more it stumbled, and the farther it went the farther it wandered. It tells us that all the relics and traces of former excellence and dignity which man carried away with him from the land of Shinar were of no real avail, and that the gospel alone can bring back light and blessing to the world."* Such study and review as we have in mind, would lead one to affirm of the religions of the Gentile nations what Mr. Trench affirms and argues of the language of the savage tribes, viz., that "they are, in every case, the remnant and ruin of a better and nobler past."

But to come to our example from mythology, which, by the way, we are by no means sure is the best selection that could be made. It is the one that came first to hand, and we set it forth with a brief exposition, merely as a specimen of the method by which we think the examination of the mythological systems generally should be conducted, in order to yield the truest and best results.

What, for example, following the ordinary system of interpretation, can be made of the myth of *Silenus*? What purport can be attributed to this fable that shall make it worthy of Greek invention (for, by the prevailing method of exposition, it is of Greek invention)? *Silenus is a drunken prophet,*

* The Journal of Sacred Literature, Jan., 1860., page 431.

and the story of his person and exploits is generally explained as representing that wisdom that conceals itself behind a rough and uncouth exterior. But this interpretation, the best one probably that can be given, if no historical allusion and no religious significance are to be found in it, is quite unsatisfactory. Why, we ask the advocates of this view, was just this particular outward disguise of wisdom chosen, rather than any other? Is wisdom eminently associated with the wine-bottle? What is the special aptitude for the teaching of the supposed lesson, of an old man, always carrying about with him a wine-bag, and generally intoxicated from its contents? There is manifestly something lame in the commentary that makes this being a representative of the abstract quality of wisdom. And, therefore, the exposition of the fable must be sought in its historical connection with some great fact or truth of interest and value to mankind.

Creuzer* instructs us that we are to seek for the origin of this myth in the religious ideas of the East, and particularly of the Jews. And he refers to the prophecies of Balaam, and also to the earlier prophecy of the patriarch Jacob, found in Gen. xlix: 9, 10. This last we will quote in full, to make more obvious the connection of the myth with the prophecy: "Judah is a lion's whelp; from the prey, my son, thou art gone up; he stooped down, he couched as a lion, and as an old lion; who shall rouse him up? The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a law-giver from between his feet, until *Shiloh* come; and unto him shall the gathering of the people be. Binding his foal unto the vine, and his ass's colt unto the choice vine, he washed his garments in wine, and his clothes in the blood of grapes. His eyes shall be red with wine, and his teeth white with milk." That we have here the point of departure, and the interpreting clew for the fable of Silenus, is a highly probable opinion. It requires but a slight change of orthography to convert *Shiloh* (the more original form probably was Shilon, שִׁלֹן) into *Silenus*, not so great, in fact, as in many other examples where a similar

* Symbolie und Mythologie, iv, p. 50.

genealogy is undoubted. And with this slight change, we can easily read in the accounts of old Silenus riding on an ass, drunk with wine, and filled with the spirit of prophecy, a perversion of the sublime utterance of the inspired patriarch, foretelling the future of Judah, and the advent of the personal Messiah. Thus expounded, there is meaning in the myth of Silenus, filled at once with wine and with prophetic wisdom. We do not insist at all that this connection between the fable and the prophecy of Jacob was understood in the later times of heathenism, but only that there was such a connection, and that with *us* the recognition of the relationship is the only thing that can make the story otherwise than grotesque and ridiculous, or that can forefend the Greek mythology and the Greek mythologists from contempt. There was *once* a religious significance in the central point of the fable—a significance that was gradually lost as the traditional system with which it was connected receded farther and farther from the light of Revelation. That significance needs to be truly pointed out, in order to anything like wholesome instruction for the student of classical literature.

We deem it unnecessary to multiply examples in proof of the point before us. The relationship that we have made probable in regard to one mythological character and a particular passage in the Old Testament, has been made probable, by distinguished writers,* in regard to many other characters and various passages in the early Scriptures. There can be but little doubt that the theory that gives to the ancient systems of religious worship this historical and traditional character, is entitled to higher credit than the theory that refers them to the deification of the powers of nature, or of abstract qualities, by virtue of some religious instinct, or of some effort of the speculative reason.

And especially may this be maintained, since it has become pretty well settled that polytheism was not the original form of any known religious worship, but was, in every instance, a

* In addition to Mr. Gladstone, we would refer the reader to R. Spearman's Letters on the Septuagint, and to Faber's Origin of Idolatry.

subsequent development or invention. The farther back we can trace any human religion, the stronger proof do we find of a primitive belief in the unity of the Godhead. This is the result at which Mr. Colebrook has arrived in regard to the ancient Hindu faith. In his work on the *Religion of the Hindus*, he says, p. 12: "The deities invoked appear, on a cursory inspection of the Veda, to be as various as the authors of the prayers addressed to them, but, according to the most ancient annotations on the Indian Scripture, those numerous names of persons and things are all resolvable into different titles of three deities, and ultimately of one God." That is, the most ancient form of the Hindu faith embraces the great tradition of a Divine Trinity in Unity.

Some of the latest and most authoritative readings of the cuneiform inscriptions of Assyria, go to the proof that the later polytheistic ideas of Chaldea were only the corruption of an original monotheistic idea. On this point, we shall have occasion, in another connection, to quote Mr. Layard.

Says Otto Von Gerlack, in his commentary on Gen. xli: 25: "The belief in one God, which lies at the bottom of all idolatrous religions,—more evidently is this the case with the religions of the most ancient times—is always presupposed by the servants of the true God to exist amongst the heathen."

This is also the result of Mr. Rawlinson's investigations of the Egyptian and other ancient faiths that he has occasion to notice in his labors on Herodotus. The latter says: "The Egyptians, as they advanced in religious speculation, adopted a pantheism, according to which (while the belief in one Supreme Being was taught to the initiated) the attributes of the Deity were separated under various heads, as the 'Creator,' the divine wisdom, the generation, and other principles, and even created things, which were thought to partake of the divine essence, were permitted to receive divine worship."* Again he says: "Originally, indeed, they had the Unity, worshipped under a particular character; which was the case in other countries also, each considering him their protector, and giving

* Rawlinson's Her., vol. ii, p. 244.

him a peculiar form and name, though really the same God ; and it was only when forsaken by him that they supposed their enemies were permitted to triumph over them. (Comp. also Joseph. Antiq. viii, 10, 3, of the Jews and Shishak.) But it was not long before they subdivided the one God, and made his attributes into different deities. In like manner the Hindus have one Supreme Being, Brahme (Neuter), the great one, who, when he creates, becomes Brahma (Masculine) ; when he manifests himself by the operations of his divine spirit, becomes Vishnu, the pervader, or Narayan, ‘moving of the waters,’ called also the first male ; when he destroys, becomes Siva or Mahadiva, ‘Great God ;’ and as Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, is the Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer, which last answers to the regenerator of what only changes its form, and reproduces what he destroys.” * * * The same original belief in one God may be observed in Greek mythology ; and this accordance of early tradition agrees with the Indian notion that “truth was originally deposited with men, but gradually slumbered and was forgotten, the knowledge of it, however, returning like a recollection.” * Once more : “It is easy to perceive in all the religions of antiquity, why so many divinities resemble each other, why they differ in some points, and how they may be traced to one original ; while others, being merely local, have a totally different character. Though they begun by subdividing the one Deity, they subsequently labored to show that all the gods were one ; and this last, which was one of the great mysteries of Egypt, was much insisted upon by the philosophers of Greece.” †

Now, this universal, primitive creed of the Divine Unity, is, to our mind, proof satisfactory that the religions of these various and diverse nations did not flow from the speculative reason by the prompting of the religious instincts, but that they all had one common origin in a direct code of instruction from God. For surely, it would be illogical to attribute the doctrine of the Divine Unity, acknowledged by the best writers to have been universal with all nations in their early

* Rawlinson's Her., vol. 2, pp. 247, 248.

† Ditto.

history, to the human reason, when it is apparent that the subsequent exercise of that reason in religious speculation, so far from preventing the disintegration of the idea of the Divine Unity, actually promoted it—dissipated that idea in either pantheism or atheism.

We cannot more appropriately conclude our remarks on the point now before us, than by quoting the following paragraphs from the second volume of Mr. Gladstone's "*Homer and the Homeric Age*,"—a volume that has come to hand since most of the foregoing paragraphs were written. Speaking of the elements of truth found in Homer, and belonging to the age and people of Homer, he says, page 3: "The more common and popular opinion has perhaps been one * * * which has treated the Immortals of Homer as so many impersonations of the powers of nature," &c. "Few, comparatively, have been inclined to recognize in the Homeric poems the vestiges of a real traditional knowledge, derived from the epoch when the covenant of God with man, and the promise of a Messiah, had not yet fallen within the contracted forms of Judaism for shelter, but entered more or less into the common consciousness, and formed a part of the patrimony of the human race." Of course, Mr. Gladstone is of the opinion that such vestiges are clearly traceable in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, an opinion with which a careful consultation of such a volume as *Duport's Gnomology* of Homer would probably induce most minds to coincide. Again, page 32, he says: "The general view, then, which will be given in these pages of the Homeric Theo-mythology, is as follows: That its basis is not to be found either in any mere human instinct gradually building it up from the ground, or in the already formed system of any other nation of antiquity; but that its true point of origin lies in the ancient Theistic and Messianic traditions, which we know to have subsisted amongst the patriarchs, and which their kin and contemporaries must have carried out with them as they dispersed, although their original warmth and vitality could not but fall into a course of gradual efflux, with the gradually widening distance from their source. To travel beyond the reach of the rays proceeding from that

source, was to make the first decisive step from religion to mythology." It will be readily inferred that we would, in substance, extend the view that Mr. Gladstone has taken of the early Greek religion, to the entire family of ancient Gentile Theo-mythologies.

We pass now to another line of investigation, which will, we think, shed the light of affirmative evidence on our main position, which is, that the idea of God is traditional amongst all nations, and derived from a primitive revelation, for the loss of which, or for its corruption, by the gradual substitution of idolatrous worship, the Gentiles are held responsible by the Apostle.

The particular point we wish to make is, that if heathenism and idolatry were a corruption of a true, original religion, and if, consequently, they came to be what they were in the Apostle's day by reason of the gradual wasting of the knowledge of God, then we ought to find, amongst all ancient heathen nations, traditions and traces, more or less distinct, of that knowledge. We have seen how the mythological systems seem to point in this direction—how the interpretation that gives them this traditional and historical value can be defended on grounds of high probability; but we acknowledge the reasonableness of the demand for something more distinctly and emphatically historical to indicate the original possession of a revealed religion amongst all nations, and of its gradual loss.

Now, in the ancient Scriptures we find enough testimony to enable us to meet this demand. We find numerous incidental notices (and all the more valuable because incidental) that go to the proof of just such a relationship as our position implies between the Hebrew faith and the various faiths and superstitions of the surrounding heathens. These notices are too numerous to allow of our examining them all, or nearly all, in this article. A few examples must suffice to indicate the argument they legitimate.

It has been a matter of surprise and perplexity with many readers of the Old Testament Scriptures, to find, every now and then, evidences of the familiar knowledge of the true

God, and of the true worship amongst people devoted to idol rites ; to hear utterances from the depths of Gentileism not unlike those of the Hebrew patriarchs and prophets. And the perplexity has doubtless arisen, at least in part, from our habit of transferring to the most ancient times the mediæval, and, till within a short time, even the modern separation and non-intercourse between the nations in possession of Revelation and the nations destitute of it. It is natural for us to think of the lines of national separation as running back in a parallel form to time immemorial, instead of converging, and ultimately meeting in a common centre. And so we are apt to think of the religious ideas of the Gentile world as growing up from the religious instincts on the soil of the different nationalities, inasmuch as we know that they were not conveyed by means of missions from the Hebrew race, and inasmuch as they cannot be explained on the ground of the rumor of God's dealings with his people sounding out amongst the heathens. Hence the embarrassment felt by many readers of the Old Testament, when they light on passages giving evidence of the existence amongst the early Gentiles of the clear and familiar knowledge of the being, and providence, and revelation of the true God. This embarrassment would be obviated by the adoption of the view that when, in accordance with the ethnographical chart contained in the 10th chapter of Genesis, the nations migrated from the primitive post-diluvian centre, they carried with them the same fundamental creed, of which some portions were retained by the different divisions of mankind for generations and centuries afterwards. On this point, we quote, with satisfaction, the following just and weighty paragraph from Mr. Gladstone's *Homer*, vol. ii, p. 5 : " Custom has made it with us second nature to take for granted a broad line of demarcation between those who live within the pale of Revelation, and the residue of mankind. But Holy Scripture does not appear to recognize such a severance in any manner, until we come to the revelation of the Mosaic law, which was like the erection of a temporary shelter for truths that had ranged at large over the plain, and that were apparently in danger of being totally absorbed in

the mass of human inventions. But before this vineyard was planted, and likewise outside its fence, there were remains, smaller or greater, of the knowledge of God ; and there was a recognized relation between Jehovah and Mankind, which has been the subject of record from time to time, and the ground of acts involving the admonition, or pardon, or correction, or destruction of individuals or communities."

We will now examine a few instances, and consider their significance in the matter before us, of the knowledge of God and of other sacred truths, preserved amongst the extra-Judaical peoples of antiquity, and recorded in the Old Testament Scriptures.

About four hundred and fifty years after the flood, according to the shorter chronology (but according to the longer, and, perhaps, more probable chronology, more than eleven hundred years), Abraham, the tenth in the series of patriarchs from Noah, on his return from the pursuit of Cherdorlaomer to Damascus, met, in the valley of Shaveh, north of Salem, at the junction of the roads from Sodom and Hebron, the kings of Sodom and of Salem. There is incidental proof, Gen. xiv : 22, that the king of Sodom was not unacquainted with the God whom Abraham worshipped. And of Melchizedek, king of Salem, it is recorded, that he "brought forth bread and wine," the emblems of some priestly service, "and he blessed Abraham, and said, Blessed be Abraham of the most high God, possessor of heaven and earth." Here, in Melchizedek, we have a representative, and we have no authority for assuming, as some writers do, that he was the *last* representative amongst his people, the Canaanites, of a worship of the true God, on the basis, doubtless, of that original and universal covenant into which God entered with Noah and his posterity. If we were at liberty to assume as proved the longer chronology, this historical incident would tell much concerning the tenacity with which the ideas carried away from the primitive seat of the three great divisions of mankind, were retained through many subsequent centuries.

A few years after the above named transaction, Divine Providence brought Abraham into circumstances, the narrative of

which in Gen. xx, throws light on the extra-patriarchal relations of God and man. Abimeleck, a Philistine king of Gerar, is there represented as receiving direct messages from God, and as recognizing both their source and their authority. The religious position of this king is precisely defined by a remark of Abraham, made in justification of his own conduct, and apparently acknowledging his mistake in regard to Abimeleck and his people: "I thought, surely, the fear of God is not in this place." But the fear of God, as well as his knowledge, *was* in that place, and in the king's heart. The true God was known, and, to some extent, revered, amongst the Philistines of Gerar. Now, we do not suppose that in either of these two instances, any persons would be disposed to place the religious ideas brought to light to the account of Natural Theology. So far as they go, these incidents are contributions to the theory of the traditional knowledge of God amongst the Gentiles.

We thus obtain glimpses of the lingering traces of revelation amongst the tribes by which Abraham was immediately surrounded in the land of sojourn and of promise.

Let us now take a little wider outlook in that and in following ages. And we will first follow to the western coast of the Red Sea, and to the valley of the Nile, that stream of population of which Mizraim, second son of Ham, was the source. Already, whilst the father of the Hebrew race was moving with his flocks and tents from Shechem to Bethel, and from Hebron to Beersheba, a mighty empire was rising in Egypt. Was there at that time amongst the Egyptians a knowledge of the Divine Being, and was it such knowledge as would indicate its derivation from a primitive revelation to mankind?

It would, perhaps, be not entirely conclusive to infer from Gen. xii: 17, that Pharaoh *understood* the plagues that came upon him and his household as a divine judgment from the hand of *Jehovah*. And yet this inference would seem to be most in accordance, both with the narrative and with the religious views of earliest antiquity generally, so far as those views crop out from the surface of society. And if at that time Jehovah was recognized in his providential government

alike by Pharaoh and by Abraham, there is no good reason to doubt that their knowledge of him was derived from the same original source. In this manner, certainly, the whole account of the transaction, as given in Gen. xii, is most naturally and most satisfactorily explained.

However this may have been, we find in the subsequent history of Joseph, as given in Gen. xli, notices that make it sufficiently evident that the God whom the young Hebrew feared and served, was not a being unknown or unacknowledged in Egypt. When, with mingled quietness and confidence, Joseph had interpreted the double dream of Pharaoh, the latter expressed his conviction that the Spirit of God, רוח אלהים, was in him. (v. 38.) This acknowledgment seems to have sprung from the lips of the Egyptian king quite spontaneously and naturally, in a manner to indicate that neither the language, nor the thought of divine inspiration it conveyed, were strange or unwonted with himself or those he addressed. And the fact stated immediately afterwards, that Joseph became a member of the priestly order of the country, would indicate that the religion of Egypt was at that time far less idolatrous, and far more pure, than it afterwards became. It was probably in a process of rapid deterioration towards that gross and abominable worship of creature-forms, for which in time it became so notorious, but as yet it had not been wholly divorced from the truth and the worship of the one personal God of original revelation. As yet, the traditions of an earlier and better faith were lingering amongst the descendants of Mizraim. And this view of the teaching of Scripture is corroborated by Mr. Rawlinson, in the third chapter of his Appendix to the second book of Herodotus. He finds — at least we so understand him — the germs of the religious ideas of the Egyptians, as well as of other nations, in the facts recorded in the early chapters of the Bible, and revealed to the fathers of the human race. He supposes that these ideas were carried away from Central Asia, by migratory movements, to different localities, where they took on new features from local influences; and hence, both their resemblance in some points, and their difference in other points.

This is a perfectly rational and common sense view of the subject, and is, moreover, the biblical view.

Let us turn from the great nation of the South to consider the religious ideas of the far east. Let us go to the plain of Mesopotamia. The 24th chapter of Genesis gives us an account of the journey of Eliezer of Damascus to that then distant country, in search of a companion for Isaac. The narrative is, and was intended to be, a beautiful exemplification of the doctrine of a special providence superintending even the domestic and social interests of God's believing ones. But there comes out also, incidentally, the fact that the doctrine of the true God, which was to be perpetuated amongst the chosen race by repeated revelations, was at that time a common possession, as respects all the parties introduced into the narrative. Hear Laban thus saluting Eliezer, and thus acquiescing in the proposal that the old servant brought from Abraham: "Come in though blessed of *Jehovah*, wherefore standeth thou without? The thing proceedeth from *Jehovah*: Behold Rebecca is before thee; Take her, and go, and let her be thy master's son's wife, as *Jehovah* hath spoken." True, there are some, Hengstenberg amongst them, who regard this language of Laban as nothing more than an echo of words spoken by Eliezer. But this interpretation is manifestly unwarranted by anything in the narrative, and is somewhat violently forced upon the narrative in the interest of a too rigid theory in regard to the use of the terms *Jehovah* and *Elohim*. If there was idolatry in Mesopotamia at that time, it had not yet blotted out the traditional knowledge of *Jehovah*. In the family of *Nahor*, at least, there were the remains of a primitive revelation. Indeed, for a long time afterwards, as will be shown, the countries of Mesopotamia were not entirely without remnants of the true religion. The most natural interpretation of the language of Laban is, that it was the spontaneous expression of his faith in, and his acknowledgment of, the God of Abraham, and of Shem, the God of covenant promises, by virtue of which the steward of Abraham had made his important journey. The thing that seems specially to have filled the whole household with joy of the event, was the recognition of the

particular providence of Jehovah, and Hengstenberg's view subtracts from the religious significancy of the transaction.

Now, the only rational explanation of this knowledge of God, possessed in common by the family of Abraham in Canaan, and the family of Laban in Mesopotamia, is, that it was derived in each case substantially from the same source, viz: the traditions brought by Noah from beyond the flood, verified by fresh revelations on the face of the new earth, around the first patriarchal altar, and carried by the diverging descendants of Shem, Ham, and Japheth, into every country of the post-diluvian dispersion. And we may remark here, that it is more than probable that we ought to revise the common opinion that Abraham was separated from his connections in Padan-Aram, because of an already prevailing idolatry. This seems not to be the best explanation of his call to go forth into a country that he knew not. This call was for the trial and discipline of his faith, that he might become an example to all future generations of the virtue of implicit trust in God, and also that from his loins a people might be fitted through whom Jehovah could convey, by means of continuous revelations, those lessons that were necessary to the highest religious education of the human race, and in the benefits of which all the nations of mankind should ultimately share. Meantime there might be, there would be, on the part of the Gentiles, a "riotous living" in idolatrous indulgences, a prodigal squandering of the portion of goods that fell to them from the original patrimony; but when at last the promised "Shiloh" should come, "the gathering of the peoples" should be to him. When Christ should be lifted up on the cross, he would draw all men to himself. From one original worship they would all have departed, to one common object of faith they should all be finally attracted.

Passing by some intervening records of the remains, in Mesopotamia, of the primitive universal belief in God, and descending the stream of chronology about 400 years from Abraham, we would pause a little on the remarkable testimony on the point before us, furnished by the history of *Balaam*, Numbers xxii: 24. This distinguished personage was cer-

tainly a worshipper, by profession, of the true God, the Jehovah-Elohim of the Old Testament. And the most reasonable inference from the history is, that Balaam's knowledge of the Divine Being was not due to rumors of the miraculous deliverance of the children of Israel from Egyptian bondage, but that it was derived from sources native to the land where he dwelt. In taking this position, we are sustained by strong authority. Says Hengstenberg, though he dissents, "The general opinion is that the religious state of Balaam is to be regarded as one excited and developed on heathen soil, by the traditions from monotheistic antiquity." And Tholuck remarks, "Appearances such as these serve to confirm the belief that a purer worship preceded idolatry and natural religion with all nations." (Quoted by Prof. Bush). How the fact implied in this last quotation can be doubted by any diligent reader of the Bible, is to us a mystery. We hold, accordingly, that in the words of Balaam we get a glimpse of the remains, in Mesopotamia, of that patriarchal religion, which was once the common possession of mankind, which gradually faded out in most countries of the great Gentile dispersion, but which, amongst the descendants of Abraham, was perpetuated, purified, and augmented by ever fresh communications of inspired instruction.

Let us descend the stream of time again, 600 years further from the date of the deluge, and examine another important record. What was there amongst the Ninevites, in the form of religious ideas and convictions, on which Jonah, 860 B. C., could engraft his warnings, that they should have been followed by such remarkable confessions and conduct as are recorded in the 3d chapter of the book of that prophet? "So the people of Nineveh believed God, and proclaimed a fast, and put on sackcloth, from the greatest of them even unto the least of them. For word came unto the King of Nineveh, and he arose from his throne, and he laid aside his robe from him, and covered him with sackcloth, and sat in ashes. And he caused it to be proclaimed and published through Nineveh, by the decree of the king and his nobles, saying, Let neither man nor beast, herd nor flock, taste anything; let

them not feed, nor drink water ; but let man and beast be covered with sackcloth, and cry mightily unto God : yea, let them turn every one from his evil way, and from the violence that is in their hands. Who can tell if God will turn and repent, and turn away from his fierce anger, that we perish not. And God saw their works, that they turned from their evil way; and God repented of the evil that he had said that he would do unto them, and he did it not." Now, how shall we best explain this effect of the preaching of the Hebrew prophet? Or, to go behind this question, how shall we explain the sending of the warning message to Nineveh? The whole transaction certainly implies direct relations between God and the "Great City" of the East. It implies the knowledge, on the part of the inhabitants of that city, of the character and claims of God. Whence was that knowledge derived? Mr. Layard says of the worship of ancient Assyria, with Nineveh for its capital, that "originally it was pure Sabæan-ism, in which the heavenly bodies were worshipped as *mere types of the power and attributes of the Supreme Deity*."* And this worship of the heavenly host, in this qualified form, he regards as the corruption of an earlier and purer theology. That theology he would identify with the earliest religious ideas of the Babylonians, Egyptians, and Phoenicians, and would carry them all back for their very source to the primitive seat of mankind in the plain of Shinar. With this doctrine of Mr. Layard we fully agree, for it explains satisfactorily the phenomenon before us, of an idolatrous people possessing yet enough of the knowledge of the true God, to enable the prophet successfully to call them to repentance and reform before the Jehovah of the Hebrews.

It will not be necessary to our purpose, though it might be interesting, to pursue this line of investigation further. By means of Scripture-notices, the stream of religious knowledge can be traced amongst the nations, from the time of Nimrod, the founder of the first great monarchy, down to the time

* Nineveh and its Remains, vol. ii: p. 333, American Edition.

when the Eastern Magi came hastening to Bethlehem with the prophetic homage of the Gentile world.

It would seem, from the preceding rapid sketch, that the nations of antiquity, whose religions are noticed in the Old Testament, were certainly indebted for their ideas of God to a direct revelation of that truth, and that between them and the Hebrews was this chief difference, that whilst both alike started their historical course in possession of a common creed, the Gentiles were left without further aid to run their career of idolatrous wastefulness, but the Hebrews were favored, for a thousand years, with continuous revelations from God. And what the Apostle, in his epistle to the Romans, charged upon the Gentile nations, was, not the sin of failing to *attain* to the knowledge of God, but the great sin of adulterating and relinquishing that knowledge.

It would be easy to bring to our doctrine the sanction of high authorities. It could be shown by quotations, that the position we have taken is one substantially reached by eminent thinkers, as the result of many years' laborious study of the religious history of man. We will not forbear to cite a few of the authorities. Says the author of the Hulsean Prize Essay for 1849,* "However general amongst mankind the notion of a Deity may be, and the possession of truths similar to those in Revelation, there is everything in the history of the human mind to show that these are things which had not entered into the heart of man by any suggestions of nature, and to make it likely that it was as true of them as of the glorious doctrines of Christianity, that 'God had reached them by his spirit.' The *premises*, it must be allowed, everywhere exist in the appearance of nature for some right conclusions as to the being and nature of God, but it is certain, especially with the theory of an original state of savage barbarism, that these conclusions would never have been formed. 'Religion,' says *Herder*, 'has its traces amongst the poorest and rudest tribes. Where did these people obtain them? Has every wretch dis-

* Mr. Thompson; referred to with approbation by Dr. McCosh.

covered for himself a kind of natural theology? These people, struggling for subsistence, make no discoveries, they follow in everything the traditions of their fathers. *Tradition is as much the mother of their religion as of their language.*”* Says Arnold, (“True and False Religion,” vol. ii: p. 211), “When we compare the pagan systems of belief with the most ancient records of the Bible, we discover that the history of the primitive days of the human race, and the primitive elements of sacred tradition, constitute the foundation of every ancient system of Pagan mythology.”† We would here gladly quote, were it not so long, the whole of the fifteenth note to the eighth lecture of Mr. Mansel on the limits of religious thought. With every line of that long and weighty note we fully agree, except one. Says Mr. Mansel, “Two very opposite views may be taken of the false religions of antiquity. The Scriptures invariably speak of them as *corruptions of man’s natural reason*” This remark is not in harmony with the general drift of the paragraph in which it occurs, and we certainly think it cannot be sustained by actual appeal to the Scriptures. *They represent the false religions of antiquity as corruptions of a primitive revelation.* If space allowed, we would multiply quotations under the authority of great names, quite as explicit as any of the above. Many such may be read in Ellis’s celebrated tract, “An Enquiry whence cometh Wisdom and Understanding to Man.”

It has been our design to bring other corroborating proofs of our main position. But we have nearly filled our allotted space, and must conclude.

The foregoing investigation naturally raises and substantially answers the question, What is the relation of natural to Revealed Religion? This question opens a wide field for special discussions, into which we have no space now to enter. The conclusion to which such discussions would conduct us would be, that practically the distinction made is verbal, and not real, and that whilst with sufficiently careful qualification, and

* Page 32. † Quoted in Arnold’s “Natural History of” Islamism. p. 30.

for some purposes of classification, the nomenclature is well enough, yet it has been the source of much confusion and of serious mischief. All the theology of mankind is the product of Divine instruction. Hence, all the teaching that sets forth Scripture revelation as only a republication of Natural Religion, is teaching with which we can have no sympathy. It is, we believe, alike unscriptural and unhistorical. We acknowledge, of course, a moral constitution in man universally, capable of receiving religious instruction and of acquiring religious ideas; capable of grasping and appropriating the truth of God, as creator and moral governor, with all those associate truths adapted to enlighten, quicken and guide the conscience. But we hold that no man, if left absolutely to self-tuition, or the educating influence of the works and providence of God, would ever arrive at that truth which lies at the basis of all religion, that "*God is.*" That truth would forever elude his grasp, and a religious development would be for him an impossibility.*

This doctrine, which is a legitimate inference from the foregoing discussion, might be defended by several considerations. We will here only summon to its support two testimonies—adapted, the one powerfully to stir the heart with a feeling of interest in a particular department of home philanthropy, and the other to beget a sense of obligation to the work of Christian missions. There is a considerable class of our fellow-beings known as *deaf-mutes*. From successive and thorough

* In an elaborate work of Mr. P. E. Dove of Scotland, on "The Logic of the Christian Faith," occur the following passages, which we gladly quote, as approximating, and in some respects substantially expressing the view we entertain of the relation of Natural Theology to Revelation: "We affirm, then, that all natural Theology is no more than the specification of the conditions of Revelation,—that if there were no revelation, reason would not be practically worthy of regard, further than it might hold out a vague and dim hope that God might still dispense a ray of divine light to illumine the obscure darkness, and dispel the mystic superstitions that gather around the heart, when exposed unaided to the contemplation of the great problem of the universe. Nay, we say more,—we may affirm that Natural Theology, in a correct form, is only possible *after the reception and study of Revelation.*" * * * "It is only after man's reason has been set free by Revelation, that man is able to reflect on the

catechizations of this unfortunate class in our asylums, it has been satisfactorily ascertained, that previous to instruction, they were "*in entire ignorance of God, of their own souls, or of spiritual existence in any form.*" This is the unvarying testimony of educated deaf mutes concerning themselves. And this is apparently the uniform testimony of all who have been engaged in their education. Says Mr. *T. H. Gallaudet*, former principal of the American Asylum, "I do not think it possible to produce the instance of a deaf mute, from birth, who, *without instruction on the subject from some friend, or at some institution for his benefit*, has originated, from his own reflections, the idea of a Creator and moral Governor of the world, or who has formed any notions of the immateriality and immortality of his own soul." Mr. *Clerc*, a deaf mute, a pupil and teacher of the Royal Institution of Paris, and for twenty years an instructor in the American Asylum, says, "You ask me, if previous to my instruction, I had any idea of God, and of the origin of the world, or of the beings and things it contains. * * My answer to this question has always been, that I had none at all; nor had I any of my own soul; for it never occurred to me to seek to know what *that* was within me which 'thought and willed.'" And this, he adds, was the experience of all of his own class, whom he had

whole phenomenon, and to see, not how much he *has* learnt from nature, but how much he *might have* learnt. The logical value is precisely the same in both cases,—that is, a Natural Theology, whether arrived at in the onward course of investigation, or arrived at through the solution which Revelation has afforded of the great problem of the universe, is equally conclusive, provided it be really and truly genuine Natural Theology. It matters not how we were able to arrive at the scheme, provided the scheme be logically unobjectionable; its value is the same, whether it be an acquisition or a *gift*,—and we conceive that a true and tolerably complete Natural Theology is really one of the gifts conferred by Revelation." * * * "This is the position. Revelation has *solved* the question. Now *accept* Revelation, and then go into the field of nature, and build up logically, step by step, such a Natural Theology as you can elaborate by the ordinary process of analysis, synthesis, and analogy." (Book vi: § 1.) The work of Mr. Dove is referred to with approbation, by Dr. McCosh, in his volume, "The Intuitions of the Mind Inductively Investigated." (p. 429.)

known during thirty years' teaching amongst them. *Mr. Peet*, formerly principal of the New-York Institution for the Deaf and Dumb, bears the following emphatic testimony: "I have long been of opinion, as the result of repeated experiments, that previous to instruction, no deaf mute has any idea of his moral accountability, or the existence of a Supreme Being. Of the correctness of this opinion, I entertain as little doubt as that of any other conclusion to which I have arrived by a process of inductive reasoning." For an overwhelming amount of evidence to the same effect, see the twenty-second report of the directors of the American Asylum, at Hartford.

We are well aware what will be the ready reply to all this. 'The moral condition of deaf mutes is no argument in behalf of the doctrine for which it is produced, because they are in an abnormal state, by reason of the closing of one of their senses.' In our view the reply is not sufficient, because they are not in *such* an abnormal condition as to prevent them from obtaining, through instruction, an intelligent and grateful belief of the above-named truths, from which, until such instruction, they are hopelessly excluded.

But there is yet another testimony which, unless there is in it some hitherto undetected error, will fully obviate the objection made to the foregoing. It is frequently affirmed that there is not, and never has been, any nation without ideas, more or less clear, of a Divine Being and a superintending providence. Were it so, the fact would be sufficiently accounted for by the foregoing remarks. But the affirmation is made on the strength of the theory that man is "a religious animal;" *i. e.*, an animal who, in all conditions and circumstances, feels the impulse to worship, and will worship. It is not made on the basis of the universal knowledge of the actual moral and religious condition of man. Now, we are assured on very high authority that at least one *nation* has been found that, because it had wandered so far from the source of primitive revelation, or for some other cause, had become most literal atheists; they were absolutely "without God in the world," without a solitary notion of a Supreme Being, of a future state, or of religious

obligations of any kind. "During years of fruitless labor," says, the pious, zealous, and thoroughly intelligent missionary to the Bechuanas of South Africa, Mr. Moffat, "I have often wished to find something by which I could lay hold on the minds of the natives,—an altar to an unknown God—the faith of their ancestors,—the immortality of the soul—or any religious associations; but nothing of this kind ever floated in their minds. They looked upon the sun with the eyes of an ox." There is no ground, aside from a preconceived theory, for supposing any serious error in this testimony.* And, therefore, we have here one of those instances where the exception constitutes the rule. In the moral state of the Bechuanas, as Mr. Moffat found them, we have a proof and a specimen of what man would everywhere become, if left for a long succession of generations without divine instruction,—what man would always and everywhere have been, but for such instruction. Left to himself, man's course is ever downward, hopelessly downward, and nothing can check this progress, or lift him up to the knowledge and communion of God, except that revelation that 'brings life and immortality to light.' For this revelation, with which *we* are now providentially put in trust, the nations are waiting, and until it be conveyed to them, the day will not break, the shadows will not flee away.

* After reading carefully the slight allusions to this point, in the eighth chapter of Livingstone's Travels, and considering the diffusion of religious ideas amongst this tribe, by means of forty years of mission labors, we cannot consider the mature and emphatic declarations of Mr. Moffat as being set aside.

ARTICLE VI.—THE DEFENCE OF SOCRATES.

Plato's Apology and Criton ; with Notes. By W. S. TYLER, *Graves Professor of Greek in Amherst College.* New-York : Appleton & Co. 1860. 12mo. pp. 180.

WHEN Dr. Richard Watson published his *Apology for Christianity*, in reply to certain parts of Gibbon's great work, the reviewer pertinently inquired, "Doth *Christianity* stand, at this time of day, in need of an *apology*?"* It is hardly less a misnomer, to designate by this word that remarkable and venerable monument, which more than any other illustrates the life and character of Socrates. A review of his past life, its motives and results, utterly devoid of every semblance of self-condemnation or excuse — it is the simplest and grandest type of a defence. Even if we had here nothing better than Xenophon has preserved in his *Recollections of Socrates*, the same imperfect conception and unartistic exhibition of the wonderful character, which he so sincerely loved and revered, we should still have Socrates portrayed in the sublimest hour of his life ; we could not fail to recognize the inherent grandeur of the subject, however handled. How great good fortune, then, to receive this discourse from the charmed mind of Plato, present at the trial, touched with the tenderest interest in every step of the proceedings, gifted with such rare dramatic power of sympathy and poetic representation. All readers, except Ast, who brought to his Platonic studies a resolute determination to reject everything received, have been compelled to feel in this defence the living presence of Soc-

* London Review, Nov., 1776, p. 346. Nevertheless, Dr. Watson, twenty years later, having become meanwhile Bishop of Landaff, put forth *An Apology for the Bible*, in answer to the then well known writings of Thomas Paine.

rates. The writers of antiquity, in long succession, refer to it for the most truth-like image of the man ; though even Cicero attributes something to the shaping hand of Plato.* But it is to Schleiermacher, who was not merely a scholar, but endowed with that fine insight properly called genius, that we owe the first adequate conception of the worth of Socrates as a philosopher, of that intellectual power which forbids us to believe that any worthier defence than a literal transcript from memory of the very words uttered, would or could have been left by Plato.† Such a man only, could a great and original thinker like Plato rightly regard as his master ; such a man only, could he justly consecrate in all his works as the exponent, because, in a certain sense, the author of his profoundest speculations.

This view invests the work with a new and surpassing interest. It is no longer a poem, but a historical document of the greatest value, since it puts us in communication with a man who exhibited, in consummate perfection, the union of personal integrity, quite inflexible, and of absolute submission to the laws. “Men of Athens,” he says, “I love and embrace you ; but I shall obey the gods rather than you”‡—not, however seeking to avoid, but electing and cheerfully suffering the penalty, holding that every citizen, by the fact of his remaining in his native country, professes his willingness to abide by her laws. It is thus that the man who came to his death by the deliberate action of the democracy of Athens, is yet the representative freeman for all ages ; that the lovers of liberty are always his lovers. Nowhere is the contrast between Mitford’s ultra Tory views and the Whig principles of the last English historian of Greece, more sharply marked than in

* Tusc. Disp., I, 40 : Quae est igitur ejus oratio, qua facit eum Plato usum apud judices ?

† See Schleiermacher’s *Platons Werke*, vol. i, sec. 2, p. 185. Stallbaum, *Praef. ad Plat. Apol.*, p. 4, cites this passage with approval : Propemodum licet cum Schleiermachero suspicari eum ipsa Socratis verba, quantum fieri posset, conservavisse. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. viii, p. 558, adopts this view without qualification, and supports it with new proof.

‡ *Plat. Apol. Soc.*, p. 29, d.

their treatment of this scene. Mitford, sympathizing with neither party, is cold and unimpressive, striving to strengthen his cause against all democracy by this example, but failing to do justice even to the character of Socrates, while inevitably missing the true dignity of his position; Grote, warming into a generous eloquence, shows his admiration of Socrates better than by his words of praise, when, in the very spirit of the Athenian, he seeks and finds some extenuation of the blame attached to the popular decision, in the conduct of Socrates himself.* When the democratic party in Holland, supported by the volcanic French republic, effected the revolution of the 18th of January, 1795—a revolution resulting in military despotism in less than three years—John Luzac, whose name should not soon be forgotten in America, pronounced before the University at Leyden, and dedicated to John Adams, his memorable oration, *De Socrate Cive*, holding up that bright example as a mirror in which his countrymen might see the form and measure of their patriotism. This discourse, translated into Dutch with additional observations, passed through two editions within the year. Luzac was removed from the professorship of Belgian History in the year following, and immediately resigned the chair of Greek Literature. His Socratic opposition to popular as well as individual tyranny, manifest in the *Leyden Gazette*, a French newspaper of which he was sole editor for many years, procured for the friend of Washington and Poniatowski—in a word, of liberty all over the world—the distrust and ill will of the dominant party. His place was restored in 1802, when the influence of the First Consul began to be felt in France and her dependencies. Soon after his removal, Washington wrote to him: “The man who acts from principle, who pursues the paths of

* Prof. Tyler says, p. 103: According to Diogenes Laertius, the Athenians repented of their condemnation of Socrates and put Meletus to death, and sent Anytus and Lycon into banishment. Grote disbelieves and denies this. Grote traces the story to Diodorus Siculus, and gives strong reasons for doubting it. Barthélemy, *Travels of Anacharsis*, Am. trans., vol. iii, p. 459, furnishes convincing proof that the account is fictitious, if Xenophon's sketch of the Defence of Socrates is genuine.

truth, moderation, and justice, will regain his influence. Such, I persuade myself will be, if it has not already been, your case. To the writings and conduct of men of this description, amongst whom you have always been placed, America is much indebted."*

The hold which Socrates has upon the hearts of American scholars, is attested by the circumstance that three editors have successively been employed upon *Xenophon's Recollections*.† When this work first appeared, a second edition was called for within a year. There can be no doubt, then, that Prof. Tyler has done well in laying before his young countrymen Plato's more vivid portraiture of the man. The conversation with Criton, with no claim to that literal fidelity which gives worth to the Defence, has always been regarded as historical in the same sense in which the speeches of the ancient historians are historical — true to the spirit while fictitious in form — strictly true to the motives and the tone of Socrates in his reply to the proposition of Criton. In fact, his refusal to escape from prison is only the logical consequence of his course before the dicastery. It is believed that both pieces were written soon after the death of Socrates.

In constituting the text, but little was left for the American editor to do. Few authors have fared as well as Plato, in this respect. While the practical English mind holds Aristotle in

* Writings of Washington. Sparks. Vol. xi, p. 221. Compare the words of the elder Adams, writing from Amsterdam, in 1781. Life and Works of John Adams, vol. vii, p. 490: I very readily acknowledge your constant attachment to the principles of the American Revolution, and the respect which has been long paid, and the services rendered, to the American cause in Europe by the Leyden Gazette; and therefore I shall not forget it nor its author. John Quincy Adams was studying at Leyden in 1795.

† *Ξενοφώντος Ἀπομνημονεύματα*. Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates, with English Notes. A. S. Packard, Bowdoin College. Andover: Gould, Newman & Saxton. 1841. 12mo. Second edition.

Ξενοφώντος Ἀπομνημονεύματα. Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates, with Notes. R. D. C. Robbins, Lib. Andov. Theol. Sem. Andover: Wardwell. 1848. 12mo.

Xenophon's Memorabilia of Socrates. From the text of Kühner. With Explanatory Notes. Chas. Anthon, Columbia College. New-York: Harpers. 1849. 12mo.

unabated reverence, the German heart has more and more turned to Plato. Five different editions of the complete works of so voluminous a writer, comprise only a part of what has been done in that direction during the present century. The accomplished F. J. Bast, counsellor to the Hessian Legation, died suddenly in Paris, on the 13th of November, 1811. He had made valuable contributions to the edition of *Gregory of Corinth*, published the same year by Weigel, at Leipsic, under the supervision of G. H. Schäfer. Of this work, Passow wrote soon after its appearance: "I have begun to find my bearings in Schäfer's *Gregory of Corinth*; for I never was, and never expect to be, able to read such a book through in course. Schäfer's unsubdued learning has always come forth too much in fragments; but they are the limbs of a Titan. He has never had time, as he complained in his *Sophocles*, to make use of all the notes he had collected, being obliged, from regard to profit, to write from memory."* Bast had now been constantly engaged for a year in making preparation for a new edition of Plato, and had collated all the manuscripts in Vienna and Paris. A critical essay upon the text of Plato's Banquet, printed at Leipsic, in 1794, the twenty-third year of his age, foreshadowed the nature and direction of his last studies. In the present undertaking, which contemplated a thorough revision of the text, with a new translation, commentary, and scholia, he was to have been assisted by two of Wolf's *élèves*, L. F. Heindorf and Augustus Böckh. Böckh had just been appointed professor in the University at Berlin, and had already given evidence of his peculiar talent, that spirit of unwearied research which cannot rest content with words, but must reach through them to things, in a number of Platonic writings, the latest of which, a discussion of the mutual jealousy ascribed to Plato and Xenophon, is well known. It is especially characteristic of the man, that upon his appointment at Heidel-

* This letter was written to Henry Voss, then at Heidelberg. It is quoted in the charming *Classical Studies* of Sears, Edwards, and Felton, p. 403. The original source is indicated on p. 360.

berg, in 1807, his first publication was a specimen of an edition of Plato's *Timæus*. Heindorf, while teaching in a gymnasium at Berlin, had already published, besides several school editions of one or more dialogues of Plato, a selection of twelve, in four octavo volumes — a work remarkable for the excellence of the commentary. His health had always been feeble, inducing a gentle and touching melancholy, relieved by the enthusiasm with which he turned to his favorite pursuits. Niebuhr, writing from Berlin in 1815, says of him: "That he has elaborated his philological system, by unwearied assiduity, in spite of constant ill health from his childhood up; that he has never allowed himself to be stopped in his progress by sickness; that he thinks nothing of all his knowledge and acquirements, and knows no greater happiness than the admiration and love of those whom he rates above himself; that he even sets little value upon his peculiar department of philology, compared to others; that friendship and kindness are his sole enjoyments — all this makes him one of the most lovable persons among the literary men of my acquaintance."* Heindorf died in 1816. The edition, which should have combined the varied excellence of the three, already interrupted by the death of Bast, was now abandoned. Böckh instinctively felt that his field was not the mere language, but the life and institutions of the ancients. The *Public Economy of Athens* appeared the next year. Meanwhile, Bast's papers had been left in perfect order, and, together with the materials collected by his associates, were transferred to Weigel, the Leipsic publisher, who had hitherto generously furthered the undertaking. It remained to find an editor. Weigel was then publishing his *Bibliotheca Classica* of Greek authors, under the general superintendence of the indefatigable Schäfer. Godfrey Stallbaum, while teacher of a grammar school at Halle apparently, had already edited *Herodotus*, vols. vii—ix of the series, when in 1820, then twenty-seven, he became corrector of the St.

* Life and Letters of Niebuhr. Am. ed. p. 296. Heindorf was then professor in the University at Breslau, where his edition of Horace's *Satires*, dedicated to Niebuhr, had just appeared.

Thomas Gymnasium, in Leipsic, under F. W. E. Rost, whom he succeeded as rector in 1836. The reputation which this school had derived from Gesner, Ernesti, Fischer, and Rost, was not to suffer in the hands of Stallbaum. In the first year of his connection with the gymnasium, an edition of the *Philebus*, with prolegomena, commentary, and the previously in-edited scholia of Olympiodorus, served to measure his ability. The incontestable merit of this performance, which by the way was brought out by another publisher, decided Weigel to entrust his abundant materials to the same judicious management. Eight volumes (xxvi—xxxiii of the *Bibliotheca Classica*) contained the text of the new edition, which was also printed on finer and larger paper, accompanied by four volumes of critical annotation, as a separate work.

These are the circumstances under which Stallbaum's first edition appeared. It was completed in 1826, the same year in which Jacobs and V. C. F. Rost commenced the publication of the *Bibliotheca Græca*, at Gotha. Stallbaum's second edition of Plato, with prolegomena, critical notes, and a perpetual commentary, was incorporated in that collection—the *Defence of Socrates and Criton* coming out in 1833. The third edition of these pieces, which Prof. Tyler follows, was printed in 1846, just twenty-five years after the first volume of the Leipsic edition. All commendation of labors, to which both the text and interpretation of Plato are so much indebted, is now superfluous. It is proper to observe, however, that while almost all that is valuable in former editions is here collected, it is chiefly upon the language of Plato that Stallbaum, in common with the Leipsic school of philologists, has expended his strength. Other scholars may have a more lively apprehension of the manners, and juster views of the history of the times—profounder knowledge even of the Platonic philosophy; but upon any question involving the analysis of a phrase, the explanation of a word, or a minute acquaintance with the varied forms in which the thought of Plato loved best to clothe itself, his decision is authoritative; and precisely because Plato's expression is guided by so marvellous a sense of fitness, illustration of this kind is invaluable. Stallbaum's text

is, to a remarkable extent, formed upon the manuscripts. Only very rarely, and in the most hopeless passages, does he trust to conjecture. Thus, in his third edition, he gives in the Defence, p. 36, a,* from fourteen manuscripts, including the Bodleian, the reading *τριάκοντα* for the vulgate *τρεῖς*, restored by Prof. Tyler. We shall have occasion to recur to this passage. Again, in the expression, p. 27, e, *πεῖθειν τινά, ὥς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστι καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεούς*, Stallbaum feels compelled to receive *οὐ*, which Prof. Tyler very properly brackets, though he states the case a little too strongly in saying that neither Stallbaum nor any other editor has been able to translate or explain it. Certainly Stallbaum, in the first Gotha edition, without disguising the difficulty, suggested that *οὐ*, if genuine, denies the predicate of the first member, *τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, pleonastically repeated in the second, where *μή* follows instead of the infinitive without *μή*, according to a familiar Greek idiom. There can be but little doubt, however, that the word should be rejected. The resemblance of *οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ* and *αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, may indicate the source of a copyist's error; and the whole passage shows signs of disturbance. Thus *ἀνδρός*, among the words cited, is wanting in many manuscripts; and just above, Prof. Tyler has rightly reinstated *ἦ*, in the phrase *ἦ καὶ ὄνων*, bracketed by Stallbaum.

These are all the variations we have noticed, though we certainly have not collated the editions. An orthographical contradiction, running through the whole volume, strikes the reader of Prof. Tyler's work somewhat unpleasantly. We find *εἰζοδος* and *εἰσελθεῖν*, for example, in the text, but *εἰσοδος* and *εἰσελθεῖν* in the notes.† The introduction of *ς* *final* at the end of words remaining entire in composition, is an arbitrary improvement, originating, if we remember rightly, with Henry Stephens. The practice has neither the authority of manuscripts nor of the earliest editions. If Prof. Tyler dis-

* The text of Plato and the Orators is cited from the pages of the Stephens editions, unless the contrary is expressly stated.

† Page 171.

approves it for these reasons, though they are not very weighty, why did he not rectify the text, as he has done in other cases? There is a certain inconsistency, too, in his management of the accentual signs. The weight of authority probably favors the treatment of a Greek word in the commentary, just as it would be treated in the text; but an editor, who chooses to preserve the accidental *form* of words drawn from the text, may depart from this rule without becoming inconsistent. It is inconsistent, after dropping $\tau\epsilon$ in the expressions $\epsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma \tau\epsilon \epsilon\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\omicron\varsigma$, to write $\epsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma \epsilon\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\omicron\varsigma$ without correcting the accent.* It is inconsistent to write in one place, "The $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ implies that something else may be said or found to be true in reference to some other man. It has no $\delta\grave{\epsilon}$ or other particle correlative to it;"† and in another, " $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ is not unfrequently used * * * without the corresponding $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ expressed."‡ The same fluctuation appears on some points of English orthography — in such possessives as *Athens'* and *Socrates's*, or *Robbins'* and *Robbins's*.§

Because Prof. Tyler has given us a good and useful book, we regret these minor blemishes. Because he has given us Plato, we have a right to complain of the slipshod style of his introduction, deformed by such makeweights as *viz.*, *to wit*, *as it were*, and the rest; by that often recurring *beau ideal*, which we remember in his former works, and would gladly exchange for our English *ideal*; by such rhetoric as "The consciousness of a divine mission * * * imbues his very person;"|| and by such translations as "conversation, *great or small*;"¶ as "Agamemnon, Ulysses, and a multitude of other men and *other women*;"** or that hideous solecism,

* Page 114. † Page 116.

‡ Page 166. If any think slightly of these matters, we commend to them the words of Porson ad Eurip. Med. I: Qui hanc doctrinam [sc. accentuum] nescit, dum ignorantiam suam candide fatetur, inscitiae tantum reus; qui vero, nescire non contentus, ignorantiae suae contemptum prætexit, majoris culpæ affinis est.

§ See pp. 35, 26, 140, 132. || Page 27. ¶ Page 10.

** Page 25. The Greek is $\eta \alpha\lambda\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \mu\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon\varsigma, \kappa\alpha\iota \alpha\upsilon\delta\omicron\rho\alpha\varsigma \kappa\alpha\iota \gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\varsigma$. It might have been $\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\varsigma \gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\acute{\iota}\kappa\alpha\varsigma$, of course; but even that would not authorize the violation of English usage, as the editor remarks on the phrase $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu \alpha\lambda\lambda\omega\upsilon$ $\alpha\rho\chi\omega\upsilon$, p. 153.

which reverses Cicero's *Nihil melius extremo*, "Now is the time to depart — *I* to die, you to live."* We have a right to expect that an editor shall be so far imbued with the spirit of his author as even to reflect, in some subordinate degree, his manner. Carlyle is, certainly, a cunning master of words; but see, in his edition of the *Letters of Cromwell* — for the Life is little more than an extended commentary upon the Letters — how the rude, unpolished strength of the text is reproduced in the comment. Such intellectual sympathy is essential to the amplest fulfilment of editorial duties. Stallbaum's crowning merit is found in the Platonic clearness of statement and illustration, which shines through all his works. Is it necessary to add, that we do not mean to advocate any unseasonable rivalry, where writers have aims so utterly distinct, but simply difference which is not absolute contradiction!

While affirming the substantial merit of the book, we no less wish that Prof. Tyler had always chosen to lay before us the plain, historic truth, which Plato, like Shakspeare, often overlooks in the pursuit of a higher truth. It is well to leave nothing to be unlearned. A word in the notes is surer than many words in possible lectures. We are told that "Socrates was 70 years old at the time of his trial," † and directed to compare the words, *ἐτη γεγονώς πλείω ἐβδομήχοντα*. ‡ Now Socrates was only sixty-nine on the sixth of Thargelion, and that was a few days after his trial. This is one of the best authenticated facts in chronology. In the passage cited, *πλείω* is omitted by some of the best manuscripts; one has *πλείω ἢ* superscribed by a second hand; while another reading is *ἐβδομήχοντα καὶ πλείω*. These circumstances, together with the unqualified *seventy years* of the *Criton*, § afford a strong presumption that *πλείω* should be rejected from the text. But the Olympic years of the birth and death of Socrates, are preserved by Diogenes of Laërte, || whose dates show that

* Page 26. † Page 101. ‡ Page 17, d. § Page 52, e.

§ Lives of the Philosophers, 11, 44. Compare ix, 41, where the date of the birth of Socrates is referred to as established, in fixing a disputed date.

the philosopher completed only sixty-nine years. Diogenes also uses the expression *γεγονώς ἐτῶν ἑβδομήχοντα*, which must accordingly mean *in his seventieth year*. His authorities are of unquestionable credit—Demetrius of Phalerum, ten years at the head of the Athenian administration, a man remarkable for the extent and variety of his information; Apollodorus the Chronologist, also an Athenian, possessed of such critical skill as might be expected from the pupil of Aristarchus; and Thrasyllus, the Platonic philosopher and mathematician. Again, when Plato speaks of the steadfast opposition of Socrates to the unjust vote, by which the “*ten commanders*” at Arginusæ were illegally condemned and executed, Prof. Tyler,* though he refers his readers to Xenophon’s historical account of the matter, gives no hint that only *eight* were included in the vote—Conon, who was blockaded at Mitylene, and Archestratus, who had died there, having no part in the battle. Of the eight, only six obeyed the summons to Athens, and only six were executed. All these facts are found in the chapter referred to by Prof. Tyler, except the death of Archestratus, an omission which explains the statement that *nine* commanders were condemned by a single vote, in another of Xenophon’s works.† To us it seems that the addition of these particulars would have been timely; and that space, if needed, might have been saved by omitting such notes as this: “For Gorgias of Leontini, a city of Sicily, cf. Diog. Laert. 9, 52; Cic. de Orat. 1, 22; Brut. 8; Plat. Gorg., Hip., and Protag. See also Smith’s Dic. Biog. and Mythol.”‡ Now, for whose benefit can this be designed? Are these “Notes for Colleges?” If the catalogue were exhaustive, it might be serviceable to a class of readers; but it has not even that merit. The reference to “Smith’s Dict.

* Page 143, where τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους is translated, “*who did not bring away for burial the bodies of the slain.*” Grote, Hist. of Greece, vol. viii, p. 239, note, has shown conclusively, that it was the neglect of *living men* on board the sinking ships, which excited such indignation at Athens. Removing the comma in Prof. Tyler’s text, then, we must translate τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας, *who did not pick up the men who had been engaged in the sea fights.*

† Mem. Soc., i: 1, 18.

‡ Page 110.

Ant.,"* for further information about the accusers of Socrates, is really as useful as any annotation of the kind. Prof. Tyler again commends Socrates for "his refusal to obey the thirty tyrants in the arrest and 'rendition' of a fugitive from oppression,"† alluding to Leon of Salamis, whom he further describes as "a native of Salamis, but a citizen of Athens, who had withdrawn to Salamis to escape the power of the tyrants."‡ We recognize a political allusion in the word *rendition*, and we observe that Prof. Tyler, in these statements, evidently follows Stallbaum. But in the single authority§ cited by the German editor, no foundation for the statements exists. In short, they rest upon conjecture; while there is reason to believe that Salamis was an Attic deme from the time of Solon to the reception of the Macedonian garrison in B. C. 318, and that Leon of Salamis was therefore an Athenian citizen, like Socrates of Alopece, but in no sense a "fugitive."

We repeat, that these defects cannot weigh against the general merit of the work; that in truth, they only deserve and attract attention, because they are found in a really valuable addition to the American catalogue of Greek classics. One other omission we notice. When Prof. Tyler edited the *Germany* and *Agricola* of Tacitus,|| he prefixed to those works a carefully written *Life of Tacitus*. His purpose is best explained by his own words, as they stand in the preface of a subsequent edition of what is left us from the *Roman History* of the same great author. "It has been," he says, "his constant, not to say his chief aim, to carry students beyond the dry details of grammar and lexicography, and introduce them into a familiar acquaintance and lively sympathy with the author and his times."¶ In this endeavor, Prof. Tyler was only true to the theory and practice of the ancient

* Page 122. † Page 141. ‡ Page 144. § Xen. Hellen., ii, 3, 39.

|| The *Germania* and *Agricola* of Caius Corn. Tacitus. With Notes for Colleges. By W. S. Tyler. New-York: Appleton & Co. 1847. 12mo.

¶ The *Histories* of Caius Corn. Tacitus. With Notes for Colleges. By W. S. Tyler. New-York: Appleton & Co. 1850. 12mo. See pref., p. 5.

commentators. Olympiodorus begins his commentary upon the First Alcibiades with a Life of Plato. Accordingly, we hoped to find collected in a new edition of the wonderful Defence of Socrates, all that can be told about the trial. Remembering Grote's assertion, "Of Meletus, the primary, though not the most important accuser, we know only that he was a poet — of Lykon, that he was a rhetor," * — an assertion which, in a work where only a single chapter could be devoted to the character, life, and death of Socrates, would be true enough if *need to state* be substituted for *know*, we yet hoped to see it shown that we do know a great deal more, and can state it on occasion. When was the trial? Where was it? Who were the prosecutors? What were their motives? What were their arguments? Unless these questions be answered, we have here a reply to nothing — a more literal *συναμαχία* than even Socrates complained of; and in answer, we have references to various fragments of information, scattered, with consequent loss of their relative significances, here and there through a library. We are presented with pencil and paints, in effect, and told to make a picture for ourselves. *Pro virili parte*, then let us attempt it. Let us see how far the form and coloring of that ancient process can be restored in a historical study of its circumstances.

* Hist. of Greece, vol. viii, p. 638.

[To be concluded in next number.]

ARTICLE VII.—MODERN SCEPTICISM AND ITS REFUTATION.

Nature and the Supernatural, as together constituting the one System of God. By HORACE BUSHNELL. Second Edition. New-York: Charles Scribner. 1858.

The Limits of Religious Thought Examined, in Eight Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford, in the year 1858, on the Bampton Foundation. By HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B. D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College, Tutor and late Fellow of St. John's College. First American from the third London edition, with notes translated. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1859.

AN authentic history of religious scepticism since the beginning of the Christian era, would be a most instructive work. Itself would constitute an apologetic treatise, which even sceptics might profitably consult. A correct knowledge of the past, might save them from many an idle circuit around the "howling desert of Infidelity." But the latest sceptics are as confident of success as were their predecessors in the earliest centuries. Unabashed by previous failures, they seem to regard a want of success hitherto as owing solely to the want of a right method and a sound philosophy. Of that method and philosophy, they suppose themselves to be at last the fortunate possessors. The triumphant emergence of Christianity from every conflict hitherto, with strength renewed and authority confirmed, seems only to heighten their complacent belief in the incomparable superiority of the present over the past, and specially of themselves over all who have preceded them. That a religion so often assailed from without, and so often rent from within, so uniformly and uncompromisingly opposing the selfishness of the human heart, should to-day stand more

conspicuously before the world, and bestow more copious blessings on the race than ever before, has no significance for them. The stone cut out of the mountain, and now filling the earth with the sound of its progress, gives no sign to them of the invisible and resistless power it embodies.

On the contrary, never has Christianity been more bitterly or more vigorously assailed than it now is. Never has it been attacked on more sides at once, or by weapons more varied and skilfully directed. Learning, Literature, Science, Criticism, and Philosophy have all been levied for the strife. The old spirit of unbelief, once so haughty and boastful of its cultivation and dignity, now recruits from every condition of society and grade of intellect, and marshals its heterogeneous forces as if for one simultaneous and final onset. But let no one fear for the issue, or dread the conflict. Nothing true can perish. Christianity could fall only if false and unworthy. Let us rather welcome the struggle, and care not how close the quarters. Persecution hastened the early progress of the gospel, and the successive onslaughts of infidels have only served to disclose the bulwarks and unmask the batteries of the gospel. Every voice from the past bids us be of good courage, and assures us that Christianity is never more aggressive, that the victories of Christ are never more rapid and brilliant, or his conquests on a grander scale, than when He arises to scatter his enemies.

The honest and the dishonest sceptic should, however, be carefully distinguished. Simple doubt, also, should not be confounded with positive unbelief. The serious doubter may be much nearer the kingdom of heaven, than the unthinking subscriber of creeds. But honest scepticism, we suspect, is of much rarer occurrence, and serious doubting of far shorter continuance, than many are disposed to believe. The means for distinguishing sincerity from hypocrisy, are not more easily applied among sceptics, than among Christians. Mere absence of immorality no more proves the honesty and sincerity of one than of the other. Pride of intellect, vanity, and self-will, are as defiling to the soul, and as inconsistent with honesty and seriousness, as are the lusts of the flesh. There may

have been just as much dishonesty in the unbelief of Hume and Gibbon, with all their correctness of demeanor, as in that of Thomas Paine, or of any other inebriate and sensualist. And yet there is a scepticism in our day which claims to be, and, in a sense, actually is, *religious*. It is even enthusiastically devout in its worship of its ideal Deity. It even affects a loftier virtue and a profounder worship than the Scriptures inculcate, or Christians practise. That among these there can be none who are devoutly earnest, and honest, and worthy, we certainly would not venture to affirm ; but that honest doubting must rest either on a misconception of Christianity, or on a distaste for its teachings, we are forced to believe ; and that such doubting, except in the rarest of circumstances, must either glide into believing, or quickly be corrupted from its simplicity, we are disposed both to believe and to maintain.

Unbelievers formerly were intent only on the overthrow of Christianity ; questions about a substitute, and about man's inherent need of some kind of religion, were rarely mooted. The sceptics of to-day parade the substitutes they propose, sometimes employing them as engines of destruction, and sometimes as defences behind which they may work the more securely. Held together by a single but subordinate aim, no one ultimate purpose now unites and controls them. With one and the same object of attack, they not only differ in their weapons and mode of assault, but are hopelessly at variance in the substitutes they propose. Comte, Strauss, Parker—Atheist, Pantheist, Theist—railing each at the idea of an authoritative Revelation, are representatives of schools which require only the absence of Christianity from the field of strife to involve them in mutual and speedy destruction. The first comes to us with its calendared worship of “humanity developed under biological and cosmological fatalities,” and its “subjective immortality” or remembrance by survivors and posterity ; the second, with its adoration of the “moral order” of the universe, and its final absorption of individual consciousness in the sum total of being ; and the third, with its “primal Intuitions of Human Nature, which depend on no logical process of demonstration, but are rather facts of

consciousness given by the instinctive action of human nature itself."* (THEO. PARKER'S "EXPERIENCE AS A MINISTER," p. 42.) Could these schools once triumph in their work of destructive criticism, and attempt the critical construction of a universal Substitute for the Gospel, it would require no Daniel to foretell results, or Bossuet to record variations.

But with all their divergences and antagonisms, one principle is common and fundamental to all. Thus, all alike assume the reliability of *a priori* reasoning on questions lying equally beyond the reach of experience, revelation, and reason. Even Comte, claiming the positivity of exact science in his speculations, and professedly "abandoning all inquiry into the origin and destiny of the universe," dogmatizes with the Pantheists of the development of the race according to natural laws; laws which, as they cannot be proved to have had a beginning, it is inferred must continue forever. Theodore Parker assures us that in constructing his "system" ("my own scheme,"† as he calls it), he "pursued two methods,—

* Mr. Parker pronounces the existence of God one of the "primal intuitions." But God does not, as a pure essence, confront the human soul. He reveals Himself by his works, both in the world around us and in the soul within us. Our knowledge of the works is intuitive, but not our knowledge of the Being revealed by them. We know of Him only by inference,—an inference, it may be, so invariable and necessary in a healthy intellect as to resemble intuition, but still an inference. It may be that mere induction from physical phenomena, never has and never could have given man the idea of God or of a first cause, and we do not believe that any deduction from any *a priori* principles whatever could give it; nor do we believe it to be attributable to tradition alone; but we do believe that the correlation of man's moral constitution and the ever-present phenomena betokening a God, is so intimate and complete, that, with the necessary idea of causation, the notion of a God is inevitably generated in every human soul whose nature is unimpaired. The resolution of that notion into a distinct conception, as well as the subsequent form and contents of the conception itself, are all alike the product of reflection and of logical processes.

† Mr. Parker enumerates three "primal intuitions," which he regards as the "foundation of religion." See p. 42 of his "*Experience as a Minister*." The curious who would see the original of these, can read in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, chap. ii, sec. 1, under "Transcendental Doctrine of Method." Mr. Parker speaks honestly when he says: "I found most help in the works of Immanuel Kant, one of the profoundest thinkers in the world; if he did not always furnish conclusions I could rest in, he yet gave me the true method and put me on the right road."

the inductive and deductive." "First, from the History of Mankind I gathered the most significant facts I could find, and thence made such generalizations as the facts would warrant, which, however, were seldom satisfactory. * * Next, from the primitive Facts of Consciousness, given by the power of instinctive intuition, I endeavored to deduce the true Notion of God, of Justice and Futurity. Here I could draw from Human Nature, and not be hindered by the limitations of Human History; but I know now better than it was possible then, how difficult is this work, and how often the inquirer mistakes his own subjective imagination for a fact of the universe." These are suggestive and instructive words. They confirm what every one at all familiar with sceptical writings must have often felt, that facts and a sound generalization are *very* "seldom satisfactory" to those who have labored at constructing a rationalistic theology; they explain the frequency and ease with which Mr. Parker has "drawn from Human Nature, and not been hindered by the limitations of Human History;" and they demonstrate that whoever would refute his "system," must not only shew "how often he has mistaken his own subjective imagination for a fact of the universe" in its construction, but prove the system itself to be founded throughout, so far as it differs from Revelation, on a speculative and imaginary basis. No reply to Theodore Parker will suffice, which fails to overthrow his assumptions of the absolute authority of reason, and of man's natural "adequacy for all his functions."

In fact, whoever will assist in the defence of Christianity, will best subserve his purpose by a concentration of his strength at a single point of the attack. Scores of authors, both before the time of Paley and since, have attempted the impossible task of occupying the whole line of defence, and by exposure of particular posts have invited assault, and so have strengthened the confidence of the enemy. The ablest defenders have been those who have selected single points in the line, and have made them impregnable. The popular treatises, commonly labelled "*Evidences of Christianity*," and professedly presenting the whole field of argument, may be useful as text

books in elementary education, but are often worse than useless to those who have already imbibed the spirit of modern scepticism. The loss of faith in the divine authority of Christianity, will generally be found to have occurred at the supposed overthrow of some particular species of evidence, or establishment of some principle inconsistent with a supernatural revelation. To disabuse the mind, therefore, of its error, the supposed overthrow must be shown to be imaginary, the principle established, to be unfounded and fallacious, and the vaunted authority of Reason, as paramount to Revelation, to be delusive and destructive.

A bare enumeration of the apologetical treatises written within the last quarter of a century, would more than exhaust our allowable limits and the patience of our readers. As Christianity has been assailed on every conceivable ground — now as an embodied life, now as a historical and documentary authority, now as a system of truths, and now as a scheme for the elevation and moral culture of the race, so apologists, in unbroken succession, have arisen, with ever increasing materials for defence. With varying exigencies, they have varied their methods of reply. Frequently their vindications have been specific and limited, like Ullmann's "*Sinlessness of Christ*," the very isolation of the questions discussed, disclosing impregnable arguments, like solitary towers along an exposed frontier. The distinction has also been often made, and justly, between the divine origin of Christianity as a life derived from Christ, and the authenticity and credibility of the Sacred Records. And the distinction should be maintained; for what establishes one does not necessarily prove the other. To shew Christ to have come from God, is not to demonstrate the authenticity of the evangelical history, invaluable as it may be as one step towards that end. Christianity existed before the New Testament, and the Christian life of believers has been perpetuated, not by the Bible alone, but by the "Church of the living God" as well. A Church without a Bible might not survive a second generation, but a Bible without a Church would be an inoperative power. There was accordingly given, at the outset, both a life and a word, a community and its statute book;

and through these double but inseparable agencies, Christianity has propagated itself and its work in the world. But while single apologists will thus render most effectual service by single and restricted aims, the whole line of defences must yet be occupied by others. No single fort must be yielded. The thought of attempting to rescue Christianity from the sceptic by abandoning the authenticity, or the strict inspiration, of the Scriptures, to concentrate on the person of Christ, is only the infatuation of the suicide. Christianity and the Bible stand or fall together. The attempt to sublimate the essential principles of the Gospel to an etherial or super-scriptural purity, whether by sceptics or by "liberal Christians," will only result in the attainment of an etherial and anti-scriptural instability. The vindication of the Biblical Records, both as authentic and inspired, cannot be safely omitted. A reëlaboration of the historical and external evidences, under the light of the latest discoveries, as by Mr. Rawlinson in his recent Bampton Lectures, is indispensable to the completion of our apologetical literature.

But our present purpose is, not so much to sketch an outline of the work to be done by Christian apologists, as to examine, briefly as may be, the methods and lines of argument adopted in the two treatises placed at the head of this article. Both these have reached a prominence among works of their class, and both have been commended and criticized with a heartiness that warrant, at once, their ability and their claim on the public attention.

Dr. Bushnell's book, "*Nature and the Supernatural*," is all aglow with a spirit of ardent and genial piety. Its profuse and brilliant imagery, its vigorous and racy style, its freshness of thought and boldness of speculation, all combine to make it one of the most readable of books. No apologetic treatise published in this country has been so widely read or so favorably received. Reviews from the most opposite standing points have united in its praise, though objecting to particular positions and subordinate considerations. It has undoubtedly ennobled the popular conception of Christianity, and stimulated to activity minds that had grown inactive un-

der the miasma of scepticism. But as a *refutation* of any one of the modern schools of sceptics, especially that of Mr. Parker, against which it is particularly and professedly directed, it cannot be accounted conclusive. On the minds of acute and well-read unbelievers, the impression it must make can neither be deep nor decisive. Christian writers should beware lest, by attempting through their endorsement to give it weight and authority, they change that impression into a conviction that Christianity is not legitimately defensible.

According to Dr. Bushnell, all modern scepticism rests in the denial of any supernaturalism in Christianity, and in affirming that all religions are alike to be referred to the simple processes and laws of nature. All schools meet at the common centre of "mere naturalism;" all agree in finding "the whole system of God" within the narrow circle of nature and natural laws. He accordingly announces his aim to be "*to find a legitimate place for the supernatural in the system of God, and shew it as a necessary part of the divine system itself.*"

The treatise itself, so far as it is a refutation of scepticism, rests in the distinction between Nature and Supernaturalism, and specially on the position that "nature, in itself, is not the true and complete system of God." It defines nature as "that created realm of being and substance which has an acting, a going on or progress from within itself, under and by its own laws" (p. 36); and the supernatural as "that, whatever it be, that is either not in the chain of natural cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect, in nature, from without the chain." It avows the expectation of proving the reality of "another and higher system" than nature, "that of spiritual being and government, for which nature exists," and to which it is subject. (p. 38.) To this "higher system," the supernatural, belong both God and man, the latter being, as distinctly as God himself, "a supernatural being." "The very idea of our personality is that of a being not under the law of cause and effect, a being supernatural." (p. 43.) Man's claim to be accounted supernatural is vindicated by the spontaneity and self-determining power

of his will. His self-determination is the affirmation of consciousness, from which there is no appeal. "Man stands out clear and sovereign as a being supernatural, and his definition is that he is an original power, acting, not in the line of causality, but from himself." (p. 51.) Nature, with Dr. Bushnell, is the whole vast physical creation, with its inviolable and unalterable laws of self-action; all not belonging to nature is the supernatural.

Between the two realms thus distinguished, the physical and the spiritual, there must exist some relation. What is it? Manifestly no other than that of subordination of nature to the supernatural. Men instinctively demand something supernatural, as is evinced by the "appetite for the demonstrations of necromancy," and the universal disposition to originate mythologies and false religions. The earth's surface, moreover, shews us historically the existence of supernatural forces, and even of "conflicting forces," thus warranting the conclusion that the Universe consists of two grand divisions, the realm of Powers and the realm of Things; the first of which "comprehends all beings that are capable of originating new trains of effects," and "the other is made up of such as can only propagate effects under certain fixed laws." "At the head of the Powers is God, as the Lord of Hosts and the First Cause; having round him innumerable orders of intelligence, which, though caused to exist by him, are as truly first causes in their action as He." (p. 85.)

Our author having thus supplanted, as he supposes, the fundamental position of the sceptics, by assuming the existence of supernatural powers outside of and operating upon nature, next addresses himself to what he regards as "one of their most valued and most triumphantly asserted arguments." The argument, which really seems to us of trifling importance in itself, concerns us here only because, in refuting it, the author presents a Theodicy, on which, as a corner-stone, his whole treatise is built. Sceptics affirm that sin cannot be the enormity the Bible pronounces it, since God, being omnipotent, assuredly would have prevented it if it were so. All this is treated as gross misconception of omnipotence. "Om-

nipotence is force, and nothing in the nature of force is applicable to the immediate direction or the determination of powers." (p. 92.) Sin is an act of the will, "an act supernatural," and as such must be outside of the chain of cause and effect. "The possibility of evil appears to be necessarily involved in the existence of a realm of powers;" "given the fact of their unbegun existence and their trial as persons or powers, they are in a condition privative that involves their certain lapse into evil." (pp. 92, 107.) And so, in self-consistency, Dr. B. denies the existence of unfallen angels, and avows his belief in "some antecedent necessity" that all beings, "in their training as powers, should be passed through the double experience of evil and good, fall and redemption." (p. 132.) The Omnipotent Himself has been powerless in the prevention of evil; has, in fact, been eternally environed by it, as a "bad possibility," which in the creation of a realm of powers has, by "some antecedent necessity," become a "bad actuality." Thus, by a Manichæan Theodicy, with "sufficient modifications," as Dr. Bushnell has it, he would vindicate the reality of sin, and the non-responsibility of the Creator for its existence.

It is unnecessary that we follow Dr. Bushnell through the remainder of his treatise. It is only the completion of a superstructure on the basis we have described; an application of the principles we have stated. We gladly acknowledge the ability of the several discussions, and the eloquence and force of many of the passages. The chapters on "The Fact of Sin," "The Character of Christ," and what is capriciously styled "The Water-marks of Doctrine," are worthy of both their themes and their author. But our simple purpose now is, to determine with what success he has accomplished his task of refuting the current scepticism. Has he furnished an antidote to the "absolute religion" of Theodore Parker?

According to Dr. Bushnell, Mr. Parker is a *naturalist*, a term of whose several meanings two only are possible in the connection in which it occurs. It must either denote one who denies any presence or power of God aside from the "chain of natural causes and effects," whether in the realms of matter

or of spirit ; or it must mean one who believes that all the phenomena of religion, as well as of intellect and of physics, are referable to "a chain of cause and effect, or a scheme of orderly succession, determined within itself." (p. 37.) But in neither of these senses—not even in the first, which is Dr. Bushnell's meaning—does Mr. Parker seem to be a naturalist. No one has been more frequent or emphatic in the expression of an apparently contrary belief. "God is immanent in the World of Matter and in the World of Spirit, the two hemispheres which to us make up the Universe ; each particle thereof is inseparable from Him, while He yet transcends both, is limited by neither, but in Himself is complete and perfect." (p. 80, *Ex. as a Minister*.) "God is immanent in the world, however much He also transcends the world." (*Discourse of Religion*, p. 161.) "The things of Nature, having no will, obey the Will of God from necessity ;" "obeying the Law (the will) of God, his omnipotence is on its side." (*Ibid.*, pp. 163, 164.) "The Infinite God must fill each point of spirit as of space. Here, then, in God's presence in the soul, is a basis laid for his direct influence on man." (*Ibid.*, p. 169.) This can hardly be styled mere naturalism.

The truth is, Mr. Parker claims for his system the title of "The Absolute Religion." He founds his claim on the assumption that his system rests in "the primal intuitions of human nature ;" that through the "immanence of God in the soul," Reason in man is absolute, and he is "adequate for all his functions." His Reason makes him possessor of all that Revelation need convey or can contain. Manifestly, whoever would cope with such a system, must first of all meet the question of the sufficiency of Reason for the office proposed. So long as that question be unsettled, all controversy with Mr. Parker is mere skirmishing at the outposts ; he can be overthrown only by assaulting his central position, the absolute authority and sufficiency of Reason.

Any attempt, therefore, at definition or distinction of Nature and Supernaturalism, as available against Mr. Parker, whether for the overthrow of his fundamental principles, or for affording ground for Christian miracles in refutation of his

system, is labor lost. Dr. Bushnell's conception and definition of a naturalist, might, indeed, be applicable to physicists and pantheists, both of whom Mr. Parker thrusts aside and denounces as dangerous errorists. He scouts both naturalism and supernaturalism, and styles himself a theist and an absolutist. He believes in the perpetual immanence of God in the soul, and the consequent sufficiency and absolute authority of human reason. He can adopt, without hesitation, Dr. Bushnell's classification of man as one of the "powers" with God, and thank him for the suggestion. It only helps to buttress his authority of reason. The question of miracles, also, is with him one of no manner of significance. Whatever the theory of their relation to nature, with him they are without weight. The authority of reason is supreme, and no miracle, however authenticated, can impugn it. He assures us that "the question of miracles, whether true or false, is of no religious significance." "They can be useful only to such as deny our internal power of discerning truth." (*Dis. of Religion*, p. 263.)

Nor do we think Dr. Bushnell's distinction between naturalism and supernaturalism is any more available against the Pantheists than against Mr. Parker. Pantheism, as is well known, is of two kinds, material and ideal — or cosmical and spiritual — sometimes called hylozoic and psychozoic. The first knows no God but the sum total of matter with its endless chain of causes and effects; the second, none but thoughts or consciousness in which matter exists for us, only as the notions or ideas of our own minds. But Dr. Bushnell, in his theory, *postulates* what the Pantheists of both schools flatly deny; he assumes the distinct and independent existence of nature and of God, while they affirm their identity. He broadly assumes* what they not only deny, but suppose them-

* This language may be thought to do injustice to Dr. Bushnell. We will only refer the reader to chap. iii of "*Nature and the Supernatural*," in which the author claims to "*prove*" the truth of his "distinctions and definitions," and even boasts of an "absolute proof that nature is not the complete system of God." A careful inspection will shew that nothing more is there accomplished than a further explanation and illustration of his definitions in the

selves, by previous analysis, to have disproved. They boast a solid basis of logic; he ignores alike their logic and their analyses, taking a short cut by the nearer road of simple definition. But the definitions themselves do not seem to be available against the Pantheists. Nature, he tells us, is a "chain of causes and effects," acting from within itself, and the supernatural is a "higher system" of powers or beings outside of nature, and superior to it. All beings of this higher system, man included, have a power over nature—are in themselves "Powers," "initiating trains of effect that flow from themselves." But the power of original creation, which is the precise thing that Pantheism denies, Dr. Bushnell's supernaturalism does not provide for. Men, angels, and devils, all "are as truly first causes as God"—all have a supernatural power over nature, which differs from God's only in degree. Surely, a Pantheistic scepticism, which knows no God but "a logical process of thought," will not feel itself seriously cramped by a Supernaturalism as broad and accommodating as this.

But his definition of the supernatural seems to us to be as arbitrary as it is unlike the ordinary meaning attached to that term. Man a supernatural being! And that, too, solely because his volitions are reducible to no known relations of cause and effect. All blind concatenations of events we are to assign to the realm of nature, but all volitions to the region of the supernatural. And yet in all the lengthened lines of natural causes and effects, can any single effect be selected more totally irremovable from its chain than an individual man? Physically, mentally, morally, he is simply and inevitably, except just so far as the Spirit of God shall mould him, the effect of innate forces and of parental and educational causes. No phenomenon of matter is more absolutely an effect than he. Nor can he originate a solitary movement above or aside from the endless complexity of causes and effects by which he is environed.

previous chapter. He seems to have felt this, and in anticipation of the charge that his "definition is arbitrary," waveringly affirms it to be "witnessed immediately by our own consciousness." (*Nat. and Supernat.*, p. 87.)

Himself an effect of all that have preceded him, he can only, as a link in the chain, contribute his share (determinable by his proportion of native endowments and divine assistance) to the causation of all that shall succeed him. Nor is this Fatalism. It attempts no theory of the will. For ourselves, we have no faith whatever in such theories. It is only an affirmation of what both reason and observation teach respecting our relation to the great stream of life, with its countless and complicated forces. And the supposed rebutting testimony of consciousness is both irrelevant and unreliable. A volition comes into consciousness only when already formed. The place and the process of its begetting lie beyond our reach. Of these, consciousness knows nothing whatever. It assures us of the freedom of our volitions, but utters never a syllable of the relation of that freedom to the vast system of causes and effects of which we are inseparably a part. It fails us at precisely the same point on this question as on the inquiry respecting the connection of our freedom with the Divine Sovereignty. It furnishes no clue whatever to a solution. We may talk of the "self-determining power of the will," but we delude ourselves if we think by that phrase to speak intelligibly to ourselves or to others, and most of all if we attempt by *it* to vindicate our claim to be accounted supernatural.

Again, Dr. Bushnell seems to us to gain but very little, if anything, against either Mr. Parker or the Pantheists, by his proposed theory of evil. Both Pantheism and the "Absolute Religion" are at the utmost remove from affirming or implying that moral evil could have been controlled by force, even if omnipotent. Both exalt man and magnify the power of his will. Both would yield at once to the demand that he be accounted a supernatural being—that he be regarded as shaping, in spite of omnipotence, his own destiny. But while Mr. Parker would deny, as we suspect, the supposed corresponding limitation of divine power, and find a solution of sin in the infinite wisdom of the Creator, rather than in the finite but successfully defiant will of the creature; the Pantheists, on the other hand, would swiftly admit Dr. Bushnell's solution, that evil "as a bad possibility environed God from eternity,

waiting to become a fact, and certain to become a fact, whenever the opportunity is given." (*Nat. and Supernat.*, p. 134.) They will affirm the theory to be singularly coincident with their own speculations. They will maintain that none but a Pantheist can consistently hold it. Themselves could not express more precisely their notion of sin than in the language of Dr. Bushnell: "There is some antecedent necessity" that all beings "in their training as powers should be passed through the double experience of evil and good, fall and redemption." But with far more consistency than he, they pronounce the evil whose disciplinary power is so wholesome and necessary, to be evil in appearance only, and not in reality. Dr. Bushnell vehemently declares sin to be contrary to the will of God, and to exist in spite of omnipotence, and yet, by "some antecedent necessity," *all* created beings, angelic as well as human, "in their training as powers" must experience its terrible curse. Every angel in heaven must have fallen into sin, in order to reach his present state of glory! The history of theological opinions brings to light many a monstrous theodicy, but we venture to say not one more grotesque and unsuited to the present strife with Pantheistic scepticism, than this mongrel Manichaeism of Dr. Bushnell.

But this method of accounting for the origin and office of evil is objectionable on a variety of grounds. The tendencies and logical consequences of his theory were shewn long ago by the Manichaeans, and have been preserved, as a warning to the church, in the works of Augustine. The theory, moreover, is an unwarrantable and dangerous limitation of omnipotence. Just in proportion as it elevates man by thrusting him into the region of the supernatural, and denying to omnipotence all control of his movements, it degrades and dishonors God. Our author tells us that "omnipotence is force," and to moral natures, in which alone sin originates, force is totally inapplicable. But the creation of man, though possible for omnipotence only, is, in no conceivable sense of the term, an achievement of force alone. As a creature of God, the elements of man's moral nature must not only have been determined on, and all their possibilities clearly discerned before

creation, but elements and possibilities alike must have been within the control, and have been the actual gifts, of omnipotence. And surely, an omniscience and omnipotence that could originate one kind of moral constitution, could originate others. Though it be granted to Dr. Bushnell that, with our moral constitution, it be inconceivable to us *how* omnipotence could have prevented our race from sinning, it by no means follows that omnipotence could not have so constituted us, as moral and accountable beings, that we could never have sinned ; unless, indeed, it be assumed that we *know* all possible modes of existence — a postulate never avowed, it may be, but far too frequently applied in modern attempts at reasoning about the infinite Creator and his works.

The treatment of modern sceptics by American writers generally, as well as by Dr. Bushnell in particular, is strikingly suggestive of the state of speculative Philosophy among us. No one of our authors has ventured deliberately to assail Mr. Parker in his stronghold. His old Unitarian friends have remonstrated, and then submitted helplessly to his scorn. He has taken special delight in taunting them with their feebleness and utter inconsistency. Among evangelical writers who have taken him in hand, the reputed author of "*The Plan of Salvation*," with great apparent argumentation, has succeeded only in a marvellous exposure of his own incapacity for sound reasoning. Dr. Bushnell, with incomparably more genius, has adopted the method of rearing from Mr. Parker's own level and philosophical basis a *rival theory*. He thinks that, as Mr. Parker's is a "wide hypothesis of the world," he is not to be vanquished by "an attack at this or that particular point," but by "an hypothesis for the matters in question," that shall "gather in, accommodate, and assimilate all the facts of the subject." That is, he could not think it labor so well expended to tumble Mr. Parker's cob-house structure into ruins, as to build over against him, on the same plain, another, more ingeniously contrived and more elaborately constructed. But, doubtless, he has adopted the only method possible for *him* to adopt. It is manifest that the fundamental principles of the speculative philosophies of both Mr. Parker and Dr. Bushnell, are too

nearly identical to warrant any other method. And it is no less evident, notwithstanding the denunciation of the Pantheists by the former, and the attempted refutation of their scepticism by the latter, that a subtle and latent Pantheism has too deeply and widely pervaded the minds of both of them, for the one not to have rested his theosophy on a Pantheistic basis, and the other not to have drawn into the very warp of his refutation a few threads of Pantheistic spinning. Whoever refutes current scepticism, must not himself be entangled in the meshes of ideal Pantheism.

The treatment of religious sceptics in this country, we have said, is illustrative of the state of speculative Philosophy among us, but a more surprising illustration is found in the very different receptions that have been given to the two works of Dr. Bushnell and Mr. Mansel. The first of these was greeted and praised from the outset, and by antipodal schools, with a cordiality due only to works of the highest merit; the second was at first but coldly accosted, then criticised in general terms, and finally has been seized with an eagerness and denounced with a vehemence deserved only by works of the most dangerous principles. Writers who have been silent in the presence of a scepticism that has jeered them at every corner, have laid hold of Mr. Mansel as if he threatened a universal demoralization of the public mind. Dr. Bushnell, taking his stand on the same boggy and shaking foothold with Theodore Parker, and spell-bound, like him, with a Pantheistic Philosophy, has been glorified with epithets; while Mr. Mansel, standing on the high vantage ground of a Realistic and Theistic Philosophy, whence he has levelled upon all modern sceptics a battery from which there is no escape, has been berated as a betrayer of the faith.

But, in our opinion, Mr. Mansel has performed an invaluable service for Christianity by his Bampton Lectures. Modern apologetic literature furnishes no parallel to it in clearness of analysis, in force of logic, in breadth of view, in moral elevation and dignity, in acuteness, in learning, and in earnest piety. It rises as much above the vast mass of such literature, as the special phase of scepticism with which it deals has ex-

ceeded all others in imposing pretensions and actual mischief. It is idle to dispute that the sceptics it combats must be encountered, if at all with safety, by weapons from the armory he has opened ; or that, with these weapons rightly wielded, they may not be driven from their strongholds. Eminent, however, as his service has been, we wish he could have so rendered it as to prevent the misconception and perversion to which he has exposed himself. His aim was simple and definite ; it was to shew, by analysis and application of the fundamental conceptions of scepticism, that both in its criticism of Revelation and in its attempt to construct a Substitute for the gospel of the New Testament, it travels beyond the boundaries of possible thought, and involves itself in contradictions that are hopelessly self-destructive.

And it must be admitted that the Lecturer went to his task perfect master of the questions to be discussed. He was entirely familiar with the foes to be encountered, and with the weapons and tactics employed by them. It was no hasty and doubtful strife into which he was hurried by his own impetuosity, or by the unthinking urgency of others. He moved into the arena with the composure and confidence of one who knew his own strength, and the weakness of his adversaries. His very errors are chargeable, not to weakness, but to excess of strength and healthful assurance. Confident of the soundness of his cause, and the certainty of its final issue, he has been less wary and guarded than would have been a weaker and more timid man. Instead of selecting a single author or school, he has assailed the whole motley host of unbelievers. Nor is this all. The success of his argument and the force of his logic bear down, not only the sceptic and his abettors, but many of those who have claimed the special prerogative of refuting him. To this last class, above all others, his lectures have given grave offence.

In the opinion of Mr. Mansel, the unbelief or religious scepticism of our day is simply an attempt to transcend the limits of human thought. To encounter and overthrow it, therefore, these limits must be pointed out, and all legitimate religious thinking be shewn to be necessarily shut up within

them. The essayed construction of a Rational Theology by sceptics, must be shown to be an impossible feat. To do this, is the one and unforgotten purpose of the Lecturer throughout his lectures.* He supposes the limits of religious thought to have been passed by two very different classes of thinkers — the Dogmatists and the Rationalists; the one aiming, by the light of reason, to explain and supplement the facts of Revelation, and the other, by the same light, to erect a standard by which the facts themselves of Revelation shall be tested, and received or rejected as they shall endure the trial. “Rationalism, so far as it deals with Scripture at all, deals with it as a thing to be adapted to the independent conclusions of the natural reason, and to be rejected where that adaptation cannot conveniently be made.” (*Limits of Religious Thought*, p. 47.)

There are three conceptions which are fundamental to the Rationalist's system of Theology, and are familiar to the speculative philosopher; they are, severally, conceptions of God as First Cause, as Absolute, as Infinite. By analysis of the contents of these conceptions, the Lecturer shews that any system we can build on them must involve irreconcilable and inevitable contradictions. He defines the First Cause, as that which produces all things, and is itself produced by none; the Absolute, as that which exists in and by itself, independent of all relations; the Infinite, as that which is unlimited in itself, and to which no addition is conceivable; and then shews that these three conceptions, when viewed objectively and in conjunction, are hopelessly self-destructive. The Absolute cannot be conceived as First Cause, nor the First Cause as Absolute, for cause necessitates relation, and relation is inconsistent with absoluteness. We cannot conceive of the First

* We have been a little surprised to find one distinguished critic affirming “his main object” to be “the proof of the position, that there are no greater difficulties in the sphere of Theology than in that of Philosophy, and that the difficulties of the two, on the most important points, are really identical.” We had supposed this to be the Lecturer's method of conducting the argument. What we are supposed to regard as the *main object*, the critic says “comes up somewhat incidentally.”

Cause as creating, without conceiving it as passing from a previous state in which it was less or more than infinite. Thus, "the conception of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal. It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active; nor, without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of that sum. A contradiction thus thoroughgoing, while it sufficiently shows the impotence of human reason as an *a priori* judge of all truth, yet is not in itself inconsistent with any form of religious belief." (*Limits*, p. 84.) "We are compelled, by the constitution of our minds, to believe in the existence of an Absolute and Infinite Being—a belief which appears forced upon us, as the complement of our consciousness of the relative and the finite. But the instant we attempt to analyze the ideas thus suggested to us, in the hope of attaining to an intelligible conception of them, we are on every side involved in inextricable confusion and contradiction." (*Limits*, p. 91.) The Absolute, the Infinite, the First Cause, as objects of thought, as conceptions from which we attempt to reason, in the construction of a purely rational theology are found to be mutually and utterly inconsistent and destructive.

These conceptions are then viewed, in the third lecture, from the subjective side, or as they exist in consciousness. The anomalies and contradictions to which, as it was shown in the second lecture, they are sure to conduct us in our logical processes, are here traced to the mental laws under which they are found to exist. Consciousness is possible only under four conditions, each of which limits and restricts the mind to finite objects, and consequently incapacitates it for a conception of the Absolute and Infinite. Thus, consciousness

implies a distinction between one object and another ; that is, an object can come into consciousness only by being distinguished from something else than itself. But distinction is limitation, and limitation is totally inconsistent with the Infinite. "A consciousness of the Infinite, as such, thus necessarily involves a self-contradiction ; for it implies the recognition, by limitation and difference, of that which can only be given as unlimited and indifferent." (*Limits*, p. 94.) Consciousness is only possible in the form of *relation* between the subject and object—between the person thinking and the thing thought of. But the Absolute is out of all relations, and can come into consciousness only as a self-contradiction. Again, consciousness implies *succession* and *duration*. Objects come into consciousness, thoughts can exist, only in succession ; but no such object or thought can be an adequate conception of an Infinite Being. Only finite objects or thoughts can succeed each other. Equally impossible is it for us to conceive of the first act of the First Cause, since the act must be a phenomenon in time, while the First Cause is out of time ; "to realize which, the mind must be in and out of time at the same moment." Lastly, consciousness necessitates personality ; but personality is both a limitation and a relation. Consciousness cannot rise above ourselves, who are both limited and related. An Absolute and Infinite Person, therefore, to us finite creatures, is an impossible conception.

In his fourth lecture, Mr. Mansel points out the origin and foundation of religion and religious service. He finds these in the intuition and the religious consciousness. Religion originates in some fact, or some state of mind, in which, as a fact, is presented to us intuitively our relation to God. Two such states or facts are found in the *Feeling of Dependence*, and the *Conviction of Moral Obligation*. Out of these two facts of Intuition, Reflection builds a religious consciousness, and a religious service. But the facts themselves furnish no conception of the Absolute and the Infinite. The theory of Schleiermacher and his disciple, Morell, that we have a feeling of absolute dependence, is shewn to be pantheistic, self-contradictory, inconsistent with the duty of

prayer, and to make our moral and religious consciousness subversive of each other. There nevertheless "runs through the whole of our religious consciousness the accompanying conviction that the Infinite does exist; though of the manner of that existence we can form no conception." (*Limits*, p. 129.) "The religious sentiment which compels men to believe in and worship a Supreme Being, is an evidence of his existence, but not of an exhibition of his nature."* (p. 128.)

The fifth lecture dwells at length on the distinction between speculative and regulative truth, which the author supposes to follow inevitably from his previous conclusions, and to be equally required in Philosophy and in Theology. An approach is thus made towards the determination of the true limits of religious thought. Philosophy, Consciousness, and Analogy, are all summoned and made to testify in support of the distinction.

The sixth lecture, distinguishing between the form of thoughts and their material contents, proves that the objections of sceptics to the doctrines of Revelation lie against the former of these, rather than against the latter. Proof of this position is found in a parallelism between some of the principal doctrines of Philosophy and of Theology. A continuation of the parallel occupies the seventh lecture; and the eighth and last, after glancing at the true province of Reason in religious questions, dwells on the true method of treating the evidences of Christianity.

It will be seen, at a glance, that the whole force of Mr. Mansel's argument depends on the soundness of his positions in the second, third, and fourth lectures. It is to these positions, particularly as stated in the second and third lectures, that his critics have most strenuously objected. They charge him with surrendering the whole office and authority of reason to the infidel, and with reducing us all to the alternative of an unthinking faith, a blind credulity, or a blank and hopeless

* What can one of Mr. Mansel's American critics mean, by representing him as saying: "Believe in a personal God on the ground of a Bible confirmed by miracles"?

scepticism. The charge is grave, and seriously pressed. It comes from men who have at heart the same object for which the Lecturer has labored, and is entitled, therefore, to serious consideration. It is no part of our purpose, however, to attempt a vindication of Mr. Mansel's course of reasoning. He will undoubtedly make good his own position in due time. Our humble purpose now is, in the brief space allowed in the remainder of this article, to indicate certain oversights and unguarded forms of expression in the Bampton Lectures, from which, in our opinion, have arisen misapprehensions of their author's meaning, and, consequently, some of the gravest objections to his method.

Mr. Mansel does not seem to us to have been sufficiently guarded in his statement of the office and functions of Reason. He announces, with great distinctness, that his purpose is to shew "the impotence of human reason as an *a priori* judge of all truth;" to pursue a course of argument that shall "necessitate the conclusion that all belief cannot be determined solely by reason." (p. 85.) He also shews, incidentally, "that reason itself, rightly interpreted, teaches the existence of truths that are above reason" (p. 69); "that it is a duty, enjoined by reason itself, to believe in that which we are unable to comprehend." (p. 110.) The author goes further. Objecting to Kant's criticism of the arguments for the existence of God, he declares it to be "necessary to protest against the pernicious extent to which the reaction against the use of reason in Theology has in too many instances been carried." (p. 116.) "A religion based solely on the reason may starve on barren abstractions, or bewilder itself with inexplicable contradictions; but a religion which repudiates thought to take refuge in feeling, abandons itself to the wild follies of fanaticism, or the diseased ecstasies of mysticism." (p. 117.) All this is intelligible and explicit. And we have no difficulty in understanding our author, when he assures us that "to Reason, rightly employed, within its proper limits and on its proper objects, our Lord himself and his Apostles openly appealed in proof of their divine mission; and the same proof has been unhesitatingly claimed by the defenders of Christi-

anity in all subsequent ages. In other words, the legitimate object of a rational criticism of revealed religion, is not to be found in the *contents* of that religion, but in its *evidences*." (pp. 204, 205.) We are surprised, then, at the language of a distinguished American critic and philosopher, when he asserts that, according to Mr. Mansel, "a belief that the Bible is not delusive must be against the convictions which reason produces;" and, Mr. Mansel "interposes Revelation and demands faith in it, while he allows and proves that if Reason be permitted to speak at all, it must be against it!" We are no less surprised at the words of another distinguished scholar and critic: "Mr. Mansel capitulates to the Pantheists, so far as reason is concerned," — "concedes that the unbelieving Rationalist has on his side the authentic utterances of human reason." But the express purpose of Mr. Mansel was to prove these supposed utterances to be, not authentic, but spurious, and to shew that when reason talks of the Infinite and Absolute, it "babbles" in a jargon of contradictions, and works in its legitimate sphere only when confining its attention to the evidences of our religion and the grounds of our faith.

But here Mr. Mansel's critics will remind us, that having, in "the abundance of his logic," involved us in hopeless contradictions, he assures us that, "in this impotence of reason, we are compelled to take refuge in faith, and to believe that an Infinite Being exists, though we know not how." (p. 129.) "In believing, we desert the evidence of Reason, to rest on that of Faith." (p. 144.) Now, it is in precisely such statements as this, that we regard Mr. Mansel as unguarded and wanting in perspicuity. He *appears* to place Reason and Faith, not only in antithesis, but in antagonism. And yet even here, with the whole tenor of the lectures in mind, there is no sufficient ground for charging the Lecturer, as his critics have done, with requiring a faith in spite of reason, or even without the sanction and support of reason. From the whole drift of his lectures, he evidently means to affirm that the "conceptions we are compelled to form," of both the mode of the Divine existence and the ground of the Divine requirements, are not to be subjected to the criteria of Reason, but must

rest solely on Revelation, an examination and testing of the evidences of which is the special and divinely appointed prerogative of Reason. No unprejudiced and intelligent reader of the Bampton Lectures can believe the Lecturer to have advocated an unthinking faith, or a faith unsupported and unrequired by Reason. But he does advocate a belief in God under the conceptions of Revelation, not because these conceptions can be authenticated by Reason, nor because they are above or contrary to Reason, but because they rest on a basis of evidences which Reason can scrutinize and sanction. It is worse than a waste of words to talk of faith without conviction, or of conviction without evidence and the use of the Reason. Faith is only the moral exercise of the soul resting consciously on the solid basis of argument and conviction; it is the soul's vision of things invisible to mortal sight, when standing on the highest summit of argument to which it can climb. It is unjust to charge Mr. Mansel, as his critics do, with the advocacy of a disuse of Reason in religion, or of a faith which is synonymous with credulity and mysticism.

Again, we could wish our Lecturer had been more exact in his use of the words "knowledge," "thought," "conception." No little confusion and false criticism seem to us to have had their origin in a misconception of the author's meaning in the use of these terms. Thus, in denying that we "have in consciousness a partial knowledge of the infinite and the absolute" (p. 97), and then in admitting that we have a partial knowledge of the "objects of Natural Religion" (p. 60); or that "we have that knowledge of God which is best adapted to our wants and training" (p. 45); or, again, "the utmost deficiency that can be charged against human faculties amounts only to this: that we cannot say that we know God as he knows himself (p. 147); it is manifest that the word "knowledge" must be used in very different senses. A very little care would have saved the Lecturer from the remark by one of his critics, "that Mr. Mansel's argument takes for granted, or rests on the silent assumption, that we can only know what we are." And yet, it must be admitted that he has compressed the sum of our knowledge into unwarrantable

limits, apparently restricting it to the simple cognition of the mind by sense-perception and consciousness, and excluding from it all convictions and conclusions from argument, by whatever process reached. It would be difficult to prove that the mind may not know as assuredly by inference as by sense or by consciousness. We could wish, also, that the author had been more circumspect in his use of the word "thought," in speaking of our reasoning of the absolute and the infinite. His purpose, unquestionably, is to shew that "the attempt to *construct in thought* an object answering to the absolute and the infinite, necessarily results in contradictions" (p. 110). But he makes a dim and undefined distinction between positive and negative thought—intelligent enough to the readers of his *Prolegomena Logica*, but not quite apparent in the Lectures, and of which his critics make the most in their criticisms. And yet, how one of these critics could tell us that Mr. Mansel makes "*all thought* of God as infinite and absolute," to be "utterly empty and vain," that he has "proved that the *very thought* of an existing God is an absurdity," is a mystery passing comprehension. Mr. Mansel has also been unfortunate in the use of the word "conception." When denying the validity of our conceptions of an infinite and absolute Being, he manifestly means to affirm the impossibility of realizing to our minds the contents of such conceptions. He is at the utmost remove from that denial of the validity of our necessary or scriptural *ideas of God* which some critics have attributed to him. He frequently recognizes that validity, resting on it, in fact, the whole argument of his fifth lecture. When McCosh criticised the use of the word conception, as apparently denying all knowledge of God, and himself, on the contrary, affirmed the possibility and validity of a "conception as to the infinite," Mr. Mansel replied, that the difference between his critic and himself was "rather in language than in substance." In fact, there underlies the whole course of argument in the lectures, a clear distinction between a conception or *idea* of a Being who transcends all limits and all conceivable modes of existence, and a conception or *comprehension* of the manner of his existence. That distinction is

not always apparent on the surface, and many a cursory reader has failed to observe it; but sagacious critics, one would think, ought not to have overlooked it.

There is a position assumed and carefully defended by the Lecturer, which, in our opinion, was unnecessary for the accomplishment of his purpose, and from which, for more reasons than we now have space to enumerate, we are compelled to dissent. "Truth is only a relation," and "truths are given, not to satisfy our reason, but to guide our practice." This position has been so far explained and modified in the preface to the author's third edition, as to relieve it of its most objectionable feature. The modified form is, that regulative truths "do not satisfy *all* the requirements of the speculative reason." He would not enjoin a *totally* unthinking obedience. But the position is still objectionable. If it be true, then our characters in this life do not necessarily determine our destiny in the next. Character is the result of emotions, emotions of convictions, convictions of beliefs, and beliefs rest on the basis of supposed truth. But if truth is "only a relation" and not a reality; is "a property of our conceptions and not of things in themselves," then our characters may prove to be mere chimeras, and totally incongruous with eternal realities. So great may be the contrariety between the Divine character and the human in a future existence, as to establish an entire and perpetual disharmony.

But Mr. Mansel's purpose did not require him to assume this position. His simple object was to thwart a pretentious scepticism which seeks to supplant the Theology of Revelation by a Theology of Reason. His task required that limits to religious thought be shewn to exist, and to be impassable, in all legitimate thinking. But to proscribe the use of reason in theological inquiries, is a very different thing from shewing reason's inability to travel the whole circuit of the infinite and the absolute. This distinction Mr. Mansel does not seem to have always kept in mind. The most formidable objections to his Bampton Lectures have been raised on passages in which he has seemed to contract the limits within so narrow a compass as to reduce the power of reason and the sum of

our knowledge to simple zero ; to resolve that knowledge into not merely negative ideas, but absolute nescience. His task required an exhibition of the incapacity of human reason to determine the grounds in the Infinite Mind for the regulative truth He has given us ; a proof of the utter incompetency of Reason to criticise the Revelation we have, or to construct another that shall supplant it ; but it did not require him to put a brand upon Reason, and compel her to be a galley-slave in Religion. To kill Rationalism it was not necessary to enslave Reason. To rout sceptics he was not obliged to tether believers.

The work most needed now, and in truth always, in treating of the evidences of Christianity, is simply that of defence. That old word *apology*, so ancient and honorable in its origin, is as significant now as ever of the specific duties of a defender of the Faith. His simple office is to repel the assailant ; to stand in the watch-tower and draw the bow ; and not to forge implements for the christian husbandman in the vineyard of the Lord. Christianity in its aggressive work in the world, has, on its own front and on its own lips, the best evidence of its beneficent mission and divine origin. The most useful apologists in our day will not be those who attempt in a single treatise the double office of convicting the sceptic of his error, and converting him to the truth. From Raymond Lull down to Horace Bushnell, attempts to construct a defence of Christianity on "a wide hypothesis of the world," "that gathers in, accommodates, and assimilates all the facts of the subject," have not been fruitful of results over which the Christian Church could specially congratulate herself. The chief subtraction from the services of Mr. Mansel is chargeable to his occasional deviations from the single work of defence, and his attempt to prescribe for the Theologian a narrow pathway, from which he is not to depart.

ARTICLE VIII.—BOOK NOTICES.

THEOLOGY AND RELIGION.

THE ELOHIM REVEALED, BY SAMUEL J. BAIRD, D. D.*—There are increasing signs of intellectual life among our American pastors. One of the most significant of these is the appearance of this volume. It discusses fundamental questions in Theology, and in a masterly way. *Old School* in doctrine and in spirit, it yet bears on every page unmistakable traces of independent investigation, and of a mind that calls no man Master but Christ, and holds no standard of appeal as ultimate but the Bible. The author is a Presbyterian pastor, and is known as the compiler of a "Digest of the Minutes of the General Assemblies," to which we once had occasion to refer our readers. The present volume, from the criticisms and discussions it will evoke, as well as from its intrinsic merits, must give him prominence among American Theologians.

No one, however, would guess, from the running title, the real contents of the volume. These would have been much better indicated by the words, "*The First Adam and the Second*," which are printed unobtrusively in small capitals on the top of the title-page, but fail to arrest the attention of the cursory reader. The author supposes, and rightly, in our judgment, that all discussions about sin and righteousness must, in the end, turn on the simple questions, What are our relations to the first Adam and the Second? By far the larger portion of the volume is occupied with answering the first of these questions; and truth requires us to say, that we know of no recent American writer comparable to Dr. Baird in closeness of approach to the true reply. Contrary to Dr. Hodge, he believes that, "in imputation, the case is never viewed or represented in any other light than as it is." "It does not create any different state of the case from that which existed prior to the imputing act." (p. 473.) A man is treated as a sinner, because he is in himself sinful. "Native corruption is truly sin;" "we truly sinned in Adam;" there is "a real and substantial oneness of nature in the race," a "real oneness of the race in Adam." (p. 541.)

The origin of souls, too long slighted or altogether ignored in our theological inquiries, is also ably discussed. There are, however, sev-

* *The First Adam and the Second. The Elohim Revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man.* By SAMUEL J. BAIRD, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Woodbury, N. J. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1860.

eral positions assumed by the author to which we should feel compelled strenuously to object, but to which we have no space now to refer. We can only recommend his treatise, to all who are interested in the state of theological opinion in this country, as one eminently worthy their attention. The historical sketch of the doctrine of original sin in the Introduction, will bear a careful perusal.

THE ATONEMENT: PROF. PARK.*—"The Edwardean Theory of the Atonement," as Prof. Park calls it—the Governmental Theory, as others have styled it—may be studied to great advantage in this collection of discourses and treatises, especially in the light of the "Introductory Essay." The treatise of Dr. Griffin had become scarce; and that of Mr. Burge, as well as the "Dialogue" of Dr. Weeks, it was next to impossible to obtain. For the sake of these, we are willing to take along with them the more common sermons of Emmons, Maxcy, Smalley, and the younger Edwards. It will, furthermore, be convenient and instructive to have the views of the several authors within the same cover for easy and constant comparison.

The most attractive part of the volume, however, is the "Introductory Essay," by the accomplished editor. No one has studied more carefully than Prof. Park the history of doctrines in America; no one is more familiar than he with the changes that have occurred in American Theology. His design in the essay, is to shew that the "Edwardean Theory of the Atonement," though not distinctly taught in its present form, was yet *essentially* held alike by the elder Edwards and by Drs. Bellamy, Hopkins, and West; the first three of whom were intimate friends, and the last, the cherished and confidential companion of Bellamy and Edwards. He concludes the examination by saying: "We have now illustrated the Rise of the Edwardean Theory of the Atonement, by citing certain passages directly or indirectly suggesting it, and written by the four men who exerted a more decided influence than others on the accredited advocates of that theory." From these four he traces formative influences on the theological opinions of the several divines, the legitimate "successors of Edwards," whose discourses and treatises make up the volume.

The admirable skill of Prof. Park in the use of his materials, are clearly discernible in every paragraph of his essay. And we think he has so far made out his case, as to prove that principles and statements are found in the writings of the elder Edwards and his two friends, Hopkins and Bellamy, which, by expansion and inference, have been wrought into what is now called the Edwardean Theory of the Atonement; but whether either of those divines would have acknowledged that theory, as now developed, is, in our judgment, more than doubtful. The theory seems to us wholly inconsistent with other sentiments which they unquestionably held. They are not the first instances, as

* *The Atonement. Discourses and Treatises by Edwards, Smalley, Maxcy, Emmons, Griffin, Burge, and Weeks. With an Introductory Essay, by EDWARDS A. PARK, Abbot Professor of Christian Theology, Andover, Mass. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication. 1859.*

they will not be the last, of theologians who have furnished principles that have been wrought into theories unlike and even subversive of their own. We are still disposed to believe the younger Edwards to be entitled to the credit of originating the distinctively Edwardean Theory of the Atonement.

DR. TURNBULL'S CHRIST IN HISTORY.*—The call for a second edition of a work like this, is some evidence of its real worth. The author has taken occasion to enhance its value, by subjecting it to "a thorough revision." A few of its chapters will be recognized by some of our readers as articles once published in this Review. The fundamental conception of the whole discussion, is that "the Incarnation is the central or 'turning point' in the history of mankind;" the whole thus having a certain apologetic bearing and a consequent pertinency to the world's current thinking.

We are not sure that we understand the author, when he tells us that miracles are to be referred to some "higher or unknown law, which controls the ordinary laws" of Nature. Is the word *law* here used in the same sense in both cases? If so, how can the theory, or the definition founded on it, be used against either the Pantheists or the Physicists, who are really the only modern objectors to miracles? They both affirm that all things in the Universe are according to "immutable order" or unchangeable law, and that our only safe course in regard to miracles is, not to accept them as divine interpositions in support of Revelation, but as phenomena to be hereafter explained in the light of advancing science. But if the word *law* is used in different senses, then is not the definition to be ruled out, not only as inapplicable to those for whom it has been made, but as inadmissible in sound reasoning? It has seemed to us that, ever since the publication of Dean Trench's work on miracles, there has been a growing disposition among defenders of Christianity to found their argument from miracles on a *theory* of the miracle, whereas the only explanation that can be given of it is, that it is an interposition of God in support of his accredited messengers.

THE WORD OF THE SPIRIT TO THE CHURCH,† by C. A. Bartol, is a little volume of eighty-six pages, which recognizes a suspense of faith among "liberal Christians," and dissuades from expecting a remedy, either in the rites and forms of the Episcopal Church, or in the misnamed spiritualism of necromancy or of Parkerism, but urges a clearer and more constant apprehension of the office of the Spirit in the church. The chief characteristic of the book is a tantalizing uncertainty in the meaning of the word Spirit. The great want of that party to which the author belongs, is a clarification of their thoughts and language.

* *Christ in History.* By ROBERT TURNBULL, D. D., author of "*Genius of Scotland*," etc. New and revised edition. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. Cincinnati: Geo. S. Blanchard. New-York: Sheldon & Company. 1860.

† *The Word of the Spirit to the Church.* By C. A. BARTOL. Boston: Walker, Wise & Company. 1859.

SERMONS BY F. D. HUNTINGTON, D. D.*—We know of no man now living whom the accidents of position and time have so largely contributed to bring into public notice as the Rev. Dr. F. D. Huntington. By ecclesiastical training and position a Unitarian, and at heart sympathizing with evangelical Christians, he was at once the compromise candidate and the most acceptable of men with the Corporation of Harvard College for the newly made chair of Preacher and Plummer Professor of Morals. His known and steady progress towards a full and final adoption of the Trinitarian creed, kept the ecclesiastical world in a state of eager curiosity to know into what enclosure he would ultimately drop when ripe enough to fall; and many an able editor was singularly alive to his distinguished abilities and eminent attainments.

But Dr. Huntington is really a gentleman of scholarly attainments, of fine culture and taste, and, withal, is an eloquent writer. His reputation is by no means altogether factitious. This volume of sermons vindicates his right to distinction. The brilliancy and fervor, and pungent life and energy, pervading its pages, will minister delight to multitudes of readers, and, we hope, carry light and peace to many of his former friends and admirers in the communion he has left.

The most notable sermon in the volume—the sermon that gives at once the greatest offence to his old associates and the greatest satisfaction to his new brethren—is that on the Trinity. The single discourse, with accompanying notes, occupies sixty-four pages. It is a popular but very effective discussion; being, at the same time, a plea for the doctrine it avows, and a defence of it against its opponents.

We must, in this connection, express our regret that Dr. Huntington has felt himself required to enter the Episcopal Communion. We do this the more freely, since Baptists never expected his accession to their numbers. The influence of his example cannot be wholesome, nor such as evangelical Christians generally can rejoice over. A church that can generate Puseyism; that counts a violation of an ecclesiastical canon a graver offence than unsoundness of doctrine or impurity of life; that unchurches and consigns to “uncovenanted mercies” all not within its pale; that requires solemn subscription to a creed which nineteenth-twentieths of its clergy repudiate in their preaching; that exalts its liturgy and ecclesiastical constitution above the religious life and freedom of the soul; a church marked and stamped with such peculiarities, can hardly afford, we should think, a congenial home for one who has come into the liberty of the gospel through such struggles as Dr. Huntington must have endured. We have heard it intimated, that sundry Unitarian clergymen have been ready, for some time past, to betake themselves to the Episcopal enclosure whenever the way should be prepared and the door opened; we should regret, though we should not be surprised, at the movement. Ecclesiastical oscillations are usually from one extreme of the arc to the other. But how a true Christian man who has been reared a Congregationalist, and as such has come

* *Christian Believing and Living. Sermons by F. D. HUNTINGTON, D. D., Preacher to the University, and Plummer Professor of Christian Theology in Harvard College. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Company. 1860.*

into that liberty wherewith Christ makes the soul free, can deliberately enter, with expectation of rest, the American Episcopal Church, is to us an inexplicable mystery.

CATHARINE BEECHER'S *APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE*.*—Miss Beecher writes with a will, and evidently regards herself as specially called to overthrow the Augustinian theory of evil, and establish in its place the Pelagian. She has, however, lost hope of carrying her point by discussion with the theologians and editors. After challenge, and appeal, and entreaty, they all persist most doggedly in a silence that both demonstrates the weakness of their cause, and gives them security from her weapons. If they would only speak, how soon she would convince and put them all to confusion. In despair of coaxing them from their coverts, she makes "an appeal to the people," and dedicates it to "the editors of the secular press, the true tribunes of the people." Alas for the theologians! Miss Beecher and the people are to take them in hand. A theological French Revolution is to be enacted. But perhaps we are unduly alarmed. Miss Beecher believes that if the theologians will only come out boldly to "a fair and free discussion," and "resign the claim of infallibility," and "confess that they have made mistakes," there will be harmony and love, such as have existed "in that family circle (the Beecher family) where the golden chain of perfect love has never for a moment been sundered by the widest diversities of opinion, or the freest discussion of differences." In the closing note of her book, she says of her brother, Henry Ward: "Whether he yet fully understands his position, is not affirmed by one who has for so short a time fully understood her own bearings in this matter."

As for ourselves, we shall defer any criticisms of Miss Beecher's book, till she understands more fully than she yet does "her own bearings in this matter."

ROBERTSON'S *SERMONS*.†—We spoke so fully, in our last, of the merits and objects of the Sermons of this noble and gifted man, that we need add little at this time, save to say that these expository discourses are pervaded by the same excellencies and the same faults as their predecessors. A prominent excellence is the vividness with which the Epistle stands as a living book before the mind of the speaker, and is presented to the hearers. To the preacher, and no doubt to his auditors, Corinth, with its "fierce democracie," its motley population, its quays, all alive with traffic, and its strongly marked social and national distinctions, was as real and living as Brighton, with its pleasure-seeking crowd, its sharp gradations of rank, its busy working men, its aristocratic visitors, and its liveried footmen.

* *An Appeal to the People in behalf of their Rights as Authorized Interpreters of the Bible.* By CATHARINE E. BEECHER, author of various books. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

† *Sermons on St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians: delivered at Trinity Chapel, Brighton.* By the late Rev. F. W. ROBERTSON, M. A., the incumbent. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1860.

Yet almost every page affords evidence that it is the outward rather than the inward life of the Epistle with which the author was in sympathy. The inadequate or erroneous conception of Paul's most important teachings, mars the pleasure with which one reads these glowing paragraphs. We must withhold our assent from the author's definition of the church, from his idea of the Apostolic calling, and from his conception of what constitutes the preaching of "Christ crucified," while we could well have spared some of the slurs at "Evangelicalism" which deform the Sermons. As in richness of thought, so in doctrinal error, these discourses even more abound than did the preceding volumes. Any one who is prepared to sift the erroneous from the true, will not fail to be profited by the earnest spirit, affluent suggestion, and apt illustration which pervade the book.

DR. MALLARY ON SOUL-PROSPERITY.*—The Southern Baptist Publication Society will commend itself to discerning Christians, securing their confidence, and establishing itself in their affections, by the issue of works of merit like this of Dr. Mallary. Written in an unpretending, but lucid and manly style, it takes us over a comprehensive survey of the *nature, effects, and means* of soul-prosperity. It cannot fail to promote a healthful personal piety among those who shall read it. Dr. Mallary is also favorably known as the author of several other religious works.

SECKER'S NONSUCH PROFESSOR.†—The disposition to revive old authors continues unabated. And all readers, who are fond of the quibbles, and quirks, and conceits, and puns, and epigrams, and antitheses, and nameless affectations, so popular in the seventeenth century, will be delighted at the disinterment of this old volume. They will be profited by it, too, if they read attentively. Secker is incomparably more worthy to be read, than multitudes of would-be authors of to-day.

THE STILL HOUR.‡—The very rapid sale of this small volume, is sufficiently indicative of its fitness to meet a prevalent and conscious want in the religious life of the church. It treats of prayer under fourteen sections, and is full of wholesome truth, pungently and practically applied. No Christian can rise from its delightful pages without feeling a stronger desire for that fulness of spiritual life which comes from close communion with God.

* *Soul-Prosperity: its Nature, its Fruits, and its Culture.* By CHARLES D. MALLARY, D. D., author of several books. Charleston, S. C.: Baptist Publication Society.

† *The Nonsuch Professor in his Meridian Splendor; or, the singular actions of Sanctified Christians laid open, in Seven Sermons, at All-Hallow's Church, London-Wall.* By WILLIAM SECKER. To which is added *The Wedding-Ring, a Sermon*, by the same author. With an Introduction, by C. P. KRAUTH, D. D. New-York: Sheldon & Company. 1860.

‡ *The Still Hour; or, Communion with God.* By AUSTIN PHELPS, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary. Twentieth thousand. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

THE SINLESS ONE, BY JOSHUA T. TUCKER.*—The Congregational Board of Publication have not only issued valuable editions of several of the New-England divines (a new edition of Emmons is now being printed), but have also published several other useful books, among which is this volume of studies and reflections on the Life of Christ. It will doubtless, with its graphic style and sound instruction, prove useful to the rapidly growing *middling classes* of the great society of book readers. The same Board also gives us,

LIFE AT THE FIRESIDE, BY W. M. THAYER,† which is full of useful hints for those who sit by the same hearth; and if not specially fresh in thought or language, is nevertheless healthful in tone, and may carry, as it has already doubtless done, invaluable instruction to thousands of homes.

PRIMITIVE PIETY REVIVED.‡—It is a sufficient commendation of this well-known book and premium essay, by Dr. Fish, that its *fifteenth* thousand has recently been issued. Written in a glowing spirit of earnest piety, and on every page prompting to personal consecration and Christian activity, the Congregational Board of Publication are doing good service in giving it a wide circulation.

JESUS, THE INTERPRETER OF NATURE, BY THOMAS HILL.§—Mr. Hill has long been known as eminent for his scientific attainments. Eighteen short sermons, written in an admirable style for the pulpit, and full of sound ethics and apt illustrations, compose this volume. The man of science never obtrudes himself, though he perpetually helps the preacher to give freshness and beauty to the illustrations of his thoughts. We miss those conceptions of sin, of Christ, and of faith, which, in our view of the gospel, are essential to its effectual working in the heart of man. But Mr. Hill is, in these respects, very much less objectionable than many of his Unitarian brethren.

SERMONS AND ADDRESSES.||—The inaugural discourse of Dr. Fisher on assuming the Presidency of Hamilton College, a variety of discourses—educational, literary, and historical—one or two review articles, and

* *The Sinless One, or the Life Manifested.* By JOSHUA T. TUCKER. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication.

† *Life at the Fireside.* By W. M. THAYER, author of "Spots in your Feasts of Charity," etc. Third edition. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication. 1860.

‡ *Primitive Piety Revived, or the Aggressive Power of the Christian Church. A Premium Essay.* By REV. HENRY C. FISH, Newark, N. J. Fifteenth thousand. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication. 1860.

§ *Jesus, the Interpreter of Nature, and other Sermons.* By THOMAS HILL. Boston: Walker, Wise & Company. 1860.

|| *Occasional Sermons and Addresses.* By SAMUEL W. FISHER, D. D., President of Hamilton College. New-York: Mason Brothers. 1860.

several occasional sermons, have been collected into an octavo volume of 568 pages. Dr. Fisher writes in a flowing and somewhat rhetorical style, well suited to be spoken, and has evidently been an industrious student. If the sermons and addresses present nothing specially new and striking, they are yet wholesome in spirit and elevated in range, and will assure alike his friends and the patrons of Hamilton College of his eminent fitness for the place he now occupies.

BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION.

COMMENTARY ON THE PENTATEUCH.*—Otto Von Gerlach was a well educated, pious, and laborious Christian pastor in Berlin, during the years 1835—1849. The volume above named, is the fruit, in part, of his study and public teaching in the Scriptures during those years. In consequence of the manner in which it was written, and the purposes for which it was designed, it is not a work of criticism adapted particularly to aid such students as have access to original sources, but is very well adapted to the wants of other intelligent readers. It every where gives evidence of generous culture and wide reading, and its interpretations are generally characterized by sobriety and good sense, and they have, moreover, a wholesome, practical aim. As an example of this sober, good sense, and freedom from all unprofitable speculation, take his short comment on "the tree of life," Gen. ii: 9: "Man was created not subject to death, but capable of dying. The tree of life, which before the fall he was permitted to taste, was meant for his sustenance. Man, in his infant condition, required some sensible corporeal assurance of immortality, and the tree of life afforded him immortality, if not by its own immediate power, yet by virtue of the promise imparted to it. But man could only continue to taste of this tree of life, so long as he, by the obedience of faith, remained in communion with God." However, with the author's representation of the state of Adam during this period of probation as "an *infant* condition," a representation quite common, we do not sympathize. The author's comment on "the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," is also a specimen of good sense, eschewing all the vagueness and incertitude of allegorical interpretation. Indeed, a marked feature of this commentary is its refreshing, but not excessive or slavish, *literalness*. Thus, God walks in the garden in human form. The serpent of the temptation implies a real animal, that was made an instrument for beguiling Eve.

From many of the author's particular explanations we differ, *e. g.* from that of Gen. iv: 7. A deeper and more *evangelical* meaning belongs to the words, we think, than Gerlach finds. But with most of his interpretations we thoroughly agree. And many of them are not only sound and just, but they are richly edifying to the Christian's heart. For example, the remarks on the wrestling of Jacob with the man by the brook Jabbok, were evidently coined from a personal experience of the struggles and conquests of the religious life.

* *Commentary on the Pentateuch. Translated from the German of OTTO VON GERLACH. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1860.*

It is to be hoped that Gerlach's commentary on *The Minor Prophets* may be given to the English reading public. We must differ from the writer of the preface of this volume, by expressing the opinion that there is less valuable commentary accessible to the English, or at least the American reader, on the Minor Prophets than on the Pentateuch. For this portion of the author's commentary we shall wait with interest.

HISTORY OF THE OLD COVENANT.*—Whoever has the first two volumes of this work, will need no other incitement to procure this. And we would counsel all who have not purchased any portion of the work, to make the investment at once. It is a work to consult, in the study of the Old Testament, through life. It is the product of genuine German erudition, and indefatigable German industry, combined with deep and reverential piety. If our ministry would study the Bible with the proper and thorough use of *such* helps as these volumes furnish, it would become robust and instructive, and all monotony and dulness would depart from its pulpit performances. And the time has come when the people *demand* at the hands of their pastors such edification as would be thus furnished.

This volume covers a period of forty years, and deals with the interesting subjects of the sojourn of Israel in Arabia-Petraea, and in the field of Moab, giving special attention to the giving of the Law.

To say that we agree with the author throughout his extended survey, would be to say that we had abandoned our judgment to the authority of a human and partial guidance. We have, in noticing the previous volumes, indicated some important points on which Kurtz seems to us to be at fault in his views. But however we may differ from him on particular expositions, and hold with other authorities, we cannot but fellowship his evangelical piety, and respect his laborious scholarship, everywhere. Upon the whole, a richer contribution has not been lately given to the Old Testament literature than is contained in these three volumes.

LECTURES ON THE EPISTLES OF PAUL TO THE THESSALONIANS.†—It is a misfortune, both to the Christian church and to the Christian ministry, that there has come to be so great and so general a departure from the early method of handling Scripture for religious edification, as well as from the prevailing method of the great Reformation. That method was not preaching from isolated texts, using them as topic-suggesting mottoes, but exposition, continuous and extended exposition, of the Word of God. If this method could be again revived, and earnestly and skilfully pursued by our ministers generally, it would, we are confident, inaugurate a new era of life throughout the church. When successfully performed, it is the most quickening and the most edifying of all pulpit discourse. Examples are not wanting in proof of this posi-

* *History of the Old Covenant.* By J. H. KURTZ, D. D., Prof. of Theology at Dorpat. Vol. iii. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1859.

† *Lectures on the Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians.* By JOHN LILLIE, D. D. New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

tion, even in the present day, as might witness the names of *John M. Mason*, *Alexander Carson*, and many others. Would that we could have, from our pastors, less of human invention, and metaphysics, and rhetoric in public teaching, and more of the skilful unfolding of Scripture. It gives us pleasure to call attention to the work at the head of this notice, as illustrating these remarks. The volume consists of thirty-nine lectures, delivered during a year's pulpit labor, in a regular course of exposition. They are an "attempt to apply the results of a critical study of the Greek text to the uses of popular instruction, and the edification of the church." This extract from the author's advertisement, shews that he understands the true method of successful expository preaching, which is not to give the people dry exegesis, but its ripened, mellow fruits.

This volume is a good specimen of expository preaching, being a blending of the doctrinal, experimental, and practical, as all genuine expository discourse must be.

We have no space to follow the author in any of his special expositions. We have been much interested in the one on II Thess. ii: 2, particularly on the expression, "As that the day of the Lord is *at hand*," as it is in our version. We are disposed to adopt the author's translation and interpretation. We should also agree with him, substantially, in his explanation of the prophecy, II Thess. ii: 3, sq., at all events to this extent, that the prediction does not look *exclusively* to the Roman apostacy.

STIER'S WORDS OF THE LORD JESUS.*—The more the Commentary of Stier shall be read by our biblical students, the higher will be their estimate of its value, and the greater the public demand for it. It will be an admirable accompaniment to that of Olshausen in the library of the Christian minister; for no one who consults a commentary at all, will be satisfied with the views of any single author, whatever may be his merits. The Lutheranism of Stier shews itself in these volumes, but is never offensively prominent. The comment covers the discourses of Jesus which are recorded by John between the fourth and seventeenth chapters of his Gospel, inclusive, and is marked by the same fulness and richness of sentiment that characterized the preceding volumes. We shall be glad to know that this Commentary is being widely circulated in our country, as it will, we believe, prove to be, in some degree, a corrective of the mischief wrought among us by other translations from the German.

STIER'S WORDS OF THE RISEN SAVIOUR, AND COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLE OF JAMES,†—The words commented on in the first half of this

* *The Words of the Lord Jesus.* By RUDOLPH STIER, Doctor of Theology, Chief Pastor and Superintendent of Schkeuditz. Volume fifth. Translated from the second revised and enlarged German Edition, by the Rev. WILLIAM B. POPE. New Edition. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New-York: Sheldon & Co. Boston: Gould & Lincoln, 1860.

† *The Words of the Risen Saviour, and Commentary on the Epistle of St. James.* By the same author, translator, and publishers.

volume, were addressed to Peter, Ananias, Paul, and John, and are contained, with the exception of II Cor. xii: 9, in the Acts and the Apocalypse; the last half, is a continuous exposition of the Epistle of James. There has long been felt a want, in our language, of good commentaries on James, which this volume will go far towards relieving. Stier brings to light the hidden life and doctrines of the gospel which underlie the whole Epistle, but are not always discerned by the ordinary reader.

PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE.

McCOSH ON THE INTUITIONS OF THE MIND.*—While the German mind, by a sudden and wide-spread revolt from the dominion of Speculative Philosophy, is rushing in the direction of the exact and physical sciences, the English and Scottish mind is engaging in metaphysical inquiries with renewed zeal and relish. How much of this is attributable to the example and Lectures of Sir William Hamilton; how much is owing to reaction against an imported Pantheism that has been unsettling so many English-reading minds; and how much to the old inherited spirit of the Scottish Universities, we cannot say; but one thing seems clear, that Unbelief in Britain is not to have exclusive control of the metaphysical weapons. Indeed, so far as metaphysics are concerned, the sceptics are fast discovering that they have fallen on perilous times.

McCosh, as will readily be believed by all who have read his former works, "does not profess," as a metaphysician, "to belong to the school of any eminent man of the past or present, nor to any school, except the one which will attend to nothing but facts." But the attentive reader will readily discover here and there traces of the formative influences of the great authors he has read; detecting, now the subtle presence of Kant, and now the bold, strong hand of Hamilton, and anon the clear, unmistakable traces of Locke, and then the fainter marks of Reid. Yet, when it suits him, he makes against them all a resolute and sometimes successful stand. In single notes, he sometimes condenses more of genuine logic and metaphysic than suffices for pages of the text. It is not our present purpose to specify any of his opinions for criticism. We shall provide for our readers, in a future number, a review and critical estimate of the whole volume. Meanwhile, as it discusses that branch of Metaphysics—Psychology—in which Christians of our day are most of all interested, and as it takes the reader into the very heart of questions over which sceptics and believers are now disputing, we commend it as worthy an attentive perusal.

CHAMPLIN'S EDITION OF BUTLER'S ANALOGY.†—Butler's Analogy of Religion cannot yet be dispensed with in our Collegiate education.

* *The Intuitions of the Mind, inductively investigated.* By Rev. JAMES MCCOSH, LL. D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Queen's College, Belfast, author of "Method of the Divine Government," and joint author of "Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation." New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860.

† *Bishop Butler's Analogy of Religion, natural and revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature.* Edited, with an Analysis, by J. T. CHAMPLIN, D. D., President of Waterville College. Boston: John P. Jewett & Company. 1860.

Our age has not yet outgrown it. Butler's *method*, if not his arguments, is as applicable and as much needed to-day as when first employed by him. His method has been found to be just as effective in dealing with the scepticism of the Pantheists, as it was in dealing with the naturalism of the Deists.

Dr. Champlin contributes his share towards an increased appreciation and use of the *Analogy*, by giving us an edition in which the paragraphs, often long and obscure as Butler left them, are broken up, and each supplied with a prefixed statement of its subject; the whole thus furnishing to the eye of the student a complete running analysis of the argument.

ANNUAL OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY,*—It is said that John Hunter was often mortified, after he had, by long, patient toil, made some discovery; to learn that the truth of which he imagined himself the first revealer, had been long familiar to the medical world. The days of useless toil, and the mortification and disappointment, were the penalty he paid for his want of "book learning." As little can the mechanic afford to neglect the literature of his profession. Hence, this *Annual of Scientific Discovery* has become indispensable to every mechanic, who would be master of his calling. Nor to the mechanic alone, but it is a necessity to every intelligent man. The student of political philosophy will remark here the fact that invention is the offspring of the union of intelligence and labor; the philanthropist will delight to observe that the tendency of modern physical science is to promote the welfare, the comfort and happiness of humanity; and the man of science, though not depending upon this volume for the minutiae of the processes of discovery, will find it (as its name implies) a "hand-book" quite indispensable for convenience of reference.

ANSWER TO HUGH MILLER AND THE GEOLOGISTS, BY THOMAS A. DAVIES.†—Who Thomas A. Davies may be, we know not. We learn from his dedication to Francis Vinton, D. D., that he and that distinguished divine were once fellow-students at West Point. That the dedication has been in consequence of Dr. Vinton's agreement with the author's views, we can hardly believe. The special object of the book, is "to shew the conflicts of the geologic faith and the Christian faith;" to prove that "the pre-Adamite fossils were made as they are" "by fiat law," and in six literal days. The arguments will not prove entirely conclusive to all minds. The author's rhetoric may be judged of by a specimen taken at random from p. 208: "It is a common notion among men, that to make themselves notorious or distinguished, they must pursue one department of knowledge; and if Mr. Miller had not departed from the rule, he would have been nigh immortally distinguished

* *Annual of Scientific Discovery, or Year-Book of Facts in Science and Art, for 1860.* Edited by DAVID A. WELLS, A. M. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

† *Answer to Hugh Miller and Theoretic Geologists.* By THOMAS A. DAVIES, author of "*Cosmogony or Mysteries of Creation, being an analysis,*" &c., &c. New-York: Rudd & Carlton. 1860.

not only as he is, but those laurels would have remained untarnished in the lapse of time. But he was evidently anxious to cover too much ground, and has, no doubt, *on this account, gone beyond his depth.*" We need hardly say, an author who can write such sentences as these, will not be likely to convince many people of the truth of his theory.

ENGLISH LEXICOGRAPHY.

MARSH'S LECTURES ON THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.†—These Lectures were originally delivered at Columbia College, in the city of New-York. They were the first, and, as it now seems, the last of the proposed "Post-graduate Lectures." The surprise and regret of the public that a plan so admirably conceived, and so worthily entered upon, should have been allowed by the Trustees to fall through, have been in no way lessened since the publication of these Lectures. It would have been very creditable to that richly-endowed institution to establish permanently in our great metropolis, for the benefit of all students, a course of instruction which should, like these papers of Mr. Marsh, embody the results of learning without the formal exhibition of it, and convey, in a popular form, from special fields of research, the fruits of long and thorough investigation. The general design of these Lectures, is to stimulate to the study of the English language in its own literature. They treat of the origin, sources, composition, etymology, vocabulary, and syntax of the language; of English as affected by the art of printing, of rhyme, of synonyms, of corruptions of English, and of the English language in America. The Lecture on Principles of Translation, as well as that on the English Bible, will have special interest for many of our own denomination. Though the Lectures do not constitute a strictly scientific treatise, and were designed less for the professed linguist and grammarian than for persons of liberal culture who have given only the customary attention to the study of their native tongue; yet they are based on a science which does not formally appear, and every page incidentally—by passing word or allusion—reveals to the philological scholar the reserved power and concealed resources of one who is thorough master of his subject. Aside from the varied learning, critical sagacity, and original research, betrayed in the treatment of his subject, these Lectures of Mr. Marsh have an independent value as illustrations of his own principles—as models of pure, elegant, vigorous English. He writes with the self-possession, but also with the genuine modesty of a true scholar. We know of no treatise that covers just the ground which this passes over, and none so minute, so varied, and so affluent in its hints and helps to the student of the English language. We heartily commend it to every one aspiring to write with accuracy and elegance his mother tongue. We hope that the public may receive the further benefit of the rare philological attainments of Mr. Marsh, in the series of Lectures to which these, at the time of preparation, were designed as introductory.

† *Lectures on the English Language.* By GEORGE P. MARSH. New-York: Charles Scribner. 1860.

WORCESTER'S DICTIONARY.*—Since our last issue, Dr. Worcester's long desired Quarto Dictionary has made its appearance; and high as expectation had been, no one, we are confident, has been disappointed. All pertaining to the mechanical execution is admirable; and the more we have looked into its pages, the stronger has become our conviction that, to all who use our language, it ought to be, and to the unprejudiced in our country it must become, the standard Dictionary. We have no space to specify the grounds of this conviction, and we are not anxious to do so, as in our July number we shall present our readers with a review of the rival Dictionaries, by the most competent critic among American scholars.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

THE LIFE OF BISHOP WILSON.†—An octavo volume of seven hundred and forty-four pages, in this book-making age, will strike most readers as an undue proportion of paper to be devoted to one mortal, whatever may have been his position and deeds. But let no one be deterred from this Life by the bulk of the volume. Daniel Wilson was entitled, by his character, his attainments, his manifold labors both in England and in India, and by his official position as Bishop of Calcutta, to be minutely and faithfully pictured. Yet the whole book could have been compressed into a narrower compass, with very great advantage.

Daniel Wilson's religious and clerical character were formed under the influence of such men as John Newton and Richard Cecil. He was, consequently, an earnest and faithful preacher of a true gospel; first as the successor and curate of Cecil at St. John's Chapel, Bedford Row, London, and afterwards as vicar at Islington. No man, probably, could have been selected from the Anglican clergy better fitted than he for the office of Bishop of Calcutta. Elected to that office at a period of life (within a few months of fifty-four) when most men begin to think of repose, he sailed for India as eager for usefulness (with some desire perhaps for place) as when he entered upon his first curacy. For nearly twenty-six years he labored on in India, with an assiduity and faithfulness rarely equalled by occupants of Episcopal chairs.

This Life throws light on various questions pertaining to Calcutta and India, but will be specially of use to those who wish to inform themselves of the progress of the Episcopal Church in India. Only the scantiest information is to be gleaned from it of any other missions. We have minute details of the Bishop's several visitations and journeys, but we never lose sight of the *Bishop* and of the *Episcopate*. Thus, in an account of his last visitation, in 1857, the author of the Life tells

* *A Dictionary of the English Language.* By JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, LL. D. Boston: Hineckling, Swan & Brewer. 1860.

† *The Life of Daniel Wilson, D. D., Bishop of Calcutta, and Metropolitan of India.* By JOSIAH BATEMAN, M. A., Rector of North Cray, Kent, his Son-in-law and First Chaplain. With Portraits, Map, and Illustrations. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New-York: Sheldon & Company. Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard. 1860.

us that the Bishop "took spiritual possession of Burmah." Could impertinence go further? When will Episcopacy, Romish or Anglican, learn the language of civility, not to say of Christian courtesy?

To all who are curious in inquiries on the influence of consanguineal intermarriage, this book furnishes some items worthy of investigation. It seems that "Mr. William Wilson was his (the Bishop's) near relative by blood, and his maternal uncle by marriage." The daughter of this Mr. Wilson, the Bishop's double cousin, became his wife, and *their* daughter married her cousin, Rev. Josiah Bateman, the Bishop's biographer and nephew.

This volume, like all others from the same house, is in admirable style, and is embellished with two portraits of the Bishop—one taken in the fulness of his manhood, and the other only the year before his death.

HOPKIN'S PURITANS AND QUEEN ELIZABETH.*—In our last number, we characterized in general terms the contents and style of the first volume of this captivating History. The second volume, which carries the narrative, with unabated interest, to the year 1585, fully sustains the wide reputation already attained by the author. Its peculiar excellencies and defects, as a historical production, will form the subject of an extended article in a future number.

HASE'S LIFE OF JESUS.†—As we have Strauss in English, we may as well have Hase also. There is a class of minds to whom the criticisms of the former have carried an extinction of faith in the gospel narratives, which may be partially resuscitated by the work of the latter. But under what hallucination of mind the translator must be laboring, that he should "*hope*" that Hase's Life of Jesus "may be useful as a manual for Theological students, Bible-classes, and *perhaps for the more advanced scholars in Sunday-schools*," we cannot venture to say.

Hase is distinguished as one of the most compact and condensed of the German Theological writers. Alluding in his preface to the "immense diffuseness of Theological writings," he "takes some slight credit for having labored in an opposite direction." All readers of his works, whether of this "Life," his "Church History," his "Dogmatik," or his "Hutterus Redivivus," can bear witness to the justness of his claim. His complete mastery of the learning of whatever subject he discusses, is also unquestionable.

The gospels are treated in this "Life" with a mingled freedom and reverence, possible only for one who, while he has drunk deep of German Rationalism, looks also devoutly upon the character and person of

* *The Puritans; or, the Church, Court, and Parliament of England during the Reigns of Edward VI and Queen Elizabeth.* By SAMUEL HOPKINS. In three volumes. Vol. ii. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

† *Life of Jesus: a Manual for Academic Study.* By DR. CARL HASE, Professor of Theology in the University of Jena. Translated from the German of the third and fourth improved editions, by JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE. Boston: Walker, Wise & Company. 1860.

Christ. Hase tells us, in one of his prefaces, that "the fundamental thought of this book is this, that a divine principle revealed itself in Jesus, but in a purely human form." And surely the "human element" is kept conspicuous enough in all his criticisms. We need not tell our readers that he makes strange work with the Evangelists, setting down one thing as to be explained by the "spirit of that age," another as a "mistake" on the part of the writer, another as a "legend," another still as a "traditional embellishment," and yet another as "a figurative mode of speech, grown into an apocryphal miracle." True, the author defends, and with great acuteness, many of the miracles against the mythical theory, and makes a noble stand in defence of the Resurrection, the truth of which, he affirms, "stands immovably upon the testimony, and, we may even say, upon the very existence of the Apostolic Church itself." But we doubt if the benefit to any class of minds in this country, from the reading of this "Life of Jesus," will compensate for the mischief that will flow to many uninstructed and unstable souls from its perusal.

RAWLINSON'S HISTORICAL EVIDENCES.*—Mr. Rawlinson's translation of Herodotus, with the ample notes and excursions accompanying it, was a sufficient guaranty of ability and fidelity in his discussion of the credibility of the Biblical Records. His defence of both Testaments, particularly of the Pentateuch and the Book of Daniel, must give great satisfaction, as it demolishes the objections most loudly vaunted against them.

Mr. Rawlinson deals in no generalities, but is always precise in his statements. The well-read student of the Christian Evidences will, of course, find portions of both the Lectures and the notes with which he is already familiar; but there are other portions, which will prove instructive to the best-read scholars. The volume, though really less able than that of Mr. Mansel, will attract a vastly larger class of readers. The attractiveness of the volume has been greatly enhanced by Mr. Arnold's translation of the notes, which were chiefly in Greek. We shall endeavor to furnish an extended review of these Lectures in a subsequent number.

THE GOSPEL IN BURMAH.†—Mrs. Wylie has not only compiled from reliable published documents, but has enlivened and enriched her narrative by information derived from personal observation, and from intimate intercourse with some of the missionaries, as well as from familiar

* *The Historical Evidences of the Truth of the Scripture Records, stated anew, with special reference to the doubts and discoveries of modern times. In Eight Lectures, delivered in the Oxford University Pulpit, in the year 1859, on the Bampton Foundation. By GEORGE RAWLINSON, M. A., late Fellow and Tutor of Exeter College, editor of the "History of Herodotus," etc. From the London edition, with the Notes translated by Rev. A. N. ARNOLD. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. New-York: Sheldon & Company. Cincinnati: Geo. S. Blanchard. 1860.*

† *The Gospel in Burmah; the story of its introduction and marvellous progress among the Burmese and Karens. By MRS. MACLEOD WYLIE. New-York: Sheldon & Company. 1860.*

acquaintance with the scenes and subjects of their labors. Herself a member of the Free Church of Scotland, she is an impartial judge of the trials and successes she has to record. A full and connected account of the Burman mission up to 1849, may be found in "Gammell's History of American Baptist Missions." Mrs. Wylie's narrative reaches very nearly to the present date. We know of no more powerful argument for any Christian mission, than that furnished by the simple story of the lives and labors of its missionaries. We wish that multitudes who possess but vague and fragmentary knowledge of the Burman and Karen missions, would, with map in hand, go through this instructive narrative by Mrs. Wylie.

MEMOIR OF JUDSON, BY DR. WAYLAND.*—Messrs. Sheldon & Company have issued this excellent memoir in one compact, neat volume, and so have brought its price within the reach of many who have hitherto been deterred from purchasing it. Every Christian minister, and especially every Baptist minister, of this day, should be familiar with the deeds and events connected with the life of Judson.

CLAIBORNE'S LIFE AND TIMES OF GENERAL DALE,† is a brief and rapid sketch, partly autobiographical, of one who was a prominent and daring actor in the conflicts with the Indians on the southern and south-western frontiers, and an active participator in the last war with England. The style of the book is quite in keeping with the pioneer character portrayed.

TRAVELS.

CAPT. MCCLINTOCK'S NARRATIVE.‡—The sterile and desolate regions lying under the Northern Aurora, have been fruitful of stirring incident and generous heroism; and the voyages undertaken for the relief of Franklin, though unavailing for the benefit of the lost company, profitless to commercial enterprise, and nearly fruitless of scientific results, have inured to the titular elevation of the commanders, the interest of readers, and the gain of publishers. The story of the voyage of the steam yacht "Fox," is second to none of the narratives which have preceded it. It owes its interest rather to the essential character of the incidents recorded, than to any special skill on the part of the narrator. The gallant commander does not make the most of his story. Had it been the fortune of Kane to discover the sad memorial of the fate of Franklin, he would have recorded the event in words that would have

* *A Memoir of the Life and Labors of the Rev. Adoniram Judson, D. D.* By FRANCIS WAYLAND, President of Brown University. In two volumes (bound in one). New-York: Sheldon & Company. 1860.

† *Life and Times of General Sam. Dale, the Mississippi Partisan.* By J. F. H. CLAIBORNE. Illustrated by John McLean. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

‡ *A Narrative of the Discovery of the Fate of Sir John Franklin and his Companions.* By Captain MCCLINTOCK, R. N., LL. D. With Maps and Illustrations. Boston: Ticknor and Fields. 1860.

dimmed the reader's eye and thrilled his pulses with sympathy. But the captain tells his story with a wonderful calmness. Nor do we hear the dismal sounds of the Arctic winter, nor see the slowly dawning day succeed the interminable night, as when we read the graphic pages of our own lamented and adventurous voyager. But not every Troy has its Homer, nor every Arctic expedition its Kane. Yet McClintock's narrative, though not imaginative, is exceedingly interesting, all the more so, perhaps, because it may be hoped that the "final" expedition will long continue to be called by that title.

LIFE IN SPAIN.*—Modern Spain, to the majority of book-readers, is almost as much a "terra incognita" as Central Africa. Not only the land itself, but the books describing it, are enveloped in a sort of golden haze, which renders all outlines as indistinct as those of a vanishing cloud, and leaves to us only the confused notion that the land of Dons is the land of black art, orange groves, proverbs, cigars, magic, beards, veils, liquorice, lemons, guitars, stillettos, crucifixes, coffee, sherry, siestas, Zineali, and romance. Writers about Spain, whether sojourners or travellers, colporteurs or pleasure-seekers, seem to drink in with the air the exaggerating spirit of the old chroniclers, and the reader is constantly perplexed whether to apply his wonder to the curious old place, or to the pleasant effrontery of his author. The writer of the book before us, declares "he tried on the spot for local color and vividness, where vividness could be given without hazarding truth." The result is a series of lively pictures made up of all sorts of figures, careless in style, but amusing in their minuteness, and, if we may believe the author, faithful to truth.

SWITZERLAND.†—We never tire of letters from Switzerland. There is a charm in the subject so great as to invest the letters of even the less intelligent class of tourists with interest, and to make doubly delightful such as are the result of an observing eye, a cultivated taste, and a practised pen. These letters, originally addressed by Dr. Prime to the New-York Observer, are written in the familiar tone and genial style which one would expect from an editor to his own paper. The author's skill to observe and to note with grace the little incidents of travel, and minor features of scenery, as well as the grander and more accustomed objects of description, contribute much to the freshness and cheerfulness of the volume. He takes it for granted that his readers will be more interested in what he sees and feels, than in any philosophical or moral reflections which he can make; but a thoughtful, reverent spirit is everywhere apparent, and his descriptions, whether of scenery or of men and manners, are often suggestive as well as sprightly. The book is printed in good type, on thick paper, and is adorned with several well-executed illustrations.

* *Life in Spain: Past and Present.* By WALTER THORNBURY. With Illustrations. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

† *Letters from Switzerland.* By GEORGE IRENEUS PRIME, author of "*Travels in Europe and the East*," etc., etc. New-York: Sheldon & Company. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

HIGHWAYS OF TRAVEL,* is an account of a "four months' journey over the beaten track of pleasure travellers in Europe." It is printed on delicately tinted paper, with excellent type, and is furnished with a full index. It is the product of a lady's minute observation, quick apprehension, thorough enjoyment, and ready power of description. The quiet pleasantry and practical good sense of the writing, makes it an instructive and entertaining record of European travel.

BELLES-LETTRES.

THE WHITE HILLS.†—We receive every quarter one or two books whose beauty of costume at once commands our admiration. They are the artistic books of the quarter; books beautiful to lie on the parlor table, and still more delightful to take up for half an hour's reading; books that accord with cheerful fires and velvet arm-chairs, or are suggestive of still, slumberous summer afternoons. Such a book is the "White Hills," with its softly tinted paper, its clear typography, its liberal margins, its firm and beautiful binding, its map of the mountains, and its sixty fine illustrations of scenery among the famous New-Hampshire hills. And these external appointments are quite in harmony with the substance of the book. The style of the popular lecturer and author is too well known to need characterization. His artist's eye, quick to discern fine differences, to seize subtle effects, and to choose right combinations, along with his affluence of language and of imagery, saves his descriptions from any tiresomeness of repetition. A pleasant feature of the book is its poetic quotations, taken chiefly, though not exclusively, from home-born poets, and forming the first collection of lyrics for the mountains ever made. Lovers of the hills will find these selections delightful interpreters of their own feelings, as well as of the scenery which they admire. Those who visit the White Mountains, will double their enjoyment by availing themselves of the aid and sympathy of this accomplished and enthusiastic tourist; while those who are debarred that pleasure, will find it the next best thing to enjoy his vivid, Claude-like pictures at home.

WOLFE OF THE KNOLL.‡—Many who read this poem, will be pleasantly reminded of the charming story by Biernatzki, which was translated from the German several years ago, by Mrs. Marsh. The scene of the poem, like that of the tale, is laid in part on a hallig, or tide-washed island, near the coast of the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein, but in part, also, under the tropical skies of Tunis. The strong and singular contrasts afforded by the life and scenery of these two locali-

* *Highways of Travel; or, a Summer in Europe.* By MARGARET J. M. SWEAT, author of "*Ethel's Love Life.*" Boston: Walker, Wise & Company. 1859.

† *The White Hills; their Legends, Landscape, and Poetry.* By THOMAS STARR KING. With Sixty Illustrations, engraved by Andrew, from drawings by Wheelock. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Company. 1860.

‡ *Wolfe of the Knoll, and other Poems.* By MRS. GEORGE P. MARSH. New-York: Charles Scribner. 1860.

ties, are presented by Mrs. Marsh with artistic skill, in pictures of vivid color, and of delicate, though never overwrought, finish. Her numbers flow freely and musically, though now and then slightly obstructed in their movement. Her verse contains few useless words—very little of mere “filling;” adjectives are employed because they have a significance, and not merely to ease the motion of the poem. The versification is varied, and suits the changes of scene and sentiment. It delays over the “pictured scroll,” rolled out while the weary caravan sleeps, it dashes along in the chase of the ostrich, it lingers over the touching story of the island church-builders, and springs in sympathy with the leaping waves and the joyful return of the long lost son. The introduction of two charming ballads, “The Tomb of the Christian Princess,” and “The Midsummer Twilight,” adds grace to the poem. Though never burdened, the poem is fraught with information relative to the customs, legends, and geographical features of the peculiar regions described, and, with its foot-notes and appendix, has a value aside from its excellence as a work of art. The curious old hymn, indited by Huldreich Zwingli when he was smitten by the pestilence, is finely translated from the originals, which is given, into old English of the sixteenth century. The tender beauty of the last poem will touch many hearts. We trust that “some future day” may give the public other fruits as rich and mellow as this, which has ripened in the darkened room of the invalid.

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE INFLUENCE OF HEALTH AND DISEASE ON RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.*—The connection of religious experience with the state of the bodily health, has been, we suspect, a subject of serious and perplexing inquiry to multitudes of reflecting and intelligent Christians. The subtle bond of union between the body and the soul escapes our scrutiny, but we know that, by mutual sympathy, the physical and spiritual parts of our nature are constantly acting and reacting on each other. It is of prime importance, therefore, to the Christian pastor and spiritual adviser, that he be familiar with those spiritual maladies and their symptoms, which are ascribable to physical rather than to moral causes, and which call for bodily, rather than spiritual, remedies. Oftentimes emotions and spiritual distempers that resist all moral restoratives, yield readily to a simple physical treatment.

But our language is exceedingly meagre in its discussion of questions pertaining to this subject; a deficiency which it was the purpose of Dr. Jones to supply by the preparation of his book. “The author makes no pretension to originality or deep thinking, nor to such an acquaintance with psychology, or physical (?) science, as a more thorough and enlightened discussion of the subject requires.” The book justifies this

* *Man, Moral and Physical; or, the Influence of Health and Disease on Religious Experience.* By the Rev. JOSEPH H. JONES, D. D., Pastor of the Sixth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1860.

caution to the reader. Dr. Jones has made a valuable collection of facts, and furnished a great many useful hints; but a scientific and exhaustive treatment of his theme must remain for another hand. Meanwhile, we commend his volume to the attention of all judicious spiritual guides.

HEALTH AND DISEASE.*—Dr. Hall has become a sort of public oracle on hygienic questions. The newspapers are constantly circulating some useful hint, taken from his "Journal of Health." This volume, which has reached a third edition, aims to inculcate just ideas of health and disease, and of the methods of preventing the one and curing the other, and also more rational notions than generally prevail of the design and proper use of medicines. The book is full of good sense and useful hints.

MR. MANSEL'S EXAMINATION OF MR. MAURICE'S STRICTURES.†—Mr. Maurice's book entitled "What is Revelation?" in reply to Mr. Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thoughts," was, in our judgment, a violation of christian courtesy, besides being, as an intellectual performance, a great discredit to its author. The examination of his strictures by Mansel does not seem to us as altogether felicitous, or such as would have best comported with his reputation and position. The provocation was great, we know, but it sounds harsh to hear Mr. Maurice charged with making "an accusation which is utterly void of truth, and which he must have known to be void of truth at the moment he wrote it down." Mr. Mansel adds, "I use these last words deliberately, regretting the necessity of uttering them, but with the fullest conviction that no other explanation is possible." He contributes little or nothing of value in support of the positions in his Bampton Lectures.

WOMAN'S RIGHT TO LABOR.—‡Literary culture, patient industry, and an earnest spirit, have been brought to the preparation of this slight volume. It comprises one of four courses of lectures, three of which were delivered in the city of Boston, in the winters of 1858 and 1859. The author has written because she feels; and she has written sensibly, gracefully, and effectively, to the time and to the point. Her positions are strengthened by reliable statistics and well authenticated illustrations. One point on which she touches we deem of much significance in the "woman problem"—the need of such a change in public opinion as shall make it *respectable* for women to work.

* *Health and Disease; a Book for the People.* By Dr. W. W. HALL, author of "Bronchitis and Kindred Diseases," of "Consumption," and editor of "Hall's Journal of Health." Third edition. New-York: W. W. Hall, 42 Irving Place. London: Trubner & Co. 1860.

† *An Examination of the Rev. F. D. Maurice's Strictures on the Bampton Lectures of 1858.* By the Lecturer. London: John Murray. 1859.

‡ *Woman's Right to Labor; or, Low Wages and Hard Work: in three lectures, delivered in Boston, Nov. 1859.* By CAROLINE H. DALL. Boston: Walker, Wise & Company. 1860.

We should have been glad if the author had found occasion more distinctly to recognize in Christianity, whose principles must underlie all permanent social reform, the power by which woman has been lifted to her present place in the Christian world, and by which alone she can hope to attain to a better estate or to a higher development. For an enlightened woman not to be grateful to Christianity and to its blessed Author, is simply monstrous. We say this, not in reflection on Mrs. Dall, who, though evidently a personal friend, and, we fear, a disciple of Theo. Parker, has written nothing irreverent, or in any way offensive to the Christian reader.

SELF-HELP.*—As the body, so the mind requires a variety of pabulum. This volume, though not designed to exercise or nourish the mind by the revelation of any hitherto unrecognized truth in philosophy, yet serves a most useful purpose in arousing dormant aspirations, and in opening to man a capacity for an indefinite degree of elevation and attainment. "Self-Help" holds the same office among books that the "Acts" does in the New Testament, not establishing any novel doctrine, but showing, by "lively experiment," what achievements are possible to the man of earnest purpose and undying determination. "Character is a perfectly educated will," says Novalis. And this truth is enforced by the whole tenor of this volume.

It is a healthful, useful, animating book, one of those "words of the wise" which "are as goads." We have loaned our copy to a young man of good natural powers and strong purposes, who is just now debating the question whether, in the face of many obstacles, he shall enter on a course of self-development and thorough mental culture. We hope for a good report from it.

We have been surprised to see how few illustrations of his subject the author has drawn from American biography; surely no country is richer than our own in instances of "Self-Help." And was it because no women had given illustrations of character and conduct, or had overcome obstacles and made themselves glorious, that here is no record of female achievement?

THE AMERICAN ALMANAC, FOR 1860.†—Those who know the value of this almanac, will, of course, have provided themselves with it at the beginning of the year; and those who do not, need simply to be told that the same amount of information, within the same number of pages, is not to be found elsewhere. Statistics of the federal and state governments, obituaries, American and foreign, notable events in the last year, besides multitudinous information of various kinds, are all here. It also contains instructive papers on Donati's comet of 1858; the Laws of Storms; and the Aurora Borealis and Aurora Australis.

* *Self-Help; with Illustrations of Character and Conduct.* By SAMUEL SMILES. Author of "*The Life of George Stephenson.*" Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1860.

The same Book. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

† *The American Almanac, and Repository of Useful Knowledge, for the year 1860.* Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Company.

THE PSALMIST, WITH MUSIC.*—To the many thousands of worshippers in our Baptist churches, in whose minds the Psalmist, by association with the holier thoughts and aspirations of their lives, has become in some sort sacred, this edition, with music adapted to congregational singing, will be doubly dear. The music, we have every reason to believe, has been selected with discriminating taste by Mr. B. F. Edwards, a gentleman whose reputation as a musician is a sufficient guaranty of his fitness for the task. Long use has attached us to the Psalmist, notwithstanding certain annoying defects, and we rejoice at its prospect of a new "lease of life" and usefulness among our churches.

"CONGREGATIONAL SINGING."†—A premium tract on this subject, by Rev J. R. Scott, of Yonkers, N. Y., presents, within a narrow compass, some of the justest views on this subject that we have yet seen.

LUCY CROFTON,‡ by Mrs. Oliphant, is a well-told English story, whose moral does not appear. Its delineations of character are natural, and its issue true to Providence, which does not, after the fashion of novels, balance its accounts at the time of marriage.

THE COLLEGIATE SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES, is an inaugural address delivered July 27, 1859, by J. R. Loomis, LL. D., President of the University at Lewisburg. Dr. Loomis ably defends the collegiate system of this country, as specially fitted to our social and political organization, and preëminently adapted to give homogeneous development to the American people.

THE MISSION OF BAPTISTS, a lecture delivered before the Philadelphia Baptist Institute, by Rev. W. Randolph, pastor of the Baptist Church, Germantown, Philadelphia, was published by request [Smith, English & Co., 1860], and is well worth reading.

JUVENILE.

ABBOTT'S FLORENCE STORIES.§—Mr. Abbott will suffer no material damage from the expert witticisms of a sharp-tongued critic (it must be hoped in charity that he is not a father), which enlivened a late number of one of our most widely circulated literary magazines. By whatever cause

* *The Psalmist, with Music ; a Manual for the service of Sacred Song in Baptist Congregations and Choirs, the tunes being adapted to the collection of hymns compiled by Baron Stow and S. F. Smith, and to the Supplemental Appendix by Richard Fuller and J. B. Jeter. Collated by B. F. EDMANDS, Conductor of Music at Baldwin Place Church, Boston. Boston : Gould & Lincoln. 1860.*

† *A Premium Tract on Congregational Singing. By Rev. J. R. SCOTT, Yonkers, N. Y. New-York : Horace Waters.*

‡ *Lucy Crofton. By the author of "Margaret Maitland," "The Days of my Life," "The Laird of Norlaw," etc., etc. New-York : Harper & Brothers. 1860.*

§ *The Florence Stories. By JACOB ABBOTT. Grimkie. New-York : Sheldon & Company.*

excited, an uncomfortable feeling of some kind, it cannot be doubted, was eased by the satisfactory blister spread for Mr. Abbott's benefit. But that author's name has been too long a household word, and is associated with too many of the innocent pleasures of home life, to be blotted, much less erased, by the stroke of a critic's pen. Mr. Abbott is the father of a *style* of children's literature, a style, of course, liable to abuse, as may be seen in most of its imitations, and occasionally, perhaps, in Mr. Abbott's own writing, but a style the merit of which is sufficiently attested by its long and undiminished popularity. Simplicity is neither silliness nor weakness, and to be instructive is not necessarily to be dry or stilted. Mr. Abbott's simplicity is that absolute truth to nature in childhood's life and within a child's range of observation, which makes the most trivial circumstances interesting; and his rule is to be instructive only so far as to satisfy a curiosity which has first been created. The "little sister" fed on Scott's and Cooper's novels, or on the "Arabian Nights," will doubtless find little entertainment in Abbott's stories. It is an old hygienic rule, that high seasoning and stimulants leave to children little appetite for healthful fare, but serve mainly to make darkness and delirium frightful, and waking fancies grotesque and unnatural. We do not understand the process by which Mr. Abbott's critic makes good-breeding to mean a lack of spirit, nor the logic which concludes a child to be always deceitful because sometimes quiet. The truth is, honor and self-dependence are the very qualities which Mr. Abbott most delights to develop in his ideal child; and no one can be a stronger advocate of fresh air and exercise, and their necessary concomitants, noise and dirt—though for the display of these last, he unmistakably has a prejudice in favor of certain times and places.

We have thus alluded to the criticism contained in the *Atlantic Monthly*, not only because we believe it to be essentially unjust to Mr. Abbott, but because it belongs to that species of popular twaddle (we know no fitter term), the more mischievous for the modicum of truth mixed with it, by which a good, a Christian child, is stigmatized as a "prig," a "spooney," or a puny sickling, who, "if he lives, you may wish had died." Even our pulpit teachers seem sometimes to forget that the term "Christian," applied to a child, as to a man, means a noble striving after the best development of every power, the rooting out of all selfishness, whether appearing in forms of meanness or of indolence, and that, other things being equal, that child has most of fresh, generous life who is most truly *Christian*. A "star paper" on "Children's Biographies," sent out on its pernicious and wide-reaching errand, months ago, seemed to be written on the assumption that a child could become a Christian, and cultivate the religious faculty, only at the expense of dwarfing every other.

PETER THE GREAT.*—This is another of Mr. Abbott's admirable series of Juvenile Histories.

* *History of Peter the Great.* By JACOB ABBOTT. With Engravings. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860.

LIFE OF LAFAYETTE.*—An excellent little book, for which there was room; written in an attractive style, suited to the capacity of children, and adorned with colored illustrations.

HESTER AND I,† written by Mrs. Wm. C. Richards, is a denominational, but not obtrusively Baptist story, designed to teach youth the lesson conveyed in its second title.

THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE

GERMANY.

THEOLOGY.—The *Studien und Kritiken*, Heft II, 1860, contains the conclusion of Dr. Rothe's elaborate series of articles on the Holy Scripture, treating especially of its inspiration. Dr. Rothe is an able and independent thinker, but strongly rationalistic. Philip Buttmann (son of the distinguished grammarian) furnishes Critical Observations on the Text of the Vatican Codex B. and its value in settling the text of the New Testament. Zyro, Professor of Theology in Bern, has an article in explanation of Matt. xi: 12. The violent breaking in of the "kingdom of heaven" upon the old order of things, he regards as expressed by *βιάζονται*, and the violent ones (*βιασταί*) who seize upon it (*ἀρπάζουσι*) are Christ and his Apostles.

The chief articles of the *Zeitschrift für die gesammte lutherische Theologie und Kirche*, Heft I, 1860, are by Merkel on the Protestant Ecclesiastical Law of the Eighteenth Century; by Rudelbach on the relation of Mich. Baumgarten to the Evangelical Lutheran Church; by Göschel, Historical Accounts regarding several attempts at Union since the Religious Peace at Augsburg. It notices at length, with high commendation, Kurtz's History of the Old Covenant, 2 vols. (translated, also, for Clark's Theological Library).

RECENT THEOLOGICAL WORKS.—New system of all the types of Jesus Christ through the entire Old Testament (*Neues System aller Vorbilder Jesu Christi*), by Ph. Fr. Hiller. New and improved edition, with a biographical preface, by A. Knapp, 608 pp.—The Types of the New Testament Church in the entire Old Testament, by Hiller, 353 pp.

* *Life of Lafayette, for Children.* By E. CECIL. Boston: Crosby, Nichols & Company. 1860.

† *Hester and I; or, Beware of Worldliness.* By MRS. MANNERS, author of "Sedgemoor," "Pleasure and Profit," "At Home and Abroad," etc., etc. New-York: Sheldon & Company. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860.

Both the above works are warmly commended.—The Chronology of the Life of Jesus (*Zeitfolge im Leben Jesu*) scientifically unfolded, by R. Grassmann, 52 pp.—The Theology of the “formula concordiæ” (*Die Theologie der Concordienformeln*), historically and doctrinally developed and illustrated, by Dr. Frank, Extr. Professor of Theology in Erlangen, I Theil, 240 pp.—Manual of the History of Doctrines (*Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*), by Dr. H. Schmid, Theological Professor in Erlangen, 140 pp.—Practical Theology (*Die praktische Theologie*), by Dr. Fr. Ehrenfeuchter, I Abth., 476 pp.—The Spiritual Kosmos (*Der geistige Kosmos*), a comprehensive survey of the principles and effects of Redemption, by Dr. K. Sederholm.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE AND EXEGESIS.—Winer’s *Biblisches Realwörterbuch*, a manual for students, preachers, &c., 2 vols., third enlarged edition.—Winer’s Pauli ad Galatas Epistola, with Latin version, and a full commentary; fourth edition, enlarged and revised, since the death of the author, from his notes, 178 pp.—The Acts (*Apostelgesch.*), interpreted for ministers and the church, translated from the Dutch of J. Da Costa by Reifert, 2 vols.—Dr. K. Wieseler on Galatians, with special reference to the doctrines and history of Paul, 622 pp.—The Song of Solomon, translated, explained, and exhibited in its artistic and poetic form, by Weissbach, 288 pp. “One of the best recent works on the Canticles.” Interpretatio Pauli Epistolæ ad Romanos, by W. A. Van Hengel, Fasc. VI, pp. 581–856.—History of Judaism and its Sects (*Gesch. des Judenthums*), by Dr. J. M. Jost, 3 vols.—Contributions to the understanding of Scripture (*Beiträge zum Verständnisse der heil. Schrift*, &c.), or the Origin of the New Testament Writings, by J. W. Melcher, Berlin, 316 pp.

PATRISTICS.—Cypriani, libri ad Donatum, de dominica oratione, de Mortalitate, &c. Ed. J. G. Krabinger, Tüb., 320 pp.—Eusebii Hist. Eccles., Greek text, revised, with Latin translation, &c., by Hg. Lämmer, Fasc. I.—History of the Philosophy of the Patristic age (*Gesch. der Phil. der patristischen Zeit*), by Dr. Albert Stöckel, 2d vol. of the “Speculative Doctrine of Man” (Roman Catholic).

PHILOSOPHY.—The *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, Heft IV, 1859, contains articles on the fundamental forms of thought in their relation to the original forms of being, by Adolf Zeising; on the relation of art to morality, and its exhibition in the construction of a philosophical system. It has Reviews of Ueberweg’s System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines, and Rosenkrantz’s Science of the Logical Idea; of Frohschammer’s Introduction to Philosophy, and Outline of Metaphysics; on the interest taken in Philosophy in Germany and France; of Matter’s Philosophy of Religion, and Emile Saisset’s Essay on Religious Philosophy. It adds a list of recent philosophical works and articles on philosophy in the periodicals, both German and foreign.—Heft I, 1860, contains a third article on The limits of the mechanical principle of physical inquiry, by Weisse; art. 2 of Zeising on the fundamental forms of thought, &c.—sub-

ject, Quality and Substance; on Socrates as a Philosopher, by Mehring; Notes on Spinoza, by Ed. Böhmer; and one or two brief Reviews.

Science of the Logical Idea (*Wissenschaft der logischen Idee*), by Karl Rosenkrantz (Hegelian Professor of Philosophy at Königsberg), 2 vols. Vol. i, Metaphysics; vol. ii, Logic and the Doctrine of Ideas.—System of Logic, and History of Logical Doctrines (*System der Logik, &c.*), by Dr. Fr. Ueberweg, Dr. and teacher of Philosophy at Bonn (a disciple of Schleiermacher).—Introduction to Philosophy, and Outline of Metaphysics (*Einleitung in die Phil., &c.*), by Dr. J. Frohschammer, Professor in the University of Munich.—Philosophy of Religion (*Die Religionsphilosophie*), by E. F. Apelt, Leipsic, 218 pp.—Æsthetics (*Ästhetik*). The idea of the beautiful, and its realization through Nature, Spirit, and Art, 2 parts, by Moritz Carriere (thorough and able).—History and System of Legal and Political Philosophy (*Gesch. und System der Rechts- und Staatsphil.*), by Prof. Dr. K. Hildenbrand, vol. i, Classical Antiquity, Leipsic, 662 pp.—The Speculative System since Kant, and the Philosophical Problem of the Present (*Speculative System seit Kant, &c.*), by C. H. Kirchner, Liepsic, 109 pp.—The Philosophy of the Greeks in its historical development, by G. Zeller, 2 vols., second edition, is learned and able.

CLASSICAL LITERATURE AND PHILOLOGY.—Pott's Etymological Inquiries, in the Indo-Germanic languages. A new and thoroughly re-wrought edition. Vol. 1, Prepositions, 859 pp.—Rost on the derivation, meaning and use of *οὐ*. 16 pp.—Celsus de Medicina, with critical notes, &c., by C. Daremberg. 407 pp.—Select Speeches of Lysias, by Rauchenstein. 3d enlarged edition. 249 pp. (An excellent edition.)—Grundzüge der griech. Lautlehre, by W. Christ. 308 pp.

The Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Heft 1, 1860, contains articles on the Constitution of Greek Villages, as aiding to the development of town-life in Antiquity; on Bacchus in the Works of Horace; Homeric Excursuses; on the materials employed in their works by the Greek artists; and Contributions to the Criticism of the Scholiasts on Virgil.

HISTORY, LITERATURE, &c.—History of the Provinces of Livonia, Esthonia, and Courland, (*Gesch. der Ostseeprovinzen Liv. Esth. und Kurland*), from the earliest time to the loss of their independence, by Otto von Rutenberg. (A valuable local history.)—History of German Nationality, (*Gesch. der deutsch. Nationalität*), by Dr. W. Wachsmuth. 435 pp.—Greenland, geographical and statistical, (*Grönland geogr. und statist. beschrieben*), by Etzel. 669 pp.—Frederick the Great and Catharine Second, by Schlözer. 278 pp. (A valuable monograph.)—Outlines of Ethnography, (*Grundlinien der Ethnog.*), by Dr. Max Pertz. 477 pp.

FRANCE.

The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge has secured a new French translation of the Scriptures, recently published in quarto. We shall give an account of it hereafter.—H. d'Anselm; the Pagan World, or Universal Mythology as corruption of the truths of Primitive tradition, the Pentateuch, and the Gospel. Vol. 2, Cosmogony & Theogony.

History of Religious Liberty in France, (*Hist. de la liberté religieuse en France*), and of its founders, by J. M. Dargaud. Vols. 3 and 4.—History of the Port Royal, by C. A. Sainte Beuve, completed in 5 vols.—History of Egypt, from its origin to our day, with lithographical plates and maps, by H. Brugsch. 4to, 1 vol. Egypt under the Native Kings.—Contemporary Portraits, (*Portraits Contem.*) Lamartine, Dumas, &c., by Jac. Reynaud.

History of Philosophy in France, (*Hist. de la Phil. en France*), by M. Gatién-Arnould. Vol. 1, Gaulic Period.—History of Philosophical Doctrines in Italy at the present day, (*Hist. des Doctrines Phil. dans l'Italie contemporaine*), by Marc. Debrit.—Facts of the Human Mind, (*Faits de l'esprit humain*), translated from the Portuguese of Magalhaens, by M. P. Chanselle.—Miscellanies of Jewish and Arabian Philosophy, (*Mélanges de Phil. Juive et Arabe*), by S. Munk. 2 Livr.—Essays on the Literature of Law by H. Thiercelin.—Literary Characters and Portraits of the 16th Century, (*Caractères et Portraits littéraires du XVI Siècle*), by L. Feugère. 2 vols.

ENGLAND.

We have barely space to mention the titles of a few works that have recently appeared. The Veracity of the Book of Genesis, an 8vo., is from the pen of Rev. Wm. H. Hoare, Fellow of St. John's, Cambridge.—A volume from Prof. Owen, illustrated, is entitled Palæontology, or a Systematic Summary of Extinct Animals, and their Geological Relations.—Scotland in the Middle Ages: Sketches of Early Scotch History and Social Progress, is from Prof. Innes, of the University of Edinburg.—A volume of Memoirs, Letters and Speeches of Anthony Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftsbury, and Lord Chancellor, has been prepared from original papers, by W. D. Christie.—Lord Brougham has collected and published his Scientific Tracts in a single 8vo. volume, entitled, Tracts Mathematical and Physical.—Lord Macaulay's Biographical contributions to the Encyclopedia Britannica, on Atterbury, Goldsmith, Bunyan, Samuel Johnson, and Wm. Pitt, with Explanatory Notes, and Extracts from his Letters and Speeches, make a volume, edited by Adam Black, M. P. for Edinburg. Mr. Black, in his preface, states that these contributions to the Encyclopedia were made with the express stipulation "that remuneration should not be so much as mentioned." It will be universally regretted that only a part of the historian's fifth volume was in such state at his death as to admit of its publication, and an early appearance of this is not to be expected.